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CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AFTER THE EIGHTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Every era has symbols of greed and wretched excess, and the past
decade brought forth its exemplars from the world of corporate finance.
Whether one chooses to focus on the individual, such as Michael
Milken, the investment bank, such as Drexel Burnham Lambert, or the
financial vehicle, the junk bond, all have acquired the type of pejorative
meaning that has been ascribed to earlier symbols of alleged financial
chicanery: the robber barons of the nineteenth century or the great trusts
of the early twentieth century. Many of the alleged excesses of the
1980s revolved around the boom in corporate mergers and acquisitions,
particularly the tactics developed for hostile takeovers and the defenses
erected by management to ward off the threat of unwanted offers.' Al-
though the pace of corporate transactions, both friendly and hostile, has
slowed considerably, it is likely that this is only a temporary lull rather
than an end to the process of corporate restructuring.2
The battle for corporate control has had an enormous impact on
every segment of society, bringing both great wealth to shareholders and
severe disruptions3 to management, investors, and the broader communi-
1. However, deceit and fraud in the financial markets, certainly did not end
with the 1980s as the collapse of the fraud-ridden Bank of Credit & Commerce Inter-
national (BCCI) and the Salomon Brothers government bond bidding scandal demon-
strate. See Bacon & Salwen, Summer of Financial Scandals Raises Questions About
the Ability of Regulators to Police Markets, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1991, at A10, col.
1.
2. See Flom, The Future of Takeovers-A Personal View, 11 Bus. LAW. UP-
DATE 1, 10 (July/Aug. 1991) (after a brief lull, takeover activity will again increase,
lead by companies with access to funds); Lipton & Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
187, 188 (1991) [hereinafter Quinquennial Election] (present lull in takeovers allows
time to consider issues of corporate governance); How Dealmakers Are Sweating Out
the M&A Transition, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June, 1991, at 19 (combination
of gulf war, recession, and bank industry problems slowing down market for corporate
transactions in 1991); Smith, Hostile Takeovers by Big Companies Fade Into History,
Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1991, at C8, col. 5 (only scattered bursts of hostile takeover
activity in 1991).
3. See Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173 [hereinafter Fun-
damental Corporate Changes] ("Mergers, hostile takeovers, plant closings, and other
fundamental corporate changes cause enormous disruption in the lives of everyone
connected with firms that experience such events"); Faludi, Safeway LBO Yields Vast
Profits but Extracts a Heavy Human Toll, Wall St. J., May 16, 1990, at Al, col. 6
(Pulitzer Prize-winning article describing effects of 1986 leveraged buyout of Safeway
on terminated employees).
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ty of "stakeholders." The 1980s saw a fundamental change in the cor-
porate control market through the expanded use of debt, including junk
bonds, to finance transactions. Outside bidders had access to an enor-
mous pool of capital to fund offers for corporations once thought unas-
sailable. Moreover, the tactics adopted to achieve control changed
through the use of two-tiered tender offers, junk bond financing, and
some corporate "raiders" organized greenmail campaigns designed to
wring profits out of companies through threats of a hostile offer. Corpo-
rations responded to the threat of hostile offers with an enormous array
of increasingly potent defenses, including "shark repellents,"5 poison
pills,6 and lock-ups.7 In certain instances, corporate management even
4. The Business Roundtable, an organization of 200 chief executive officers of
large public corporations, described stakeholders as the corporation's "employees, cus-
tomers,* suppliers, creditors, the communities where the corporation does business, and
society as a whole." Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance
and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAw. 241, 244 (1990) [hereinafter Corporate
Governance]. Stakeholders have firm-specific investments in corporations that may be
appropriated by shareholders through an extraordinary corporate transaction, without
the consent of the stakeholders, that redistributes company's value to its shareholders.
Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 3, at 175.
5. These are generally provisions in the corporate charter that provide for
stringent conditions before approval of a merger, such as super-majority approval of
extraordinary transactions and fair price provisions providing all shareholders with the
same consideration for their shares. The board of directors reserves the right to waive
the restrictive provisions if it approves the transaction, thereby giving the corporation
a negotiating tool. See Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market
for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 393-95 [here-
inafter Agency Cost Model].
6. Poison pills are rights granted to shareholders that vest upon the occurrence
of a specified triggering event, generally the acquisition by an outside party of any-
where from 10% to 25% of the issuer's stock. This right permits the purchase of
additional shares at a'predetermined bargain price. Poison pills generally contain both
"flip-in" rights, allowing the purchase of the target's stock, and "flip-over" rights,
permitting purchase of the acquirer's stock. These rights dilute the bidder's holdings
and significantly increase the cost of completing the transaction. Id. at 398-99; Note,
The Defensive and Offensive Use of "Poison Pills" Within the Business Judgment
Rule, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 127, 134-36 (1989). Bidders generally condition their bid
on management redeeming the rights before completing the transaction, and usually
seek to enjoin operation of the poison pill. See, e.g., City Capital Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering management
to redeem poison pill).
7. Lock-ups are agreements between the target and a bidder giving the bidder
an advantage over other bidders (real or potential) by granting the bidder the right to
purchase a large block of stock or prized assets of the target at a favorable price if a
third party submits a competing bid. See Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements
and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 250-51
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adopted the ultimate defense of a leveraged buyout (LBO), through
which management and investors take a company private in a transac-
tion financed by the company's own assets.8 By 1989, the trend of
corporate restructuring culminated in the largest transaction in financial
history -- with the LBO of RJR Nabisco for $24 billion, a deal punc-
tuated by a frantic bidding war in which each participant furiously
sought to top competing offers with bids built on creative financing.9
The rapid developments in the market for corporate control in the
1980s challenged the courts to resolve disputes involving management's
power to adopt defensive measures using the legal concept of the busi-
ness judgment rule. This rule, however, could not comprehend the types
of conduct being challenged.'0 The Delaware judiciary had developed
the business judgment rule to protect management's ability to act with-
out the threat of second-guessing by the courts. The rule shields direc-
tors from liability for their good faith decisions if the decisions are
based on adequate information (or an attempt to obtain the information)
and are not tainted by self-interest." The Delaware Supreme Court
(1990). Courts have enjoined lock-ups where the transaction unfairly favored one
bidder and effectively halted a competitive auction for the target. See Hanson Trust
PLC v. MLSCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); In re Holly Farms Corp. Share-
holders Litigation, 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989).
8. See Prentice & Langmore, Shareholder Alternatives to Hostile Takeovers:
Restructurings, Auctions and Macmillan II, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 4, 30 (1989)
(management LBO is one of the most extreme forms of defensive restructuring). Man-
agement LBOs present conflict of interest issues, and if the highly leveraged company
goes into bankruptcy, creditors will often allege that the original LBO was a fraudu-
lent conveyance and seek to recover profits from selling shareholders or lenders. See,
e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Schwab & Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 846 (10th. Cir. 1990); Mur-
phy v. Meritor Savings Bank, 126 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); Mellon Bank
v. Metro Communications, Inc., 95 Bankr. 921 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), rev'd 945
F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991).
9. See B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990) (cov-
erage of the events).
10. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
772 (D. Del. 1988) (recapitalization); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (recapitalization and special dividend); Moran v. Household
International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (poison pill); Shamrock Holdings, Inc.
v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP)); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(management LBO); A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (ESOP).
11. See Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty
of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1351, 1358-62 (1989); Bradley & Schipani, The
-Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1992]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LA W JOURNAL
eroded the business judgment rule's protections, however, in a series of
cases decided in the mid-1980s. These cases signaled the Delaware
Supreme Court's unease with the protection offered by the business
judgment rule in corporate control transactions where management's
defensive measures or a coercive bid may taint the decision-making
process. 
2
The judicial trend of subjecting directorial decisions to closer re-
view was part of a larger movement emphasizing the benefits of allow-
ing the market for corporate control to police managerial performance
and, ultimately, replace inefficient managers. In a seminal irticle, Profes-
sor (and now Judge) Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel
argue that management should be passive when presented with an offer
for the firm's shares. 3 The passivity thesis, which relies on the market
1, 23-24 (1989); Note, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in Cor-
porate Control Contests: Is It Time to Make Shareholders' Interests Paramount?, 23
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 919, 927-29 (1990) [hereinafter Business Judgment Rule]. The busi-
ness judgment rule incorporates the director's duty of care and duty of loyalty. If
there is no violation of these duties, the court will not substitute its judgment for the
directors' decision. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985).
12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). In Van Gorkom, the court held that a board of directors was grossly
negligent in its failure to follow proper procedures in determining the adequacy of the
offer price even though the friendly tender offer was a 50% premium over the cur-
rent market price. 488 A.2d at 873; see infra text accompanying notes 89-101 (dis-
cussing Van Gorkom). Van Gorkom has been roundly criticized as "one of the worst
decisions in the history of corporate law." Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and
the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) [hereinafter Trans Union];
see also, Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business
Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1188 (1986) (decision is "misguided").
Shortly after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court considered a board's
defensive self-tender in response to a two-tiered tender offer in Unocal. The target's
self-tender was for all shares except those held by the defendant bidder. 493 A.2d at
951. The Court noted that when a board faces a tender offer, there is an "omnipres-
ent specter" of self-interest requiring an enhanced review of the board's decision. Id
at 954; see infra, text accompanying notes 105-116 (discussing the Unocal decision).
Although the court upheld management's defensive response in Unocal, the decision
indicated that a potentially higher level of scrutiny would be applied to determine
whether defensive measures were commensurate with the threat posed by the offer.
The Delaware Supreme Court extended the rationale of Unocal in Revlon by imposing
a duty on the directors to conduct a fair auction to achieve the best price for share-
holders when a company faces an impending break-up. 506 A.2d at 182; see infra,
text accompanying notes 117-127 (discussing the Revlon decision).
13. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
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as the -primary disciplinary tool for corporations, conflicts with a
managerialist approach that emphasizes the need to protect management,
shareholders, and other corporate constituencies from coercive tender
offers. 14 The differing approaches reflect the deeper philosophical ques-
tion of on whose behalf the corporation exists and operates: shareholders
or a broader group of stakeholders."5
For shareholders, the 1980s proved to be quite lucrative, with gains
variously estimated at $150 to $300 billion. 6 By the end of the 1980s,
however, shareholders had seen the Delaware Supreme Court erode the
scope of their protection from management's defensive tactics aimed at
defeating hostile offers and preventing future unwanted advances. In
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Proper
Role]. Their thesis is that "shareholders' welfare is maximized by an externally im-
posed legal rule severely limiting the ability of managers to resist a tender offer even
if the purpose of resistance is to trigger a bidding contest." l at 1164. The passivity
thesis has been criticized for, among other things, not fully' comprehending
management's potential role as the strongest negotiator on behalf of the shareholders
to seek a higher price from the bidder. See, Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating
Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 53, 55 (1985); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Ten-
der Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982).
14. The leading proponent of the managerialist approach is Martin Lipton, who
argued that boards should have complete discretion to defeat hostile tender offers.
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979). More
recently, Lipton proposed that boards be elected to a five year term, during which
there can be no hostile offers for the company. At the end of each term shareholders
would review the company's performance and then decide whether to reelect the
board. Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2, at 225-26. For an
analysis comparing the theoretical limits of the passivity thesis and managerial ap-
proach, see Brown, In Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57, 85-93
(1990).
15. See, e.g., Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201
[hereinafter Theories of the Corporation]; Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX L. REV. 865 (1990) [herein-
after The Meaning of Corporate Life]. Professors Johnson and Millon have been. the
leading proponents of the position that the focus of corporate law should be expanded
beyond merely protecting the interests of shareholders, and must include a societal fo-
cus promoting the greater good of the communities in which corporations. operate. See
also Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH L. REV. 1862 (1989)
[hereinafter Misreading the Williams Act]; Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About
State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989) [hereinafter Missing the Point].
16. See Coffee, The Uncertain 'Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stock-
holders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 443 n.30 [hereinafter
Takeover Reform] (estimated shareholder gains through corporate restructuring during
the period from 1981-86 are between $167 billion and $244 billion).
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1989, the court held that a board of directors could reject a $200 per
share tender offer to pursue a business combination that, according to
the board, would result in even greater long-term gains for shareholders,
although shareholders could not vote on the proposed transaction or
otherwise reap any immediate benefits. 7 Scarcely two years later, the
company, Time Warner, saw its stock fall to $88 1/8 per share, and
there appeared to be little if any hope for shareholders to achieve the
propounded long-term gains within any reasonable period, if ever.Is
The Time decision signalled the end to heightened scrutiny by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court and may represent the beginning of an era of add-
ed protection for management in which the business judgment rule al-
lows management to pursue strategies without regard to shareholder
interests.
The perception of negative effects on both management and
stakeholders from the wave of takeovers and resultant corporate
restructurings reached beyond the rather narrow confines of financial and
judicial circles to the political arena. Largely in response to pressure for
relief from management of local companies subject to takeover threats
and, to a lesser degree, from employees, local businesses, and communi-
ty groups, a number of states enacted laws in the 1980s to limit
takeovers. 19 Some states went beyond simply enacting legislation to
limit tender offers for local companies by altering the focus of the board
17. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1989).
18. See Landro & Smith, After Stock Debacle, Some Ask: Will Hubris Undo
Time Warner, Wall St. J., July 19, 1991, at Al, col. 6; Landler and Dobrzynski,
Time Warner: As Debt Worries Mount, So Do Doubts About Steve Ross's Strategy,
Bus. WEEK, July 22, 1991, at 70.
19. Among the states that responded to pressure to protect a local corporation
by enacting or amending takeover laws to make a pending offer more difficult to
complete are: Arizona (Greyhound); Florida (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich); Massachu-
setts (Gillette); Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson); Missouri (TWA); New York (CBS); North
Carolina (Burlington Industries); Ohio (Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.); Pennsylvania
(Armstrong World Industries); Washington (Boeing); Wisconsin (G. Heilemann Brewer-
ies). See Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the
Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 346 (1990); Mahle,
Proxy Contests, Agency Costs, and Third Generation Antitakeover Statutes, 15 J.
CORP. L. 721, 730 (1990); Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate Take-
overs: Lessons From State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 561 (1989)
[hereinafter State Competence]; Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the Nation-
al Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467, 469-70 [hereinafter State Anti-Takeover Legisla-
tion]. Connecticut enacted its second generation antitakeover statute at the behest of
Aetna, although there was no pending offer for its shares. See Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (1987).
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of directors. These states permitted (or even required) consideration of
the interests of non-shareholders in determining how to conduct the
business, including responding to takeovers.20 This legislation funda-
mentally changed corporate law's exclusive focus on shareholder wel-
fare. Managers and shareholders previously constituted the closed world
of corporate law, but now the public interest has been injected into the system. 2'
20. Twenty-eight states have enacted provisions in their corporation codes per-
mitting directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders in determining the prop-
er response to an offer. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1991);, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West
Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
415-35 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
pars. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d), §23-1-26-5 (1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108 (West Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-
210 (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN., tit. 13A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. L. ch. 156B, § 65
(Law. Corp. Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1992);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon
1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Supp.
1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35D, 40.1 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
717, 501, 505 (McKinney Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin
Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 515,
1525, 1715, 1716 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1991 Supp.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West' Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-830 (1989). See
Lieberman & Bartell, The Rise in State Anti-Takeover Laws, 23 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 149, 154-55 (1990) (reviewing various state statutes).
21. Some commentators support the expanded focus of corporate law to protect
other constituencies affected by corporate activity. See Johnson, The Meaning of Cor-
porate Life, supra note 15, at 908 (reasserting shareholder primacy is not necessarily
the proper role for corporate law; non-shareholder interests more closely aligned with
management's in takeover context); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note
15, at 261 (corporate law must take into account the public dimension, not just share-
holders rights); Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 16, at 449-50 (state statutes may
be a way to protect contracts of stakeholders); Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point,
supra note 15, at 855 (state statutes are a "new vision of what corporations are"); Cf
Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time:" A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 BUS. LAW.
377, 384 (1991) (Delaware Supreme Court properly recognizes the need to protect
non-shareholder interests in corporation as separate from interests of shareholders).
The expansion of directorial power to consider different constituencies has
been criticized as being both unworkable and a thinly disguised attempt by manage-
ment to protect itself from the market for corporate control by expanding the board's
power to reject offers. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78
GEO. L.J.'71, 141 (1989) (stakeholders should depend on contracts with corporation to
protect interests); Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-takeover Legislation: A Broadminded
New Approach to Corporation Law or "A Race to the Bottom"?, 1990 COLUM. Bus.
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The recent changes in corporate law reconfigure tensions between
management and shareholders by adding new constituencies who demand
attention from corporations.22 The key issue is whether those new con-
stituencies, the stakeholders, will be able to maintain their newfound
prominence, or will fall back into the recesses of corporate law. These
state statutes and judicial rules have vested the power to address both
shareholder and stakeholder concerns in the board of directors, with only
minimal judicial oversight. Given stakeholders' dependence on manage-
ment to champion their interests, it is doubtful that, on their own,
stakeholders will be able to achieve any real voice in corporate decision-
making.
That prediction, however, does not necessarily mean stakeholders
will suffer from management decisions. The 1980s also saw a more
L. REV. 119, 122 [hereinafter Evaluating State "Anti-Takeover" Legislation] (corpora-
tion law cannot adequately address concerns of non-shareholders); Carney, Does Defin-
ing Constituencies Matter, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 422 (1990) [hereinafter Defining
Constituencies] ("altering legal rules to permit consideration of [stakeholder interests]
will have little effect on corporate behavior"); Macey, Fundamental Corporate Chang-
es, supra note 3, at 175 (negative effects on non-shareholders can best be remedied
through contractual side-payments from corporation); Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legis-
lation, supra note 19, at 476 (managerial self-interest sole reason for state statutes).
See infra text accompanying notes 207-10 (discussing effect of non-shareholder stat-
utes on shareholders).
22. In addition to stakeholders, bondholders have sought greater protection from
takeovers. Bondholders are generally considered more conservative investors than
shareholders, yet they saw the value of a number of their holdings eroded by LBOs
that dramatically increased corporate debt while shareholders reaped the benefits from
the transactions. Moreover, a number of those companies ended up in bankruptcy or
teetering on the brink of insolvency, forcing even greater losses on creditors of the
failing corporation. Bondholders have only minimal defenses against management's
defensive actions, such as LBOs or, re-capitalizations entailing assumption of large
amounts of additional debt, because generally, directors do not owe creditors of the
corporation a fiduciary duty. Some commentators have argued that directors should
owe fiduciary duties to bondholders similar to those owed to shareholders. See Mitch-
ell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1165 (1990);
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus LAW. 413 (1986). Never-
theless, courts have rejected such an extension of fiduciary duties, holding that bond-
holders are governed by the terms of the bond indenture. See Hartford Fire Insurance
v. Federated Department Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); see also, Comment, Debenture Holders and the
Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 484 (1988) (fiduciary duty principle cannot be used
to regulate debtor-creditor relationship because of degree of adversity between corpora-
tion and bondholders).
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subtle change in the market as institutional investors acquired a greater
stake in public corporations while individual stock ownership dimin-
ished. These institutional investors, which are primarily public and pri-
vate pension funds, mutual funds, bank trust funds, insurance companies,
and nonprofit endowments, own approximately 44% of the total equities
in the United States.23 More importantly, the assets controlled by insti-
tutions are funds invested by individuals, companies, and communities
who are the stakeholders in corporations. The dynamic facing corpora-
tions is that they cannot separate the interests of equity investors, which
increasingly involve institutional owners, from stakeholder interests be-
cause those two groups significantly overlap. Institutional investors may
seek greater responsiveness to shareholder interests and force manage-
ment to give more than rhetorical attention to corporate stakeholders
because the institutional investors represent both of those interests. The
potential of institutional ownership becoming a dominant influence on
the direction of corporations is at this point more a promise than a reali-
ty. There is, however, an increasing possibility of far reaching changes
in the relationship between management and shareholders, and the con-
sequent change in corporate law.
The slowing pace of the corporate acquisitions market, and fewer
legal challenges to management, allow for some reflections on how
corporate law responded to the issues raised by hostile offers and man-
agement defenses as well as how the law may develop as we enter the
next era of corporate law.' Part II of this article briefly reviews where
corporate law stood before the boom in mergers and acquisitions began
to reach the courts and state legislatures in the 1980s. Part III analyzes
the judicial response, primarily that of the Delaware courts, to
management's defensive measures, and how the Delaware Supreme
Court swung from raising the level of scrutiny of management decisions
to deferring to those decisions, at the cost of abandoning the basic prin-
ciple that shareholder welfare is the fundamental focus of corporate
decisions. Part IV examines the status of stakeholders, and explores
whether corporate law has in fact changed at all in addressing the con-
cerns of those groups beyond giving management a freer reign in run-
ning the corporation now that states permit corporate boards to consider
the interests of non-shareholders. Part V reviews the role institutional
investors may play in representing the interests of shareholders and non-
shareholder constituencies through the proxy process, and how manage-
ment may seek to limit the voting power of institutional shareholders.
23. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK 1991
at 5.
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The Article concludes by advocating that the Delaware Supreme Court
pull back from its decision in Time deferring to management's conclu-
sions about the value of corporate plans. The Article recommends that
the court reassert its role by subjecting defensive measures to a higher
standard of scrutiny requiring that management disclose the basis for its
strategic plans. This would ensure that institutional shareholders have
sufficient information to judge the value of their investment and the
effects of management's plans.
II. CORPORATE LAW BEFORE THE TUMULT
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means concluded that the ten-
sion between shareholders and management in the modern corporation
arises from the separation of ownership and control that insulated man-
agement from the discipline of the market.24 Until the pressure for
change from the mergers and acquisition boom reached the courts and
state legislatures, corporate law operated on the relatively straightforward
relationship between management and shareholders. Management con-
trolled corporate operations, with broad discretion to implement policies
and determine the direction of the corporate enterprise. A legal regime
developed to protect shareholders from the breadth of management's
discretion by creating a series of rules designed to ensure management's
accountability to the shareholders' primary interest: wealth maximization.
The bugaboo of corporate law was the unrestrained manager wasting
corporate assets for personal enrichment with nary a care for the
shareholders' hard earned (yet relatively meager) investment in the
company's stock.25 By enshrining shareholder welfare as the governing
principle, corporate law developed a closed system that did not require
consideration of the interests of other corporate constituencies.
This focus on shareholder welfare has never been free of contro-
versy. In response to the thesis that shareholders are the sole beneficia-
ries of the corporation, Merrick Dodd argued in the 1930s that corpora-
tions had a social, as well as, economic function, and that corporations
,24. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 127-277 (1932).
25. One of the basic assumptions of corporate law has been that a company's
stock is widely held by individuals, each with only an infinitesimal stake in the cor-
poration. Contra Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
523 (1990) (arguing that this assumption was never true and is now obsolete). None-
theless, the assumption does not adequately describe the current situation of large
scale institutional ownership of the stock of most highly capitalized corporations. See
infra notes 299-331 and accompanying text. (discussing effect of institutional owner-
ship on proxy process).
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must serve a greater variety of interests.26 Four decades later, consumer
activists Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman proposed expand-
ing corporate boards to include constituency representatives to make
corporations more responsive to society's interests.27 Beyond the issue
of corporate governance is the question why shareholders should have
primacy over other potential claimants to a corporation's value and
continuing enterprise. There is no a priori legal requirement that a cor-
poration must act to maximize the welfare of its shareholders, even if
such a principle allows for the creation of a systemically consistent set
of rules.2" Moreover, "shareholder welfare" is not a precise term, and
confining shareholder welfare to the immediate maximum market price
for the' company's stock provides no insight into how that goal is to be
accomplished.29
Regardless of how the term is understood, the philosophical issue
of whom the corporation should serve did not interfere with the corpo-
26. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REv.
1145, 1148 (1932). The issue of what it means to be a -corporation" and who that
corporation should serve has been evolving since the middle of the nineteenth century.
The historical development of the theory of the corporation is beyond this Article's
scope. For an excellent review of the development of the theory of the corporation,
see Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old De-
bate, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 806 (1989).
27. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
123-28 (1976).
28. See M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 44-47 (1988)
(discussing concept of "systemic consistency" in rules of law). The economic view of
the corporation as a "nexus" of contracts, or contracting' relationships, views the
shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of the value created by the corporation with
the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decisions. See Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theo-
ry of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). If one accepts the premise that corporate law should reflect
the theory of the firm described by economists, then there is a basis for asserting that
shareholder welfare should be the fundamental organizing principle of corporate law.
See, e.g., Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 3, at 179-80. The
economic analysis of corporations is not a value-neutral approach, and corporate law
can encompass other social and political values. See Hazen, The Corporate Persona,
Contract (And Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C.L. REv. 273, 275 (1991)
[hereinafter Corporate Persona] ("While economic analysis undoubtedly is helpful, it
does not provide the complete answer to all of our problems. Furthermore, economic
analysis, like any paradigm, brings with it its own biases and shortcomings.").
29. See Johnson, The Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 15, at 881 n.66.
Johnson correctly notes that "the belief that corporate managers should be held ac-
countable does not logically lead to the conclusion that maximizing shareholder wealth
is the proper focal point of corporate activity." Id at 882.
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rate law's development around the principle of shareholder welfare. The
means of constraining management's discretion in governing the cor-
poration fell into three broad categories: shareholder voting, the market
for corporate control, and judicial review.3
A. Shareholder Democracy and the Problem of Collective Action
Corporations are sometimes compared to democratic political institu-
tions because each has a constituency with a right to vote for represen-
tatives who determine policy and oversee the operation of the bureau-
cratic entity, be it corporate or governmental. 3' Under state law, share-
holders have a broader franchise than political voters, with the right to
amend the corporate charter and approve major changes in the
company's structure, such as a merger, sale of substantially all assets, or
liquidation, as well as the right to elect the corporation's board of direc-
tors. 2 The corporate charter or state law may specify other areas of
permissible voting. On issues in which there is no right to vote, share-
holders are generally empowered to propose and vote on resolutions
recommending certain actions to the board.3 While state law governs
30. The economic approach views the market as the primary method for re-
straining management opportunism and enforcing accountability. That method of con-
straint does not strictly involve corporate law, except to the extent legal rules inter-
fere with the proper functioning of the market.
31. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1991) (election of board of di-
rectors). The Business Roundtable asserts that comparison of corporate and political
governance is erroneous, and that voting in the two systems "cannot be equated."
Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 244. The Business Roundtable does not,
however, describe the proper understanding of coiporate voting, or why the different
goals of corporate and political entities means that the act of voting .cannot be
"equated" where one of the franchise's essential aims is to choose representatives.
One may suspect that the Business Roundtable's hidden agenda is to dissuade share-
holders from thinking that they can prosper without management's firm (even omni-
scient) guidance.
32. See., e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242 (charter amendments), 251
(merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275 (liquidation) (1991). Certain transactions, such as
mergers, may require a higher percentage of the vote for approval. See, e.g., N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKinney 1986) (two-thirds of outstanding shares).
Shark repellant charter amendments generally require a super-majority vote of out-
standing shares, but those provisions can be waived by the directors. See supra note
4.
33. Shareholders generally vote by means of a proxy, although corporations
must hold annual meetings open to all shareholders where voting rights can be exer-
cised. In some states shareholders can even call a special meeting. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1991) (special meetings may be called by the board of
directors or by persons authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the by-
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the basic requirements for shareholder voting, federal law controls the
content and process of voting by proxy. Any person who solicits proxies
from more than ten shareholders must provide each solicitee a written
proxy statement containing various disclosures pre-approved by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC).34
Prior to the 1960s, proxy contests were the primary means of ef-
fecting changes in corporate control. Their use, however, declined in
favor of the tender offer because of the often insurmountable problems
of mounting a successful proxy contest.3 Thus, while state law gives
shareholders the right to vote, and the SEC proxy rules govern the
content of the proxy and the solicitation process, the important issue is
whether shareholder voting even matters.
The problem shareholders face is coordinating their actions to effec-
tively discipline management when it is more likely that individual
shareholders will be apathetic to a proxy solicitation. The collective
action problem rests on the presumption that widely dispersed sharehold-
laws). Federal regulations permit shareholders to submit proposals that management
must include in the company's proxy statement and place on the company proxy card
to allow shareholders to vote on the proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1991). The
proponent is allowed a 500 word supporting statement in the management proxy. lId
Shareholder proposals must involve a proper subject of shareholder action and may
not relate to the ordinary business operation of the company or conflict with a man-
agement proposal, although the scope of what proposals are prohibited is vague and
subject to changing interpretations by SEC staff. Shareholder proposals were generally
directed toward corporate governance and financial issues prior to the 1970s. Ryan,
Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L.
REV. 97, 116 (1988).
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1988); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1991). The pre-clearance requirement entails filing a preliminary
proxy statement with the SEC at least 10 days before the proposed mailing date to
allow for review and any objections by the SEC staff. 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-6 (1991).
"Solicitation- is broadly defined to include "[t]he furnishing of a form or proxy or
other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to
result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii) (1991). The breadth of the proxy solicitation definition has been
held to include advertisements not specifically targeted to shareholders as well as
furnishing information to the financial press. See Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985); Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners,- 561
F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). All proxies are subject to an antifraud prohibition
barring false or misleading statements or omissions. Shareholders have a private right
of action to sue for antifraud violations. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434
(1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1991).
35. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act,. supra note 15, at
1864 (hostile takeover has replaced proxy fight as the more potent vehicle for ousting
management).
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ers with small holdings in the company will not find it economically
feasible to bear the costs of informing themselves about management's
proposals.36 Shareholders face high agency costs in pursuing the neces-
sary information while reaping only a pro rata benefit equal to their
stock ownership for their expenditure.37 The likely shareholder response
is termed "rational apathy," in which no shareholder undertakes the
burden of becoming informed about management's proposals and will
usually exercise the franchise, if at all, in management's favor.3
Even where shareholders overcome the decision to be rationally
apathetic and decide to oppose management by running an opposition
slate of directors or making a shareholder proposal, they face two addi-
tional problems. First, the shareholders must deal with the "free-rider"
issue. Although each shareholder may gain from opposing management,
if the costs are greater than the individual benefit from the action, it is
more likely that the shareholders will take a free ride on the expendi-
tures of other shareholders by enjoying the benefit without the cost.39
As with the rational apathy problem, the free rider problem stems from
36. The collective action problem in the corporate context is thoroughly re-
viewed in R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983). Professor Rock aptly summarized the
collective action problem facing shareholders: "[W]hile it is better for all if each
contributes, it is better for each not to contribute, with the result that discipline, while
in the collective interest of the shareholders, is not provided." Rock The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 456
(1991) (footnote omitted).
37. The collective action problem arises once a corporation has more than one
shareholder. In a sole shareholder corporation, the owner has the greatest incentive to
gather information to evaluate and discipline management because that owner will
reap the entire benefit, equaling or exceeding the cost of acting. Once ownership
becomes dispersed among a large group of shareholders, the problem of coordination
arises, although there is no clear line past which the collective action problem effec-
tively eliminates all shareholder oversight. See Bebchuk and Kahan, A Framework for
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1080 & n.
30 (1990) (discussing collective action problems from dispersed ownership); Rock,
supra note 36, at 453 (discussing sole shareholder oversight of corporation).
38. See Gordon, Ties That Bind: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem
of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 43-44 (1988) [hereinafter Shareholder
Choice] ("rationally apathetic" shareholders will compliantly return proxy).
39. Rock points out that free riding is a problem only if it interferes with the
collective good either because the group is too small to act collectively without all
the members or the presence of free riders will cause others to engage in free riding.
Rock, supra note 36, at 461. In a corporation owned by widely dispersed shareholders
with small individual holdings, it is the more likely the free rider problem in proxy
contests will arise.
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dispersed owners who lack a sufficient incentive to organize against
management since any gain will be equally shared and may not out-
weigh the costs of acting.
Second, the likelihood of success is minimal for widely dispersed
shareholders, and the costs of undertaking a proxy fight can be high.
Management controls the agenda and the timing of when the proxy
materials will be sent. Moreover, management runs the voting, and
because most proxies are not secret, it can intervene in the middle of
the process to pressure shareholders to vote with management or switch
their votes.40 Finally, failing to vote has the same effect as voting with
management because shareholder proposals generally must pass with the
vote of a majority of the corporation's shares, not a simple majority of
the shares voted. When these problems are combined with the rational
apathy of most shareholders, management usually has an overwhelming
advantage.
The cost of mounting a successful proxy campaign is compounded
by federal securities laws and the right of management to reimbursement
for costs related to the proxy contest.41 In addition to complying with
all the applicable proxy rules, which entail certain costs and delay,
shareholders who coordinate their activity by communicating their posi-
tions or soliciting proxies may be subject to the disclosure requirements
of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related
rules requiring groups beneficially owning more than five percent of a
public company to disclose the names of the group members, its stock
ownership, and its plans with regard to the company.4 2 If the share-
holder group holds ten percent or more of the company's stock, it may
be subject to the short-swing trading prohibitions of Section 16. 4' The
securities laws undoubtedly increase the cost of pursuing a proxy contest
regardless of whether complying with the proxy rules and other secu-
rities laws is considered an onerous burden."
40. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 24, at 560-62
(describing a number of ways in which management can acquire "tainted" votes dur-
ing an election).
41. See Rock, supra note 36, at 461 (compliance with federal proxy regulations
increases costs of organizing shareholders).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 - 240.13d-7 (1991);
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1991). A 13D schedule must be filed within 10 days of
the person or group owning 5% or more of the issuer's stock.
43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988). See Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 545-46 (discussing potential lia-
bility under section 16).
44. See Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
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Greater costs are not problematic if the rules provide shareholders
with a commensurate benefit; unfortunately, they do not. Shareholders
and management must comply with the same proxy rules, but manage-
ment is reimbursed for its proxy costs while challengers' must pay their
own costs, except in the rare circumstance where a new board is elected
and votes to pay the challengers' costs. The board can approve payment
of proxy expenses if the contest involved a question of policy and the
expenses are reasonable. 5 As might be expected, those limitations are
empty, and boards routinely approve management's proxy expenses,
including the costs of proxy solicitation and public relations firms. 6
Shareholders mounting a proxy fight, however, have no affirmative right
to reimbursement. If the contest involves a shareholder proposal that is
not somehow coupled with replacement of the board, then the possibility
of reimbursement rests on management largesse, a doubtful proposition
at best.
The various hurdles facing widely dispersed shareholders desiring to
discipline management through the corporate franchise means that the
proxy process can be largely hollow. Management can rely on a quies-
cent electorate to approve its proposals, which came to include the vari-
ous antitakeover provisions developed in the 1980s. These provisions
provided the context in which the courts and legislatures altered the
focus of corporate law beyond the simple principle of protecting share-
holder welfare.
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 894 (1991) [hereinafter Reinventing the
Outside Director] (regulatory barriers exist, but their importance is exaggerated);
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 533 (shareholders face
many obstacles, and no single rule is a "show stopper", but the cumulative impact is
large). The litigation is an additional hidden cost of a proxy contest expense likely to
result from management's attack on the proxy statement as allegedly violating the
antifraud prohibition and the reporting requirements of section 13(d). The corporation,
however, bears management's legal expenses. See id. at 540 (antifraud proscription is
.serious overkill" when used by management to- challenge shareholder statements in
proxy contest).
45. See Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1944).
46. See Levin, 264 F. Supp. at 802-04 (use of two proxy solicitation firms and
public relations consultant are reasonable expenses); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp.
604, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (use of proxy solicitation firm reasonable expense). Profes-
sors Bebchuk and Kahan found that reimbursement of management's expenses has
rarely been denied if the proxy contest did not involve a policy question or because
the costs were unreasonable. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 37, at 1107-08.
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B. A First Attempt to Corral the Market for Corporate Control: The
Williams Act
In 1960, there were only eight cash tender offers for U.S. corpo-
rations,47 totalling less than $200 million. By the middle of the 1960s,
however, hostile offers emerged as the method of choice for gaining
control of a company and ousting its management. Tender offerors oper-
ated with almost complete freedom in bidding for companies, with no
obligation to disclose the true identity of the bidder or the source of
their funding. The offers were conditioned on quick acceptance to stam-
pede shareholders into accepting.48 Management's response was some-
times equally suspect, including unsubstantiated statements concerning
the offer.49 Although Congress heard horror stories of tender offer
abuses, it also received testimony about shareholder benefits from an
active market for corporate control.50
After considering tender offer reform legislation for three years,
Congress passed the Williams Act5 in 1968 to prevent some of the
abuses observed in tender offers. Congress recognized that tender offers
serve important purposes in disciplining management and improving its
accountability to shareholders. The Williams Act advances two objec-
tives: shareholder protection through disclosure, and regulatory neutrality
between offerors and management.52 The disclosure provision was pat-
terned after the proxy rules, and the SEC was given broad authority
under the Act to promulgate rules to protect against fraudulent and
47. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811, 2812.
48. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS at 2812.
The offeror was not required to give any specified period for shareholders to review
an offer. In hearings on tender offer reform legislation, one Senator referred to the
.rape" of corporations by raiders operating under a "cloak of secrecy." Full Disclo-
sure of Corporate Equity Ownership.in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 [hereinafter Hearings on S. 510] (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
49. Hearings on S. 510, at 204-05.
50. Id at 56-57 (Professor Samuel Hayes); Id. at 115 (Professor Robert
Mundheim).
51. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1967). See Tyson, supra note 19, at 249-52 (extensively reviewing legisla-
tive history of Williams Act).
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manipulative tender offer tactics."
Section 14(d) of the Williams Act establishes basic disclosure duties
in tender offers, requiring the offeror to disclose to the SEC its identity
and background, the source and amount of funds used in making the
purchases, the offeror's holdings in the target company, and the purpose
of the purchases.-" If an offeror increases the price during a tender of-
fer, all shareholders will receive the higher price. 55 The SEC granted'
target shareholders rights to regulate the terms of the offer. This is an
expansion of rights beyond those specified in the Williams Act. Rule
14d-7 allows tendering shareholders to withdraw their shares while the
offer remains open. If the offer is for less than all shares, Rule 14d-8
requires the offeror to purchase the shares on a pro rata basig if the
offer is oversubscribed. 6
Section 14(e) is a two-prong antifraud provision, prohibiting false
or misleading statements in connection with a tender offer, and prohibit-
ing fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices in a tender offer.57
The 1970 amendments 5 to the Williams Act expanded the SEC's
rulemaking power under Section 14(e) to proscribe fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative practices. The Commission enacted two rules to limit
abuses in tender offers: Rule 14e-1, which requires that all tender offers
remain open for twenty business days; and Rule 14e-2, which requires
that, within ten business days of the commencement of the tender offer,
the target send its shareholders a statement explaining its position on the
tender offer. 9
The regulatory regime adopted in the Williams Act and expanded
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988). The information provided to the SEC on
Schedule 14D-1 and transmitted to the target is called the Tender Offer Statement. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1991). Section 14(d) and Rule 14d-9 impose similar disclosure
requirements when the issuer makes a tender offer for its own securities. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-9 (1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
56. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-7, 14d-8 (1991).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
58. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988)).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a), 14e-2 (1991). The Commission has also promul-
gated Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, which prohibits trading or tipping informa-
tion relating to a tender offer in the target's securities. The rule is designed to miti-
gate the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (employee of financial printer not a fiduciary to stockholders of
target company), and is not directly related to the abuses of the tender offer process
by offerors or targets.
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by the SEC has been likened to a "federal corporation law. '60 Despite
the Williams Act, however, many states responded to hostile takeovers
by passing what has come to be called first-generation anti-takeover
legislation. 6' The state legislation tended to follow the Williams Act
disclosure model, but many of the statutes also imposed pre-bid notice
requirements on bidders and allowed state officials to review the sub-
stantive terms of the offer.62 Moreover, the statutes often reached be-
yond the state's borders to regulate foreign corporations. 3
A key issue concerning the Williams Act has been determining
whether Congress intended to preempt the states from regulating tender
offers or only intended to regulate the narrow area of proper disclosure
and procedures for tender offers.64 In its first decision considering
whether the Williams Act preempted state regulation of tender offers,
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,65 the Supreme Court issued a muddled plurality
opinion that was effectively overruled a few years later.
MITE effectively invalidated most first-generation antitakeover stat-
utes. However, the Court was split on the constitutional basis for over-
turning the state legislation.66 Three Justices concluded that the appeal
60. Tyson, supra note 19, at 260.
61. See Garfield, State Competence, supra note 19, at 542 (37 states passed
first-generation anti-takeover statutes).
62. Id. at 543; Lieberman & Bartell, supra note 20, at 150; Langevoort, State
Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 213, 232 (1977).
63. Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical
Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 733, 738 (1979);
see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (invalidating Illinois takeover act
that regulated nonresident shareholders).
64. Scholarly, commentators have interpreted the Act and the SEC rules both
ways. Compare Tyson, supra note 19, at 248 (Supreme Court has "emasculated Wil-
liams Act by faulty construction of provisions" and has "derailed tender offer regula-
tion from the federal track Congress intended."); Garfield, State Competence, supra
note 19, at 540 (legislative history "reveals a strong desire on the part of Congress
that takeover battles be fought on a level playing field"), with Johnson & Millon,
Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 15, at 1868 ("proper understanding of the
Williams Act offers no credible support for the preemption claim").
65. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
66. MITE challenged the Illinois antitakeover law after making a cash tender
offer for the shares of Chicago* Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation head-
quartered in Chicago. Id. at 627. The Illinois law required an offeror to provide the
target and the Illinois Secretary of State twenty days advanced notice of a bid. Dur-
ing that period only the target, not the offeror, could communicate with shareholders.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54A, E (repealed 1983). The act applied to all
target companies in which Illinois residents owned 10% or more of the outstanding
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was moot after MITE withdrew its offer and did not offer an opinion on
the constitutionality of the Illinois law.67 Five Justices concluded that
the law violated the commerce clause," but only three Justices were
willing to find that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois statute.6 9
The plurality opinion concluded that Congress intended to preempt state
laws that effectively favored bidders or targets because of the Williams
Act's policy of neutrality in tender offers." Yet, the opinion is not
clear why that policy preempts state laws that regulate tender offers.71
The Williams Act and SEC rules curb the most abusive tactics in
tender offers by mandating disclosure by bidders and target management,
a uniform price for all shareholders, withdrawal rights, and an adequate
waiting period before the offer closes. Unintentionally, the Williams Act
does not answer the pivotal question of what role, if any, the states had
to play in regulating takeovers, and the Supreme Court did not provide
a definitive answer in the first review of, a state antitakeover statute in
MITE.
C. Protecting Shareholders Through Fiduciary Duties
The traditional corporate model envisions a pyramid, with the direc-
tors at the top, overseeing management which acts for the good of the
shareholders at the bottom. The accountability of the directors is ensured
through judicial review of their decisions under the rubric of fiduciary
duties imposed on the directors: the duty of care and the duty of loyal-
ty. Shareholders may enforce these duties by bringing derivative actions
shares, or which met two of the following conditions: 1) the corporation was orga-
nized under Illinois law, 2) the corporation had its principal office in Illinois; or 3)
the corporation had 10% of its assets in Illinois. Id. The statute further authorized the
Illinois Secretary of State to hold hearings to determine whether the disclosure re-
quirements had been met, whether the offer involved any fraud, and to stop the ten-
der offer until the completion of the hearing., Id. at para. 137.57.
67. 457 U.S. at 655 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 664
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 643 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ.); id at 646 (Powell, J., con-
curring); id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 647 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 639 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
70. Id. at 633 (plurality opinion).
71. See Weiss, What Lawyers Do When the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evalu-
ating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Its Progeny, Part 1, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1655, 1663 & n.53 (1990) [hereinafter Emperor Has No Clothes I], Part II, 79
GEO. LJ. 211 (1990) [hereinafter Emperor Has No Clothes ii] (without establishing
major premise of preemption argument, Justice White assumes neutrality policy of
Williams Act prohibits state legislation protecting target; cited passages from legisla-
tive history do not necessarily imply intent by Congress to preempt state law).
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on behalf of the corporation.72
The duty of care requires that directors exercise the care of a rea-
sonably prudent person acting under similar circumstances.73 The duty
covers primarily the procedural aspects of the board's decision-making
process, mandating that the board be adequately informed of the facts
relating to the proposed act or policy, and to properly deliberate before
acting. 74 Although judicial pronouncements on the duty of care seem-
ingly require a certain threshold of board involvement in a decision,
findings of directorial violations are rare. Duty of care. cases focus more
on articulating a standard rather than undertaking anything more than a
cursory review of the board's actions as a prelude to finding that there
is no violation."
The duty of loyalty requires that directors act in the best interests
of the corporation, free from their own interests.76 The Delaware Su-
preme Court announced the rationale of the duty in Guth v. Loft,
72. Shareholders must first make a demand that the board of directors institute
an action on behalf of the corporation alleging breach of a fiduciary duty, unless
making such a demand would be futile because of the board's involvement in the
alleged wrongdoing. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 11, at 28. If demand is required,
then the board's decision not to pursue the action is protected by the business judg-
ment rule. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (directors conduct
in dismissing suit must meet requirements of business judgment rule).
73. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
(directors managing corporation "are bound to use that amount of care which ordi-
narily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances"). Most states have
codified the director's duty of care. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1990);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney Supp. 1992); see also Bradley & Schipani, supra note 11, at 18 n.107
(citing state duty of care provisions).
74. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court summarized the parame-
ters of the duty of care: "[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to mak-
ing a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.
Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge
of their duties." 473 A.2d at 812.
75. See Palmiter, supra note 11, at 1358-61. The more recent Delaware cases,
Aronson and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), uphold the
directors' compliance with the duty of care while ostensibly requiring directors to
review corporate decisions. In the rare cases of virtually complete directorial nonfea-
sance, courts have imposed liability for violating the duty of .care. See, e.g., DePinto
v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37, 46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
822 (1967) (director unaware of three years of.corporate losses in approving valueless
transfer of company); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981)
(director liable for corporate losses due to complete inattention to corporate affairs).
76. As with the duty of care, most states have codified the duty of loyalty.
See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 11, at 26 n.159 (listihg state statutes).
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Inc.,7' where it stated:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests ....
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a pro-
found knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has estab-
lished a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremp-
torily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty. 8
The duty of loyalty does not prohibit all transactions involving potential
self-dealing, but the proponents of a transaction in which a board mem-
ber or management has a financial interest must show the entire fairness
of the transaction to the corporation, and that disinterested members of
the board approved the transaction after complete disclosure.79
If the directors' decision is not tainted by a conflict that entails a
breach of the duty of loyalty, and if the decision meets the minimal
procedural requirements of the duty of care, then the court will apply
the business judgment rule to protect the directors from liability. The
business judgment rule is a presumption of the court that "in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was in the
best interests of the company."8" Invocation of the business judgment
rule means that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
directors, thereby giving boards latitude to take risks and, perhaps more
importantly, to avoid forcing the judiciary to evaluate complex business
decisions that it likely could not fully comprehend." As one court not-
ed colloquially, the rule prevents "Monday-morning quarterbacking." 2
The board's duties of care and loyalty are equally implicated in
transactions involving corporate control, when the board must follow
proper procedures in reviewing an offer and confront the obvious con-
flict of interest presented by a transaction that will affect the positions
of both management and the directors. In both friendly and hostile trans-
actions, the directors have a stake in the outcome such that any decision
77. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
78. Id. at 510. The case involved a director usurping a corporate opportunity.
79. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); see Palmiter, su-
pra note 10, at 1395-1411 (reviewing development of application of duty of loyalty).
80. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
81. See Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1439 ("judges lack competence
in making business decisions").
82. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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may be tainted by self-interest. Courts could require that all acts by the
board of directors be subjected to the entire fairness test applied to
transactions implicating the duty of loyalty. In Cheff v. Mathes, 3 how-
ever, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors' conflict of
interest in a corporate control situation is qualitatively different than in
other cases raising loyalty issues.8 4 If the directors could show that
there was a policy conflict between the corporation and the offeror, then
"the directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an honest mistake
of judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable at the time the deci-
sion was made." 5 The Delaware Supreme Court opted to apply the
business judgment rule to the directors' decision, rather than the stricter
entire fairness standard, by positing the potential loyalty problems as
somehow different, i.e. inconsequential.
Cheff eliminates any meaningful role for judicial review of transac-
tions involving corporate control "[b]ecause competent counsel could
always document a policy conflict between a would-be acquirer and
defending management .... .6 As interpreted by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in the context of takeovers, the business judgment rule
gives management a potent weapon to defend against hostile offers by
allowing the board to reject an offer and adopt defensive measures with-
out justifying how its decisions will benefit the shareholders. Once the
implications of Cheff's minimal level of scrutiny of management's
antitakeover tactics became apparent, the Delaware Supreme Court react-
ed by imposing, at least temporarily, a higher standard of review. The
path of the Delaware Supreme Court in first adopting that standard, and
its recent demise, will be reviewed in Part III.
III. THE PENDULUM SWINGS: MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDERS IN
THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
Delaware is the preeminent jurisdiction for defining the limits of
corporate law because 'a disproportionate number of large companies are
83. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
84. Id. at 554. Cheff involved a challenge to a stock repurchase program de-
signed to prevent a hostile acquisition.
85. Id. at 555 (citation omitted).
86. Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tac-
tics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review? 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 249 (1989)
[hereinafter Delaware's Intermediate Standard]. Professors Gilson and Kraakman note
that companies losing cases under the lax Cheff standard "were smaller companies
without the benefit of advice from special counsel and investment bankers." Id at
n.7.
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incorporated there. The state has been accused of winning the "race to
the bottom" to attract corporate charters. 7 The Delaware judiciary is
widely credited with bringing a special expertise to corporate law issues,
and indeed Delaware courts decided most of the major state corporate
law decisions in the 1980s or other courts cited the Delaware courts as
precedent to support their decision. The corporate law decisions of the
Delaware courts were considered pro-management, and Cheff certainly
adheres to that tradition.8" The business judgment rule served as a
shield for management risk taking by allowing the board to rely on the
judiciary's reluctance to second guess board decisions to pursue transac-
tions that may not ultimately result in the greatest gain to sharehold-
ers.
8 9
Shareholders used to have at least the theoretical ability to disci-
pline and, ultimately, replace inefficient managers without causing dis-
ruptions outside the corporate community. By the early 1980s, however,
this basic premise of corporate law began to collapse as the power of
management to protect itself grew far beyond the limited ability of the
courts to use legal principles, such as the business judgment rule, to
guard shareholders from corporate decisions entrenching management.
Defensive measures approved by directors became increasingly trouble-
some for shareholders, but the rules of corporate law were ill-equipped
to curtail managerial discretion. Ultimately, the principle of shareholder
primacy would be questioned by both the courts and state legislatures as
the effect of mergers and acquisitions reached broader constituencies.
The conflict between shareholders and management took precedence
because, at least initially, that was all corporate law could address at
one time.
87. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
88. See Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 133
(1988) (Delaware courts generally give management wide discretion); Gilson &
Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, supra note 86, at 250 (Cheff considered
unduly favorable to management).
89. Some commentators argue that shareholder interference with management's
decisions by pursuing legal claims can cause management to take fewer risks. Fischel
& Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 265-74 (1986); see
Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1442 (shareholder lawsuits when management
decisions turn out poorly will reinforce management's tendency to avoid risk, which is
detrimental to shareholders).
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A. The Van Gorkom Signal
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,9 the Delaware Supreme Court sent a
signal that it was ready to adopt a greater role in reviewing
management's actions in corporate control transactions. The court re-
viewed a class action challenge to the board's decision to approve a
buyout of Trans Union Corp. at $55 per share, a fifty percent premium
over the price of the company's stock prior to the announcement.9
The shareholders had overwhelmingly approved the buyout.92 Despite
the obvious increase in value received by the shareholders, and their
strong approval of the transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a 3-
2 decision, held that the board "was grossly negligent in that it failed to
act with informed reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the . . . merger
proposal . . . .-" The corporate bur was taken aback, to say the least,
by a finding that a well-respected corporate board's decision was not
protected by the business judgment rule.'
The court focused on the board's inadequate review of the $55 per
share merger proposal. Jerome Van Gorkom,. Trans Union's chairman
and CEO, approached Jay Pritzker, a prominent investor, and proposed
the $55 price and suggested a financing structure for Pritzker to acquire
the company.95 Shortly thereafter, Pritzker made an offer contingent on
90. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
91. Id. at 866.
92. Id. at 870.
93. Id at 881.
94. The Delaware legislature subsequently limited the effect of Van Gorkom by
enacting a provision permitting shareholders to amend the corporate charter to elimi-
nate monetary liability for breach of the duty of care by directors. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991). Section 102(b)(7), which became effective on July 1, 1986,
provides:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit
the liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyal-
ty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law; (iii) under section 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
95. 488 A.2d at 866. Prior to approaching Pritzker, Van Gorkom considered
and rejected an LBO of Trans Union at $55 per share. Id. at 865. A strong motive
for selling the company was -to allow it to take advantage of large investment tax
credits that were not currently applicable apply due to insufficient taxable income. Id
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a decision being reached by the board in three days. The merger propos-
al allowed Trans Union ninety days to accept any better offer, and
Pritzker had the right to purchase one million shares of Trans Union
stock at a slight premium if a higher bid was accepted. At a special
board meeting the day before the offer expired, Van Gorkom made a
twenty minute presentation concerning the company and the merger
proposal, although the agreement was not available for review. The
entire meeting lasted two hours, and the board 'did not have any outside
appraisals or fairness opinions to consider.96 The court determined that
the board did not fully inform itself about the proposed merger before
voting on it, finding that:
[Under] all of the surrounding circumstances - hastily calling the
meeting without prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed sale of
the Company without any prior consideration of the issue or necessity
therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by Pritzker, and the total
absence of any documentation whatsoever - the directors were duty
bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom . . . , and if they
had done so, the inadequacy of that upon which they now claim to
have relied would have been apparent.97
The majority opinion paints a picture of a board's decision that is
not a model of a thoughtful deliberative process. In fact, however, no
Delaware court reviewing management's conduct under the business
judgment rule has reached a conclusion remotely similar to Van
Gorkom. The holding that the directors were grossly negligent in not
fully informing themselves is suspect. The board's five outside directors
were eminently qualified, and Van Gorkom was a lawyer, an accountant,
and an experienced manager with an intimate familiarity with Trans
Union's business. The business judgment rule is designed to allow direc-
tors to use their experience to make decisions without judicial second
guessing, including a board's decision to defer to the CEO's judgment
that an offer at a fifty percent premium does not require a drawn out
review process that will likely not change the final decision to accept
the offer.9" The Van Gorkom opinion, however, reads like judicial sec-
ond guessing, and serves as a signal to corporations that the Delaware
Supreme Court will not acquiesce in board conduct that is at the limit
96. Id. at 866-70. Fischel notes that the majority opinion is "almost like a
detective story." Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1438. The above account is
intended only as a cursory review of the dense factual analysis in the majority opin-
ion.
97. 488 A.2d at 875.
98. See Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1445-47.
[Vol. 36:3
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AFTER THE EIGHTIES
of adequate consideration where the issue is control 'of the corpora-
tion."
The court's focus on the lack of an outside valuation is an integral
part of the signal to corporations that a more rigorous decision-making
process is necessary. Although the court stated that it did not "imply
that an outside valuation study is essential . . . [or] that fairness opin-
ions by independent investment bankers are required as a matter of
law,"' °° there is no other way to read the opinion than as a mandate
to corporate boards to adopt the very procedures broadly hinted in the
opinion. Nevertheless, focusing on the board's failure to secure outside
legal and financial advice about the adequacy of the offer does not
answer the ultimate question of whether the decision to -accept a fifty
percent premium was proper.' °'
99. Professors Macey and Miller interpret Van Gorkom as the Delaware Su-
preme Court making an "example" of the Trans Union board "to send the strongest
possible message to the corporate bar that rush offers need not be entertained."
Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, supra note 88, at 138. This Article
agrees with their position that the rush offer was the core problem, and makes the re-
lated point that the Van Gorkom Court intended to inform corporations of the proper
procedures they should follow in future situations involving issues of corporate control
by making an example of Trans Union's board.
100. 488 A.2d at 876.
101. One of the Trans Union board's strongest arguments was that the 50%
premium over the market price validated the board's decision to accept the merger.
The argument is based on the efficient market theory that the securities markets di-
gest information within a short period of time and adjust stock prices accordingly to
reflect that information in valuing the security. See generally, Henning, Between
Chiarella and Congress: A Guide to the Private Cause of Action for Insider Trading
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 39 KAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (discussing Su-
preme Court use of efficient market theory in Rule 10b-5 cases). The court rejected
that argument, finding that Van Gorkom and the board "knew that the market had
consistently undervalued the worth of Trans Union's stock." 488 A.2d at 876. By
rejecting the market price as the sole indicator of a company's value, the Delaware
Supreme Court created a powerful shield allowing management to point to its own
"valuation" of the company as the basis for rejecting a price the market (i.e., share-
holders) considered fair. See Macey & Miller, supra note 88, at 138 ("difficult to
justify defensive maneuvers if the efficient capital markets hypothesis is accepted").
The full implication of this aspect of Van Gorkom would not be apparent until the
court's decision in Time, in which it blindly accepted management's assertion that the
company was worth far more than a cash tender offer.
Commentators argued that the effect of Van Gorkom may be merely to
mandate unnecessary procedural steps for boards that will only serve to generate legal
and underwriting fees without substantially altering the outcome of the process. See
Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1453 (outside consultants are the biggest
winners after this case); Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, supra note 88,
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The essential mistrust of management and directors embodied in the
duty of loyalty is implicated in corporate control decisions. Yet the
Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff rejected a strict application of the
entire fairness standard in reviewing the transaction. Short of reversing
Cheff, the Van Gorkom court sought to require boards to use some type
of independent source of information to support a decision. Effectively
requiring legal and financial opinions is the most obvious method to
force a board to document its decision. Van Gorkom's message is a
functional one that addresses how a board makes a decision while main-
taining the basic rationale of the business judgment rule, that the sub-
stance of the directors' decision will not be reviewed. °
at 134-35 ('[f]airness opinions of investment bankers are notorious for the degree to
which they can be induced to reflect the wishes of the incumbent board").
102. Professor Fischel bitterly criticized the Court's implied requirement of out-
side legal and financial advice, noting that an attempt to obtain an opinion might
have "killed" the Trans Union merger and that participation by outside consultants is
"a type of insurance no matter how worthless their opinion is or how much it will
cost." Fischel, Trans Union, supra note 12, at 1446, 1453. The implicit assumption in
criticizing the cost of using outside lawyers and investment bankers is that, without
the court imposing that requirement, corporate boards would not hire these advisers.
That assumption is highly suspect if for no other reason than those outside advisers
perform the "grunt work," for lack of a better .term, of putting together the necessary
documents for public filings, proxies, and closings. The "expertise" provided by in-
dependent advisers goes far beyond providing fairness opinions and valuations because
an offer involves far more than a board of directors simply saying no (or yes). The
costs imposed by Van Gorkom are more likely a minor addition to the legal, finan-
cial, and accounting bills the corporation receives for independent advice.
In contrast to the overwhelmingly negative reputation of lawyers and in-
vestment bankers, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
1988), the lawyer for a bidder involved in an auction terminated a telephone call
from the target's CEO after the CEO tried to improperly pass important information
about the bids without informing the other bidder. Id. at 1275. The Delaware Su-
preme Court noted the integrity of the bidder's counsel and that the information
would not otherwise have come to light without his statement. Id at n.23. At least in
this one instance, the presence of an outside adviser advanced the cause of fairness to
shareholders.
A more telling argument against the enhanced procedural requirements of
Van Gorkom is that "papering" the transaction will not affect the board's decision.
Macey and Miller conclude that "the benefits of such increased deliberation are likely
small, because of the ease with which corporate boards, aided by a phalanx of so-
phisticated lawyers and investment bankers, can cloak result-oriented decision-making
in the guise of careful deliberation." Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered,
supra note 88, at 141. That criticism assumes that directors will not undertake their
review of an offer in good faith, and that the decision has been made before the
consideration begins. While that may be true in some instances, it is an unfair gen-
eralization when applied to all boards. There is no way to quantify the effect of the.
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B. Unocal and Revlon: Claiming a Seat at the Table"°3
The rise of the corporate "raider" coercing shareholders into tender-
ing their stock or, if they refused, making them face the prospect of
receiving "junk" bonds in a forced back-end merger, received an inordi-
nate amount of attention from corporate management (for propaganda
purposes) and from courts. The idea that shareholders could be forced or
"stampeded" into tendering rests largely on the assumption, noted earlier
in the context of proxy contests, that stock owners are widely dispersed
individuals who cannot or will not adequately review the value of an
offer to determine whether it is in their best interest to tender or to hold
out in the hope of a higher offer. The concomitant of this sad picture of
shareholder coercion is the need for management to rescue shareholders
from the corporate raider and their own blind self-interest in an immedi-
ate payoff, a scene one commentator compared to a "spaghetti west-
er. , 104 There is, however, some question whether shareholders are ev-
er "mistreated" by an offer that will pay them more for their stock than
its current market value. 05
Nevertheless, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' ° the Del-
aware Supreme Court recognized the two-tier tender offer as "a classic
coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the
first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will
receive at the back end of the transaction."' 0 7  Mesa owned
approximately thirteen percent of Unocal's stock, and commenced a
partial cash tender offer for thirty-seven percent of Unocal's shares at
enhanced procedures required by Van Gorkom.
103. Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes I, supra note 71, pt. I, at 1684. Professor
Weiss argues that the Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), upholding an-Indiana anti-takeover statute as not uncon-
stitutional or in violation of the Williams Act, does not explain the analysis used to
reach its decision thereby allowing the Court to retain flexibility in deciding future
cases. Professor Weiss terms this as keeping "a seat at the table." Weiss, Emperor
Has No Clothes I, supra note 71, at 1684.
104. Bradford, Stampeding Shareholders and Other Myths: Target Shareholders
and Hostile Tender Offers, 15 J. CORP. L. 417, 418 n.2 (1990). .,
105. See id. at 464 ("myth of target shareholder mistreatment in takeovers is as
unfounded as the myths of the tooth fairy, Santa Claus, and the Easter bunny") (foot-
note omitted); Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 15, at 439 ("In the real world,
demonstrated examples of coercion remain as rare as confirmed sightings of the Loch
Ness monster."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 13, at 1164 (share-
holder welfare maximized by barring management from resisting tender offer).
106. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
107. Id at 956 (footnote omitted).
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$54 per share. Upon completion of that transaction, Mesa intended to
effect a back-end merger by exchanging junk bonds ostensibly valued at
$54 per share for the remaining shares. After an extended board meeting
to consider Mesa's offer, the outside directors rejected it as inadequate
and considered a self-tender for the company's shares. Shortly thereafter,
the board approved an exchange offer of debt securities valued at $72
per share for the remaining forty-nine percent of Unocal's stock if Mesa
successfully completed its offer; Mesa was explicitly excluded from
tendering its shares back to the company. The Delaware Chancery Court
enjoined Unocal's discriminatory exchange offer.'
The Delaware Supreme Court began the analysis of the applicability
of the business judgment rule to a board's decision involving corporate
control by addressing the conflict of interest problem shunted aside in
Cheff. The court stated that "[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of
the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of
the business judgment rule may be conferred."' °9 The "enhanced duty"
examination involves a two-step analysis: first, pursuant to Cheff, the
offer must pose a danger to corporate policy; second, the defensive
response "must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 0 The
court noted the possible concerns a board may consider in determining
whether the offer posed a threat to the corporation or its shareholders:
"inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, ques-
tions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities
being offered in the exchange......
The court held that the discriminatory exchange offer was reason-
ably related to the threat posed by Mesa. 12 The coercive nature of
Mesa's offer and the problems with receiving junk bonds in the back-
end merger posed a substantial threat to the corporation. Moreover, the
court noted that T. Boone Pickens, chairman of Mesa, had a "national
108. Id. at 950-53. It is interesting to note that the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion makes repeated references to the role of the board's investment advisers in
determining the value of the company and proposing various structures for the trans-
action. This emphasis is likely an implicit affirmation of Van Gorkom's admonition
that boards seek independent advice in considering an offer.
109. Id. at 954.
110. Id. at 955.
111. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955.
112. Id. at 956.
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reputation as a 'greenmailer"' whose actions posed a threat to the corpo-
ration."3 The board's exchange offer served to protect shareholders,
even short-term investors, and was reasonable in response to the threat
posed by Mesa. Therefore, the court applied the business judgment rule
to Unocal's actions."
4
The new intermediate level of scrutiny adopted in Unocal avoids
the pitfall of Van Gorkom because a court can focus on "objective"
criteria, such as, the nature of the threat and the reasonableness of the
response, without necessarily becoming involved in reviewing how the
directors reached their decision. Unocal shows that directors will use
outside legal and financial advice to erect powerful defensive measures
that will always withstand the type of review the court applied to the
Trans Union board's decision, yet simply applying Cheff to the discrimi-
natory exchange offer would be a hollow exercise. The Delaware Su-
preme Court adopted a compromise position that allows the business
judgment rule to retain its primacy while constricting the wide berth the
rule gave to management.
Unocal does not explain what types of offers constitute a sufficient
threat to the corporation to permit a defensive response, and therefore it
is impossible to determine from the opinion what responses will be rea-
sonable beyond those facts described in the case." 5 The Unocal test
announces that the Delaware courts will more closely scrutinize board
decisions involving corporate control while retaining maximum flexibility
to first define what is a "threat" to the corporation and then decide
whether the defensive response was proportionate to the threat. In that
sense, the Delaware Supreme Court staked its claim to a seat at the
table of corporate control contests, but did not announce whether it
would be an active participant in the game.
While Unocal announced an intermediate level of scrutiny of
management's defensive tactics, it also recognized that the board is not
strictly limited to considering shareholder welfare in ascertaining whether
113. Id. It is not clear how Pickens' reputation as a greenmailer posed a threat
to Unocal, especially when a company must agree to greenmail by buying out the
person's stake in order to prevent a takeover. It is anomalous to use a management
defensive tactic, greenmail, as the basis for finding a threat to the corporation. The
Delaware Supreme Court later upheld a board's greenmail payment under the Unocal
intermediate scrutiny standard in Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986).
114. 493 A.2d at 958.
115. See Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the
Noncoercive Tender Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 225, 260 (1989) (Unocal's ambiguous elements susceptible to contradictory inter-
pretations).
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an offer constitutes a threat. The court stated that the directors may
consider an offer's effect on other constituencies, which was the only
factor in the nonexclusive list that did not relate directly to the structure
of the offer or its value to shareholders. 1 6 Whether the court intended
to alter the basic principle of corporate law, that the directors act solely
on behalf of the shareholders, is not clear from the opinion because the
question of the interests of other constituencies was not at issue. The
effect of acknowledging non-shareholder interests, however, gives the
court even greater flexibility to shape future decisions to include those
interests if they are of sufficient magnitude."'
The issue of management's defensive tactics becomes more compli-
cated when there is more than one bidder seeking control of the compa-
ny, and the board is placed in the position of choosing between compet-
ing bids that may include a management sponsored proposal. The rather
simple context in which the court began its enhanced scrutiny of board
decisions in Unocal, a case with only one bidder who could easily be
painted as a "raider" in a black (or green) hat, became more complex in
the bidding war at issue in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc."' Pantry Pride indicated to Revlon that it was interested in
negotiating the purchase of Revlon at approximately $43 per share, and
that Pantry Pride was ready to pursue a hostile takeover. Revlon imme-
diately took defensive measures by adopting a poison pill."9 Pantry
Pride launched a hostile offer at $47.50 per share, which the board
rejected as inadequate. Revlon then completed an offer. for ten million
of its shares by exchanging a debt security and cumulative preferred
stock for the tendered shares. The new securities included covenants
116. 493 A.2d at 955.
117. Compare Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, supra
note 86, at 267 & n. 65 (shareholder interests are primary and consideration by direc-
tors of other interests would render most of corporate law incoherent), with Johnson,
The Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 15, at 888 n.88 (Gilson and Kraakman
are incorrect in concluding that non-shareholder interests would render corporate law
incoherent).
118. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
119. Id. at 177. In Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a company decision adopting a poison
pill even when there was no pending or threatened tender offer was protected by the
business judgment rule under the Unocal proportionality analysis. 500 A.2d at 1356.
The court noted rather ominously, however, that applying the business judgment rule
to adoption of a poison pill does not insulate the board. "The ultimate response to an
actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that time, and nothing
we say here relieves them of their basic fundamental duties to the corporation and its
stockholders." Id. at 1357 (citing Unocal).
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limiting Revlon's power to incur additional debt, sell assets, or pay
dividends without approval from the independent directors. 20 Pantry
Pride renewed its offer at essentially the same price. The Revlon board
authorized management to begin negotiations with third parties interested
in acquiring the company. Pantry Pride then raised its bid three more
times, reaching $56.25 per share.
Management reached an agreement with Forstmann Little & Co.
(Forstmann) for an LBO of the company at $56 per share, conditioned
on board waiving the poison pill and canceling the restrictive covenants
on the debt securities. Upon announcement of the LBO, the value of the
debt securities began to fall, and the bondholders threatened litigation
against the directors for their losses. Pantry Pride continued to pursue
Revlon, announcing that it would top any other bid for the company.
After receiving financial information from Revlon that was not made
available to Pantry Pride, Forstmann raised its bid to $57.25, condi-
tioned on Revlon agreeing to certain actions. 12' Forstmann agreed to
an exchange of the debt securities for new securities at par to 'protect
their value. Forstmann demanded immediate acceptance of its offer, after
which Pantry Pride then raised its bid to $58 per share. Pantry Pride
filed suit to enjoin any transaction between Revlon and Forstmann and
require Revlon's board to redeem the. poison pill and cancel the debt
security covenants.
The Delaware Supreme Court first considered whether the poison
pill and exchange offer for ten million shares were protected by the
business judgment rule under the Unocal standard.'22 The court held
that Pantry Pride's initial offer was a threat because the board deter-
mined it was inadequate and was made by a company intent on a "bust-
up" transaction financed by junk bonds.12 It then concluded that the
120. 506 A.2d at 177.
121. The Forstmann conditions were: (1) Revlon's agreement to a lock-up option
on a Revlon division at a price at least $100 million below Revlon's valuation of the
unit if another acquirer owned 40% of Revlon's shares; (2) a no-shop provision; (3)
cancellation of debt security covenants and redemption of the poison pill; (4) a $25
million cancellation fee; and (5) no Revlon management would not participate in the
merger. Id. at 178.
122. Id. at 180-81.
123. Id. The court accepts the board's conclusion as to inadequacy without sub-
jecting it to even minimal scrutiny, using the pejorative terminology of "bust-up" and
"junk bond" as if that buttresses a reasonable conclusion that an offer is inadequate.
It is possible the court undertook the initial Unocal analysis of the defensive mea-
sures as an example to the lower court of how these types of defensive actions
should be reviewed, knowing that upholding the board on the preliminary defensive
measures under the enhanced scrutiny standard would not change the ultimate decision
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poison pill and exchange offer were reasonable responses to an inade-
quate offer." 4 If the perfunctory Unocal analysis of management's de-
fensive tactics was the extent of Revlon, the case would be wholly un-
important except to show that the Delaware Supreme Court was not
interested in pursuing any measure of heightened scrutiny.
The court went on to hold, however, that once Revlon became
involved in a bidding war and "the break-up of the company was inevi-
table," the board's duties changed from "defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-
holders at a sale of the company."' 2 Revlon takes Unocal one step
further by imposing an additional duty on the directors to conduct an
auction for the sole purpose of maximizing the value of the company
for the benefit of the shareholders. Revlon means not only that the
directors' decisions will be more closely reviewed, but that the court
will evaluate those actions under the single standard of shareholder
wealth maximization. On that basis, the board's goal of protecting the
value of the debt securities "was inconsistent with the changed concept
of the directors responsibilities."' 2 While Unocal acknowledges that
non-shareholder interests may be considered by a board in responding to
an offer, that concern is inappropriate when the break-up of the compa-
ny is inevitable because non-shareholder interests are subject to the
overriding limitation that all acts must be for the benefit of shareholders.
The court held that Revlon ended the bidding contest without allowing
the auction to run its course to permit the highest bid. Therefore the
board's decision to enter the agreement with Forstmann could not with-
stand the heightened Unocal scrutiny.'27
Revlon expands the Unocal policy of closer scrutiny of
management's actions in a corporate control contest because Unocal
applies to the directors' actions in direct response to a takeover, and
measures their validity in proportion to the threat posed. Revlon goes a
to invalidate the Revlon board's conduct of the auction as a breach of its fiduciary
duty.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 182. The court noted that-the board "no longer faced threats to
corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot." (citing
Revlon at 182).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 184. The court found that "the Revlon board ended the auction in
return for very little actual improvement in the final bid. The principal benefit went
to the directors, who avoided personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the
board owed no further duty under the circumstances." Id.
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step further by holding that when there is no longer any "threat" to the
corporation, the board must take positive steps to maximize the value of
the shareholders' investment. Management can no longer simply respond
to a threat; it must create the greatest possible value in the short-term.
While Unocal provided management with discretion to respond reason-
ably to an offer, Revlon forces a response that is not both defensive in
nature and wealth maximizing.
128
Revlon does not, however, clarify the issue unresolved in Unocal
regarding what constitutes a threat to the corporation. The Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that there was no longer a threat to corporate
policy or to the shareholders' interests once the break-up was inevitable,
but did. not identify when that line had been crossed. Describing the
break-up of the company as "inevitable" is the conclusion of the Revlon
analysis, not the starting point. Revlon, however, does not explain when
the point of inevitability is reached or what constitutes the "break-up" of
a company. The court created a new auction duty without specifying
when the board must fulfill the duty, thereby maintaining its seat at the
table first claimed in Unocal. By failing to provide a clear description
of the scope of the test, the court created an additional level of
heightened scrutiny without limiting its application.
While Revlon is an extension of Unocal's enhanced scrutiny ap-
proach, reconciling the underlying policies of the two decisions is more
problematic. Unocal stated that the concerns a board may address in-
clude those of non-shareholders. The decision gives the board, not the
shareholders, the power to determine the proper response to an offer
threatening the corporation's policy or effectiveness. However, stating
that consideration of non-shareholder interests must entail benefits to the
shareholders, Revlon, disparages the board's actions favoring bondholders
at the expense of shareholders, and seemingly cuts back on Unocal's
shift away from the principle of shareholder primacy. The tension be-
tween the two decisions is a further reflection of the court's approach
creating a new standard to scrutinize management without defining the
scope of that standard. 29 The fundamental unresolved issue for the
court is whether management, through consideration of non-shareholder
128. See Note, Time and Time Again the Board is Paramount: The Evolution of
the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Trigger Through Paramount v. Time, 66 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 159, 173 & n.77 (1990) [hereinafter Time and Time Again] (Revlon
established a bright line rule that is a subset of Unocal's analysis).
129. See Johnson, The Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 15, at 914
(Revlon tries to contain the "potentially mutinous" policy of Unocal acknowledging
non-shareholder interests).
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interests, or shareholders would be the beneficiaries of the new standard.
C. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.: Wavering on Height-
ened Scrutiny
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 3 the Delaware
Supreme Court proved that the indecision in the Unocal and Revlon
decisions could lead to a questionable result. Newmont Mining faced
two potential offers, both of which might be hostile, from Ivanhoe Part-
ners (Ivanhoe), a T. Boone Pickens entity owning 9.95% of Newmont
Mining, and Gold Fields, which owned 26% of Newmont Mining. After
Ivanhoe failed to enlist Gold Fields in a joint undertaking, Ivanhoe
made a two-tiered tender offer for 42% of Newmont at $95 per share,
with a back-end cash out merger at the same price. Ivanhoe subsequent-
ly raised its offer to $105 per share, which the Newmont Mining board
rejected as inadequate. Newmont Mining and Gold Fields then entered
into an agreement that allowed Gold Fields to purchase up to 49.9% of
Newmont Mining conditioned on the company declaring a special divi-
dend of $33 per share. Further, Gold Fields would only be allowed 40%
representation on Newmont Mining's board. With the funds from the
special dividend, Gold Fields then made a "street sweep" of Newmont
Mining stock, increasing its holdings to 49.7% of the shares.'
Ivanhoe challenged the special dividend and Gold Fields' street sweep.
The Delaware Supreme Court found that both Ivanhoe and Gold
Fields posed a threat to the company.'32 The Gold Fields threat was
not overt, in that it never made an offer for Newmont Mining, but Gold
Fields did "pause[] to weigh its options" with regard to Newmont Min-
ing, and it could conceivably have undertaken a hostile offer.' The
court held that Newmont's response to both threats was reasonable un-
der Unocal because it "enabled Newmont to maintain its independent
status for the benefit of its other stockholders."" 3 More importantly,
130. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); see Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Inter-
mediate Standard, supra note 86, at 257 n.38 (Ivanhoe "demonstrates that the road to
doctrinal clarity in Delaware is neither straight nor straightforward").
131. Id. at 1338-40. The Court explained that a street sweep involves the rapid
accumulation of a company's stock in open market transactions during (or shortly
after) a tender offer for the stock. The shares are generally purchased at a small
premium over the market price from arbitragers holding large blocks of stock. Id. at
1337 n.3.
132. Id. at 1342.
133. Id.
134. Ivanhoe at 1344. The court upheld the special dividend on the basis that it
distributed to shareholders the "heretofore undervalued nongold assets," a position that
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the court did not subject Newmont Mining to a Revlon analysis because
the board never put the company up for sale and there was never a
bidding contest between Ivanhoe and Gold Fields.
The focus on Newmont Mining's desire to remain independent is
the key to the decision, and demonstrates the potential breadth of the
threat prong of Unocal's heightened scrutiny. 35 By recognizing that
independence is a separate corporate value to be protected in the face of
a hostile offer, the court sanctioned virtually any response by the board
as proportionate to the threat because, by their nature, hostile offers
destroy corporate independence. Moreover, the court set a high standard
for applying the Revlon duty by holding that the Newmont directors did
not trigger the auction duty because they never decided to sell the com-
pany. This is the flip side of the independence issue, because any board
seeking to avoid being taken over will usually not put itself up for sale.
The implication of Ivanhoe is that the Delaware Supreme Court could
abandon the new enhanced scrutiny standard it had just adopted in favor
of a return to Cheff's deferential approach to management's decisions in
corporate control -contests. Ivanhoe indicates that the court may adopt an
expansive approach to what constitutes a threat to the corporation. That
possibility, however, would have to wait for a later time.
D. Interco, Pillsbury, and Macmillan: Shareholders in Ascendancy
Management's expanding power to fight hostile offers led to the
erection of increasingly formidable defensive barriers. This resulted in
extensive litigation that challenged the courts, both doctrinally and pro-
cedurally, to develop a coherent set of rules, with expedited hearings
and pressure to deliver reasoned judgments within a matter of days or
weeks.'36 While the courts doubtlessly sought to achieve consistency
reiterates the rejection of the efficient capital markets theory in Van Gorkom. See
supra, note 100 and accompanying text. In Black & Decker Corp. v'. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988), the district court rejected the target's
argument that its recapitalization plan was designed in part to assure continued corpo-
rate independence. The court distinguished Ivanhoe on the grounds that Newmont
Mining had not undergone a change in control, whereas in Black & Decker the con-
trol of the target changed when management's voting power increased from 7% to
54%. Id. at 782-83.
135. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, supra note 86,
at 257 n.38 (if any hostile offer is seen as a threat to corporate independence, and
any defense is reasonably related, then Unocal analysis is reduced to rhetoric).
136. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1142 (Del. 1990) (decided by Chancery Court on July 14, 1989, with oral decision
delivered by Delaware Supreme Court on July 24 after argument); Ivanhoe Partners v.
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and, adhere to precedent, the decisions resulting from the application of
Unocal and Revlon are not easily reconcilable. The cases are not a
steady march forward in developing the Unocal standard for determining
the types of threats to which management can respond and the reason-
ableness of the defensive tactics. Instead, they indicate that the Delaware
courts' first favored greater protection of shareholders by invalidating
defensive tactics, and later reversed course in favor of granting manage-
ment broad discretion to erect substantial barriers to hostile offers.
In City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 3 Ste-
ven and Mitchell Rales began accumulating a stake in Interco through
their investment vehicle, City Capital Associates. Interco responded by
adopting a poison pill with both "flip-in" and "flip-over" provisions.13
Interco then announced it intended to undertake a major restructuring
program, after which the Rales contacted the company and offered $64
per share, later raised to $70. After receiving advice from its investment
banker that the offer was inadequate the Interco board voted to reject
the Rales' private $70 offer, and authorized management to explore a
restructuring plan. 139 One week later, the Rales announced a $70 per
share cash tender offer, conditioned on, among other things, redemption
of the poison pill and a determination that Delaware's antitakeover stat-
ute was unconstitutional."4
The board rejected the tender offer as inadequate after reviewing a
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (Delaware Supreme Court deci-
sion. on interlocutory appeal delivered 14 days after submission of case); Grand Met-
ropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1050-52 (Del. Ch. 1988) (case filed
on October 3, 1988, preliminary injunction denied November 7, and final decision
issued on December 16 after discovery, briefing, and arguments). In addition to the
litigation attacking defensive tactics in Delaware state courts, the parties often chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Delaware anti-takeover statute in the federal district
court, with the same pressure for immediate decisions. See RP Acquisition Corp. v.
Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co.,
Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Del. 1988).
137. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
138. Id. at 791. The "flip-in" provision was triggered when a person acquired
30% of Interco's stock, and the "flip-over" provision was activated upon a merger or
acquisition of 50% of the company's stock.
139. Id. at 792. The board also changed the poison pill by lowering the thresh-
old for the "flip-in" provision from 30% to 15%. The Rales owned approximately
8.7% of Interco's stock. Id.
140. Id. In City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 696 F. Supp.
1551 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988), the district court upheld the
constitutionality of the Delaware law.
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study by its investment bankers showing a new reference range for the
company of $74 - $87.14' The Rales later increased their offer to $72
per share, which the board rejected as inadequate the board instead
adopted a restructuring plan. The restructuring involved selling assets
and assuming over $2 billion of debt to pay a dividend to shareholders
made up of cash, debentures, and a stub equity share. An investment
banker valued the restructuring package at $76 per share. 142 As part of
the restructuring, Interco also announced it would sell its Ethan Allen
furniture division, one of its most valuable assets. Thereafter, the board
rejected the Rales' next bid of $74 per share. The Rales then brought an
action in Delaware Chancery Court challenging the company's refusal to
redeem its poison pill and sale of its Ethan Allen division.
The Chancery Court began its analysis by making two crucial fac-
tual determinations: first, the court found that the value of Interco's
dividend was "inherently a debatable proposition" primarily because of
problems in valuing the stub equity share; and second, the court deter-
mined that the all cash tender offer was not coercive. 143 The first
prong of the Unocal analysis required a review of the nature of the
threat. The court held that in a cash tender offer for all shares, the only
threat is to shareholders and not to corporate policies.'"
The court noted that noncoercive offers may still pose a threat
because shareholders cannot bargain effectively with the offeror, while
management may be able to extract a higher price or pursue more valu-
able alternatives. 45 Defensive tactics were reasonable, therefore, to al-
low the board to exercise its business judgment "to take such steps as it
deems appropriate to protect and advance shareholder interests."146
Once the directors used the time provided by the defensive tactic to
seek a "value-maximizing transaction . . . the legitimate role of the
141. The investment banker had earlier advised Interco's board that the reference
range was $68-80. The court noted that the investment banker's range was based on
a deliberately vague method of valuation. 551 A.2d at 792.
142. Id. Interco's board had approved a compensation arrangement with the in-
vestment banker providing a large premium if the restructuring was successful, which
the court characterized as "a rather straight forward and conventional conflict of inter-
est" for a firm valuing a transaction in which it has a substantial stake. Id. at 793.
143. Id. at 795-96.
144. The court followed the method of analysis proposed by Gilson and
Kraakman, see Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, supra note 86.
The court noted that threats to shareholders from an offer come in two forms: threats
to voluntariness stemming from, such as two-tiered offers, and threats from inadequate
offers that are not otherwise coercive. 551 A.2d at 797.
145. 551 A.2d at 797-98.
146. Id.
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poison pill in the context of a noncoercive offer will have been fully
satisfied." 47 In comparing the Rales offer of $74 cash with the re-
structuring proposal, the court found that shareholders may reasonably
choose the cash payment rather than select a securities package of de-
batable value. 4  The board, however, sought to preclude shareholder
choice between two noncoercive alternatives by refusing to redeem the
poison pill to protect the restructuring. That response was not reasonable
in response to the threat posed by the tender offer. The court found that
under Unocal the directors' decision could not be justified. 49 The
court upheld the sale of the Ethan Allen division as an "easy" question
of reasonableness, however, finding that a board may respond to an
inadequate offer through a restructuring. The offeror has no right to
demand that a company not undertake actions that change the status quo
and affect the offer. 5 '
Interco reflects the problems first confronted by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Unocal and Revlon in balancing the demands of share-
holders and management.' The principle of shareholder primacy led
the Chancery Court to invalidate the poison pill, while the focus on
managerial discretion under the Unocal standard resulted in holding that
the board acted reasonably in selling a "crown jewel," the Ethan Allen
division. Nor did Interco violate its fiduciary duty in not conducting an
auction. Nevertheless, Interco's analysis of what types of threats an offer
poses to shareholders is an important clarification of the scope of
Unocal. Where the offer is for all cash and does not involve a back-end
transaction at a lower value, management's response is limited to using
147. Id. at 798.
148. Id. at 799.
149. Interco at 799. The court criticized the board by noting there may be a
case justifying a decision permanently barring shareholders from accepting a
noncoercive offer, but that was not presented on the facts before it. Id. at 798.
150. 551 A.2d at 801. In deciding whether the Interco board must conduct an
auction for the company, the court read Revlon as applying the Unocal standard to a
particular transaction requiring the board to act in an informed manner by probing the
market for the best price. Revlon does not, however, require directors to follow a
single course of action. An open market auction and a defensive restructuring may be
acceptable responses. The court stated that Revlon was not a sharp turn" in the law,
but rather it requires the board to assess the costs and benefits of a decision and
consider other alternatives. Id. at 802. The court then held that the Interco board had
fulfilled its duty under Revlon to explore alternatives and had appropriately informed
themselves about the company's value. Therefore the directors had not breached their
fiduciary duty by failing to conduct an auction. Id. at 802-03.
151. See Johnson, The Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 15, at 920
(Interco opinion is "at war with itself').
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defensive tactics to advance shareholder interests by seeking a better
deal because the only threat is to shareholders and not to the corpora-
tion. The board serves as the representative for the shareholders in the
face of a noncoercive offer, and the defensive response must maximize
shareholder welfare.
Interco also takes Unocal one step further by focusing on the need
to preserve shareholder choice. Although Unocal allows the board to
protect shareholder interests, the opinion is unclear about who decides
which course (or offer) is best for shareholders. Interco integrates the
principle of preservation of shareholders' right to ultimately decide what
path is best into the determination of what is a reasonable response to a
threat. By finding that an all cash offer does threaten only the share-
holders, responses by the board will not be allowed if they interfere
with the power of shareholders to choose between competing offers. The
burden then shifts to the directors to explore alternatives. Any defensive
tactic must be designed to generate the maximum value while reserving
to shareholders the choice of which competing offers they should accept.
The trend toward empowering shareholders to determine whether to
accept a bid continued in Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury
Co. .152 The Delaware Chancery Court again considered the threat
posed by an all cash tender offer and the target's use of a poison pill
and asset spin-off to defend against the offer. Grand Met commenced a
tender offer for all Pillsbury shares at $60 per share, later raised to $63
per share. The Pillsbury board declined the offer as inadequate and
refused to redeem the poison pill.'53 Pillsbury then announced a re-
,structuring plan that included the spin-off of a large subsidiary and
distribution of one share of the spin-off company for each share of
Pillsbury stock, with a special dividend to be paid to holders of the new
shares after the transaction.
Following the analysis applied in Interco, the Chancery Court held
that a cash tender offer for all shares poses no threat to corporate poli-
152. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
153. Id at 1052 & n.4. Prior to the announcement of Grand Met's bid,
Pillsbury heard rumors of Grand Met's interest. Pillsbury began communicating with
state regulatory commissions about possible violations of -Tied-House" provisions
barring manufacturers of alcoholic beverages from owning restaurants, such as those
owned by Pillsbury. On the day Grand Met's offer was announced, Pillsbury sued
Grand Met in 14 states alleging violations of the "Tied-House" laws. Id. at 1051-52.
Three months before Grand Met's bid, Pillsbury's chairman was quoted as saying, "If
you want to see a hell of a cat and dog fight, just let someone make a move on
us." Id at 1051. The facts bear out his prediction.
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cy.15 The court then compared Grand Met's offer and management's
plan to determine whether shareholders were threatened by an inadequate
bid.' 55 In analyzing Pillsbury's plan, the court noted that while the
company's investment bankers valued it at $68, shareholders would not
realize that value for at least four or five years even if Pillsbury's oper-
ations achieved predicted levels, which was itself a doubtful proposi-
tion." The court next determined that, if the poison pill were not re-
deemed and the Grand Met bid failed, shareholders would suffer imme-
diate and substantial losses since Grand Met's outstanding bid was the
sole reason for Pillsbury's high current stock price; Pillsbury's plan
would take years to achieve the same or greater value.'57
In refusing to redeem the poison pill, the Pillsbury board was pre-
venting shareholders from choosing between two noncoercive offers. The
board argued, however, that shareholders were not the proper party to
decide whether to accept a tender offer because only the directors have
the duty to determine the policy of the corporation. The court flatly
rejected that argument, holding that the board's refusal to redeem the
pill, disenfranchising shareholders, was not a reasonable response to any
threat posed by the offer. The court ordered redemption of the poison
pill.'58 Contrary to Interco, the Chancery Court also enjoined the spin-
off, finding that the transaction would substantially alter Pillsbury's cor-
porate structure and negatively affect the Grand Met offer. 59
Pillsbury takes the principle of shareholder primacy to its outer
limit, but brings into question whether the business judgment rule can
survive such an approach. In order to vindicate the shareholders' right to
choose, the Chancery -Court had to judge between competing offers. To
support the conclusion that the shareholders should determine which
offer to accept, the court had to determine that the offers were essential-
ly equivalent in value. This determination draws the court into the very
154. Id. at 1056.
155. Grand Met at 1057-58.
156. Id. at 1057. "In all events, expectancies over a four or five year period
out into the nineties are subject to economic and competitive conditions which are
beyond Pillsbury's control.'; Id.
157. Id. at 1058. The court calculated a loss of at least $1.5 billion to share-
holders by assuming that Pillsbury's stock would recede to the price before the offer,
a decline of approximately $25 per share. As evidence of strong shareholder support
for the bid, the court noted that 87% of the shares were tendered. Id.
158. Grand Met at 1059. The court also noted the irony of management's re-
structuring plan that entailed the ultimate break-up of the company, while the offeror
made a noncoercive cash bid. Id. at 1061.
159. Id.
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realm supposedly protected by the business judgment rule, even as mod-
ified by Unocal and Revlon, that the directors alone have the duty to
inform themselves of the alternatives available and calculate what re-
sponse will best protect the shareholders and the corporation. Whether
the business judgment rule should even apply in takeover situations is a
separate question. However, the language of the Delaware Supreme Cou-
rt's decisions indicates adherence at least to the rhetoric of the rule.
Pillsbury largely disposes of that rhetoric, elevating shareholders' desires
for maximum value to the level of sole guiding principle in evaluating
management's defensive response.
Interco and Pillsbury reflect the trend in tender offers away from
the two-tier coercive offer that caused such consternation in management
and the courts. Although management could still argue that an offer was
coercive because the price did not reflect the full value of the company,
that claim began to ring hollow since every bid seemed to be inade-
quate. Additionally, companies' investment bankers often gave increas-
ingly higher valuations to each new bid."6 The implicit reasoning be-
hind most of management's arguments in favor of rejecting a hostile
offer is that the market has not fairly valued the company, and that
given sufficient time, shareholders will reap a greater return from
management's efforts than from accepting the offer. Although the Dela-
ware Supreme Court accepted that the market may not reflect a
corporation's full value in Cheff, Interco and Pillsbury look to the mar-
ket as the criterion for determining the adequacy of an offer and gaug-
ing the reasonableness of management's defensive- efforts to negotiate
the best deal for shareholders. Just as offerors moved away from coer-
cive bids, so the Delaware courts seemed to move in the direction of
adopting the market as the best available guide to determine a
company's value.
While Interco and Pillsbury focus on comparing the value of offers
by management and the offeror, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan
indicates that the directors' decision-making process is also subject to
scrutiny under Unocal and Revlon. 6' Macmillan is a catalogue of hor-
rors and the opinion adopts an attitude of near contempt for manage-
160. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1272-
73 (Del. 1988) (noting incongruity of investment banker's maximum valuation of $80
on June 7 with its opinion on August 25 that hostile offer of $80 was inadequate).
161. 559 A.2d 1261. Macmillan was the subject of perceived or actual takeover
attempts for over one year. The Chancery Court had invalidated a restructuring pro-
posal sponsored by management. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d
1227, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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ment and the board's actions that had not been seen since Van
Gorkom." The Chancery Court had earlier enjoined a management-
sponsored restructuring in response to an all cash tender offer on
grounds similar to Interco and Pillsbury; that the offer did not pose a
threat to the company and the restructuring was not an adequate alterna-
tive." In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the con-
duct of an auction run by directors that the court characterized as "alleg-
edly" independent. Management engaged legal and financial advisers to
rubber stamp decisions designed to repel outside bidders and transfer
control of the company to management.
After the Chancery Court's rejection of the management restructur-
ing, Robert Maxwell proposed an $80 per share merger in which
Macmillan's senior management would be retained. Macmillan did not
respond to Maxwell's offer, but instead negotiated with Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), a renowned LBO firm, to reach an
agreement for a management LBO. Macmillan provided KKR with con-
fidential financial information on the company. After receiving no re-
sponse to the offer for five weeks, Maxwell made a cash tender offer
for the company at $80 per share. Maxwell also offered to negotiate the
purchase of certain assets for $1.1 billion. Macmillan rejected the $80
offer as inadequate despite an earlier opinion by the company's invest-
ment adviser that its maximum breakup value was $80 per share.
Maxwell informed Macmillan that he would prevail in an auction for the
company, yet management continued to negotiate an LBO with
KKR.' 64
Without knowing the content or price of KKR's proposed LBO,
Macmillan management suggested that they would support the proposal
with the board. KKR indicated it would submit its final bid three days
later. The day before KKR's bid was due, management informed
Maxwell that it would have to submit a bid the following day, and that
management intended to support KKR's bid and would not consider
Maxwell's offer to top any bid. Maxwell subsequently increased his
offer to $84 per share, while KKR proposed a two-tiered offer of cash
and subordinated debt with a face value of $85 per share. The board
accepted KKR's offer, after which Maxwell increased his offer to
$86.60. The board then instituted an auction for the company to be
162. The court subjects management's various buyout schemes and the board's
inattentiveness to its duties to withering scorn lasting over 10 pages in the reported
opinion. 559 A.2d at 1265-78.
163. Id. at 1271.
164. Id. at 1272-73.
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conducted by Wasserstein Perella. After Maxwell and KKR submitted
virtually identical bids, Macmillan's chairman called KKR representa-
tives to "tip" them about Maxwell's bid.' 6 After further bidding, and
actions that clearly favored KKR over Maxwell, the board accepted
KKR's bid and granted it a lock-up option on Macmillan's most highly
valued assets."
The court noted that the facts showed not only deception by
Macmillan's management about the conduct of the auction and the fa-
voritism showed to KKR, but also "the board's own lack of oversight in
structuring and directing the auction."' 7 The board's failure to conduct
a fair auction breached its duty of loyalty and its duty of care to fully
inform itself. The transaction would be judged under the entire fairness
test rather than the business judgment rule. Under that higher threshold
standard, the decision of the board could not stand.
The more important part of Macmillan is the court's dicta concern-
ing the relationship between the Unocal and Revlon analyses. 6 The
court reviewed the asset lockup agreement to determine whether the
board's decision met the requirements of Revlon, although it need not
have reached that issue, given its finding that the board repeatedly
breached its fiduciary duty. Nevertheless, the court stated that the
Unocal enhanced standard applies to directors' decisions made in con-
ducting. a Revlon auction, although their responsibilities are different in
responding to the offer.' 69 When a company is under a duty to con-
duct an auction to maximize shareholder value, a plaintiff must first
show that the directors treated a party unfairly before applying the
Unocal standard. If there is unequal treatment, then the court must de-
termine whether the directors properly perceived that shareholder inter-
ests were enhanced by the auction. The board's actions must be reason-
able in response to any threat to shareholders. The actions of
Macmillan's board were tainted by the breach of the duty of loyalty and
165. 559 A.2d at 1275. KKR's counsel terminated the discussion once he real-
ized the impropriety-of the call. Id.
166. Id. at 1276-77. Senior management and Wasserstein Perella made presen-
tations to the board about the process for submitting the final Maxwell and KKR
bids, which the Court described as "false" and "untruthful." Id. at 1277.
167. Id. at 1279. The Court went on to state that "[t]he board was torpid, if
not supine, in it efforts to establish a truly independent auction . . . ." Id. at 1280.
168. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 8, at 55 (analysis was "presumably"
dicta).
169. 559 A.2d at 1287. "Although the board's irresponsibilities under Unocal
are far different, the enhanced duties of the directors in responding to a potential shift
in control, recognized in Unocal, remain unchanged." Id. (emphasis in original).
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the deceptions by management. Therefore the lockup option was invali-
dated. 17
0
The litany of abuses described by the court makes Macmillan an
easy case. However, the close scrutiny of management and the board
signaled that the Delaware Supreme Court was willing to apply the
policy of enhanced review to the procedures adopted by a company in a
corporate control contest. The emphasis on management fairness, togeth-
er with the clarification of the interplay between Unocal and Revlon,
elevates the principle of shareholder primacy to the core value in corpo-
rate law. Yet the court still did not clearly define the scope of the tests
it applied. The issue of when the Revlon auction duty applies remained
unanswered because in MacMillan, the court merely concluded that Re-
vlon applied, without stating when that point was reached. 171
It would be wrong to portray the Delaware courts as uniformly
advancing shareholder interests in an open market for corporate control
by invalidating management defensive tactics, or that the law was in any
sense a "seamless web" laying out all permissible responses to an offer.
In TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Co.,172 the Delaware Chan-
cery Court upheld a board's refusal to redeem a poison pill or to negoti-
ate with an offeror. The court accepted the argument that management
could refuse to negotiate in furtherance of its responsibilities to manage
the corporation for the long-term interests of the shareholders, even if
the short-term value of the stock will be negatively affected by the re-
fusal to negotiate. '71 In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corpora-
170. Id. at 1288.
171. Id. at 1285. "This case does not require a judicial determination of when
Macmillan was 'for sale.'" (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In a fo6tnote, the
court noted the vagueness of its position; "Clearly not every offer or transaction af-
fecting the corporate structure invokes the Revlon duties." Id. at 1285 n.35. The issue
is what types of offers or transactions do invoke the auction duty.
172. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,173 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
173. Id. at 92,182. The opinion is interesting because the Chancery Court con-
sidered the issue of which interests the board should protect in responding to an
offer. The Court posed the question this way:
mo what interest does the board look in resolving conflicts between inter-
ests in the corporation that -may be characterized as "shareholder long term
interests" or -corporate entity interests" or "multi-constituency interests" on
the one hand, and interests that may be characterized as -shareholder short-
term interests" or "current share value interests" on the other?
Id at 92,178 n.5. The competing interests of the corporation and shareholders were
reconciled on the basis that the long run interests of the corporation and the share-
holders are congruent, although the opinion does not identify the long run interests.
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tion,74 the Chancery Court upheld a self-tender and creation of an
ESOP that effectively stopping a hostile offer and proxy fight to replace
the board. The Court found that Polaroid had a valuable patent claim
that shareholders may not adequately assess. Therefore, the cash tender
offer posed a threat to shareholders who may undervalue their
shares. 175
TW Services and Polaroid were decided by the Chancery Court
after Macmillan, and demonstrated that management's defensive tactics
were not doomed to failure. Moreover, it was unclear whether there was
any consistency in the decisions spawned by the policy of heightened
scrutiny. The Delaware Supreme Court had not yet clarified the scope of
Unocal and Revlon by adopting a clear application of the enhanced
review standard. Nor had the court established a more precise definition
of when the auction duty applied, thereby still retaining its seat at the
table even after reviewing a number of challenges to defensive tactics
designed to thwart offers.
E. Time Trumps the Shareholders
After Macmillan, the balance between shareholders and management
was tilting toward the shareholders, although there was no sure basis to
predict the outcome of a challenge to management's defensive tactics in
any particular case. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court reoriented the law back in favor
of management and, quite possibly, brought an end to the policy of "en-
hanced review" requiring maximization of shareholder interests first sig-
nalled in Van Gorkom, announced as a new standard in Unocal, and
extended in Revlon. Time does not explicitly reverse these prior prece-
dents, but it uses the rhetoric of enhanced review to reach a conclusion
that effectively drains those decisions of their meaning. Ultimately, the
decision relinquishes the court's seat at the table. The law began with
dissatisfaction with Cheff, Time returns to management the discretion it
once had in responding to challenges. The important question is whether
the Delaware Supreme Court will adhere to the Time decision and allow
management to respond to challenges for control without meaningful
oversight during the next wave of mergers and acquisitions.
Id. at 92,180.
174. 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
175. 559 A.2d at 290.
176. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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1. The Transaction
In 1987, Time, a publishing and entertainment company, reviewed
its need to expand globally by acquiring concerns with access to world-
wide markets. Time's board ultimately authorized management to begin
discussions with other companies, including Warner Communication, Inc.
as part of a strategic plan. Time's board acted with the proviso that
Time's management control the company after any acquisition. More-
over, the board stressed that any acquisition required careful planning to
avoid putting Time "in play." The board considered further defensive
measures beyond the poison pill and other shark repellant devices it had
already adopted.
Time and Warner negotiated throughout the latter part of 1988 and
into 1989 concerning the structure of an acquisition and management of
the new corporation. 17 7 In March 1989, Time and Warner's boards ap-
proved a merger in which the Warner shareholders would own 62% of
the new corporation after an exchange of stock. The Warner sharehold-
ers received a 12% premium for their shares because Time retained
control of management as a means of protecting the "Time
Culture." 17 Time's board also adopted additional defensive measures,
including a share exchange agreement with Warner, a no-shop provision,
and agreements with various banks prohibiting those banks from lending
to third parties seeking to acquire Time. On the public relations front,
Time announced the transaction and applauded itself for reaching an
agreement that did not involve debt financing.
The Time-Warner merger proceeded swimmingly until June 7,
1989, when Paramount announced a cash tender offer for Time at $175
per share, causing the stock to soar $44 (approximately 35%) in one
day. 79 After three meetings, Time's board rejected Paramount's bid as
177. Time favored the outright acquisition of Warner in an all cash, or cash
and securities transaction, while Warner sought a stock swap in order that its share-
holders could retain their equity in the corporation. Time agreed to Warner's proposal,
but the negotiations temporarily foundered on the issue of who would become the
CEO and who would be in the line of succession to that position. Time's board
considered control of the company's governance crucial in order to maintain the
"Time Culture." Id. at 1145. Negotiations resumed in January 1989 when Steven
Ross, Warner's CEO, agreed to Time's proposed management structure. Id. at 1145-
46.
178. Id. at 1146. The new corporation, Time Warner, would have a 24 person
board, with equal representation from both companies, and co-CEOs from both com-
panies for five years. The board would create editorial and entertainment committees
to oversee those operations controlled by Time and Warner, respectively. Id.
179. Id. at 1147. Time's CEO immediately fired off a letter to Paramount, at-
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inadequate,' 80 concluding that the merger with Warner "was the better
course of action" and declined to negotiate with Paramount. The rules of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), on which Time listed its shares,
required a vote by Time's shareholders to approve the Warner transac-
tion. Time sought permission from the NYSE to proceed with the merg-
er without shareholder approval because its directors "expressed their
concern that Time stockholders would not comprehend the long-term
benefits of the Warner merger;" the NYSE rejected the request."'
The board considered the Paramount bid a threat to the "Time Cul-
ture," and decided to reformulate the transaction as an outright acqui-
sition of Warner through a two-tiered offer at $70 per share.8 2 The
new transaction required Time to finance the deal by assuming $7-10
billion of debt, and agreed to waive its poison pill against Warner. Para-
mount raised its offer to $200 per share. Despite offering a 60% premi-
um over the price of Time stock before Paramount's initial offer, Time's
board rejected Paramount's offer as inadequate because the Warner tran-
saction "offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders and, un-
like Paramount's offer, did not pose a threat to Time's survival and its
'culture.""8 3 Paramount and Time shareholders sued to enjoin the
Warner acquisition.
2. The Revlon Analysis
The Delaware Supreme Court began by examining the plaintiffs'
argument that Time's board must conduct an auction for the company
under Revlon. The Chancery Court found Revlon inapplicable because
the merger did not constitute a change of control since no single share-
holder gained or lost a controlling interest in the surviving entity.'"
tacking that company's president and denigrating the offer as "smoke and mirrors."
As might be expected, Time's board heartily approved the response after being shown
the letter.
180. Interestingly, the Time board's investment adviser valued the company in
March between $189 and $212 per share, while in June after the bid by Paramount,
its valuation range was $40 per share higher. Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,272 (Del.
Ch. 1989). Time asserted that the second valuation included a control premium, while
the March valuation served a different purpose. Id.
181. 571 A.2d at 1148.
.182. The offer entailed the purchase of 51% of Warner at $70 cash, and a
back-end merger in an exchange of cash and securities. Id.
183. Id. at 1149.
184. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
93,279-80. The Chancery Court determined that "[c]ontrol of both remained in a
large, fluid, changeable and changing market." Id. at 93,280.
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The Delaware Supreme Court adopted a much more restrictive approach
in defining when Revlon applies. The court found that there are two cir-
cumstances requiring an auction: first, when a corporation initiates an
active bidding contest involving the clear break-up of the company; and
second, when the target abandons its long term strategy and seeks an
alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company in re-
sponse to an offer."' The court tried to retain some flexibility in its
definition of when the auction duty applies by stating that it was not
excluding other possibilities. Yet, the opinion's precise language describ-
ing when Revlon applies makes clear that those other possibilities are
not easily imagined, and are likely only theoretical.
Either circumstance triggering Revlon necessarily requires the target
board to make the decision to commence the auction process. The key
to the analysis is its focus on the "break-up" of the corporation clearly
diminishing the economic entity such that it is a different enterprise.'
8 6
Therefore, the court reasoned, the decision to change the transaction
from a merger to an outright acquisition of Warner had no effect on
whether the Revlon duty applied because the change did not require the
board to abandon its strategic plan or otherwise make the sale of Time
inevitable."' By adopting the break-up of the company as the crucial
event under Revlon, the court avoided the position adopted by the
Chancery Court of examining whether a "change of control" oc-
curred.'88 Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court chose a much higher
threshold for the auction duty.
More than raising the Revlon threshold, however, the court nar-
rowed Revlon to the point of irrelevancy by requiring that the directors
affirmatively choose to bring about the break-up of the corporation. In
Revlon, the court emphasized the need to serve shareholder interests by
maximizing the value of the stock. Under Time, that interest is contin-
gent on a board's determination that it will undertake to engage in a
course of action to maximize the stock's value, a decision that necessari-
ly implies the effective dissolution of the corporation. Among the con-
cerns that a director may consider in responding to a takeover are the
non-shareholder interests articulated in Unocal. Those interests can sup-
185. 571 A.2d at 1150.
186. See Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUs. LAW. 2105, 2111
(1990) [hereinafter Beyond Time] (court intended Revlon to apply if continued exis-
tence is abandoned by diminution).
187. 571 A.2d at 1151.
188. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
93,280.
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port a decision to reject a bid and not enter the Revlon mode, regardless
of whether that decision results in maximizing shareholder welfare in the
short or long term.'8 9 In short, management will have little trouble
avoiding Revlon because shareholder interests are no longer the driving
force in determining the proper response to a bid. The power of direc-
tors to decide whether to even respond to an offer means the likelihood
of a Revlon auction is remote.
3. The Unocal Analysis
After disposing of the Revlon argument by vesting the decision to
invoke the auction duty in the board of directors, the Time decision
turned to the plaintiffs' Unocal challenge to the merger. The Unocal
analysis required the Delaware Supreme Court to first determine the
nature of the threat posed by Paramount's $200 per share all cash tender
offer.'" Interco and Pillsbury began their enhanced review assuming
that a cash tender offer is not coercive to the corporation, only to the
shareholders. Under this analysis, the degree of coercion is derived sole-
ly from the inadequacy of the offer. Under those opinions, once man-
agement responds by proposing its own plan in response to the original
offer, the inadequacy of the offer is ultimately an issue for the share-
holders to decide. The court's role is to ensure that shareholders have
the power to choose between roughly equivalent offers.
Time rejects the premise of Interco and Pillsbury at the outset,
stating that the court disapproves "of such a narrow and rigid construc-
tion of Unocal" and will not undertake to judge what offer is best for
shareholders.19 Instead, the court determined that Paramount's offer
constituted a threat to Time because its shareholders "might elect to ten-
der into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the
strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might pro-
duce."" 9 According the timing of Paramount's offer was designed to
upset and confuse Time's shareholders.
Paramount's proposed takeover also posed a threat to Time's strate-
gic plan to protect the unique "Time Culture" while pursuing global
189. See Johnson & Millon, Beyond Time, supra note 186, at 2119 (consider-
ation of non-shareholder interests means Revlon's days may be numbered); Norwitz,
supra note 21, at 381 (Time clearly increases the board's discretion).
190. 571 A.2d at 1151-55.
191. 571 A.2d at 1153. The Court went on to note that "Unocal is not intended
to lead to a simple mathematical exercise: that is, of comparing the discounted value
of Time-Wamer's expected trading price at some future date with Paramount's offer
and determining which is higher." Id.
192. ld.
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expansion. The court adopted a position advanced in Van Gorkom that a
firm's market price may not adequately reflect the true value of the
corporation. Therefore, management may consider shareholder "igno-
rance" of the value of staying the course in resisting an offer.
93
Moreover, a takeover which threatens corporate objectives may be the
basis for rejecting an offer. By analyzing only the effect of a bid on the
corporation rather than the type of bid and its value to shareholders, the
Delaware Supreme Court transformed the first part of the Unocal test
from evaluating whether an offer constitutes a threat to examining
whether the board has any plausible basis for adopting a defensive mea-
sure. Time gave directors the power to designate an offer as a threat to
the corporation, allowing the court to hold that the "board was under no
obligation to negotiate with Paramount.""9
The second prong of the Unocal test permits the court to decide
who should determine whether the corporation will pursue a short-term
strategy to maximize the value of the shares or a long-term strategy to
achieve corporate goals. Revlon decided that a board must maximize
shareholder value once the break-up of the firm is inevitable. Interco
and Pillsbury endorse the concept of shareholder choice to determine the
ultimate direction of the corporation. Time reverses that trend by holding
that Delaware law confers on management and the board the duty to
manage the enterprise, including "the selection of a time frame for
achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the
stockholders."' 95 An offer does not require management to "abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit
unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy. " ',
The court's analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that restructuring
the Warner transaction was a reasonable response to Paramount's threat.
4. An Analysis of Time
Time removes the Delaware courts from their previous role of de-
termining the value of an offer or other extraordinary corporate trans-
actions, such as recapitalizations and special dividends. Under Interco
and Pillsbury, the Chancery Court critiques the valuations of
management's responses to hostile offers and concludes that the compet-
ing transactions were essentially equal. The business judgment rule,
however, operates on the premise that courts are not equipped to make
193. Id at 1150 n.12.
194. Id. at 1154.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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business decisions, such as estimating the value of securities and debt
instruments. Under the business judgment rule, the courts should defer
to the expertise of a properly informed board. Once the court travels
down the path of evaluating competing offers, board decisions will be
disrupted by post hoc judicial review that will likely not clarify accept-
able standards of conduct.
Time is also important because the opinion refocuses the court on
the primary role of directors in determining the proper course for the
corporation. The analysis of what constitutes a "threat" after Unocal
narrowed as offerors made all cash bids. The trend toward allowing
greater shareholder choice may have ultimately resulted in a rule where-
by shareholders alone decide whether to accept a cash tender offer since
there was no threat to the corporation. The Interco and Pillsbury deci-
sions approach the passivity thesis for responding to offers by asserting
that management cannot block the shareholders' right to accept reason-
ably equivalent offers once the defensive measures had achieved their
purpose of inviting competing bids. Whether or not this development
was welcome, the Delaware Supreme Court had long adopted a pro-
management position that would never countenance such a radical depar-
ture in favor of shareholders. Time is a natural reaction to the enhanced
scrutiny standard, which backs on the power of both management and
the board to respond to offers. Thus, Time reiterates the basic message
of Unocal that directors do not lose the protection of the business judg-
ment rule in responding reasonably to an offer.
Time answers the question left open in Unocal concerning the defi-
nition of a threat by granting the board power to determine whether a
bid constitutes a threat to the corporation or its shareholders.'97 Lan-
guage used by the court clearly shows that the threat need not be to
shareholders and that a corporation may reject an offer even if share-
holders would realize a short-term profit.' 8 If the board may consider
"corporate" interests that may be opposed to the shareholders' goal of
maximizing the value of their investment, then every bid can be a threat
to the corporation no matter how shareholders value it or whether they
want to accept it.'" The -court's analysis of what constitutes a threat
197. Note, Time and Time Again, supra note 128, at 204. See Hazen, Corporate
Persona, supra note 28, at 293 (court favors management in power struggle for con-
trol of corporation by raising exit price for shareholders).
198. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
199. See Johnson & Millon, Beyond Time, supra note 186, at 2115 (court fo-
cused on the corporate enterprise interests rather than only shareholder interests, which
the board may consider in responding to an offer).
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comports with its rejection of the efficient market theory because corpo-
rate goals are not restricted to maximizing the price put on the firm as
reflected by stock prices. Under the Time analysis, the value of a corpo-
ration can exceed the aggregate price of its stock. Therefore, the board
may adopt defensive measures to preserve the corporation based on its
own conclusion that the offer is less than the "true value" of the corpo-
ration.
The weakness of Time is its failure to perform more than a cursory
review of the reasonableness of the board's response to the threat from
Paramount's bid. Time confines its analysis under the second part of
Unocal to reverential recapitulations of the need to preserve the "Time
Culture" and the value shareholders would ultimately realize from the
merger of Time and Warner.2"° Yet the court makes no effort to deter-
mine whether these claims are even reasonable on their face. The point
is not that the Delaware Supreme Court should have judged valuations
as the Chancery Court did in Interco and Pillsbury. But there is not
even the slightest effort in Time to scrutinize whether management has a
basis for its argument that its strategic plan will ultimately result in
greater shareholder value. The court reduces the second prong of Unocal
to a dead letter by blithely accepting Time's strategic plan as the basis
for rejecting the offer. 20 ' The court clearly signals management that
they should have the board adopt some form of a long-term company
plan that will be plausibly beneficial to the enterprise and its sharehold-
ers. Once the plan is in place, the board may refuse to negotiate with
any offeror and, indeed, keep the company from ever being acquired
through a hostile offer by refusing to consider any proposed transaction.
Time brings corporate law to a point far removed from the Court's start-
ing point in Van Gorkom and Unocal. Time effectively rejects the
shareholder welfare principle that had long guided corporate law, thereby
200. The Court's use of the "Time Culture" as an apparent basis for the board
to reject the offer is hard to accept at face value. The v~unted "Culture" to be pre-
served includes People magazine and an annual issue of Sports Illustrated dedicated
to the latest in women's swimwear exhibited in exotic locales, in addition to Time
and its history of journalistic independence. Any company can claim that its .culture is
unique and worth preserving, yet that argument should not be the sole basis for re-
jecting all mergers, and no guidance is given as to what cultures are worthy of pres-
ervation.
201. See id. at 2121 (continued vitality of Unocal called into question by Time);
Note, Time and Time Again, supra note 128, at 206 (Time marks the end of any
meaningful proportionality review under Unocal); Note, Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 11, at 969 (Time suggests that the business judgment rule protects the board of
directors as long as strategic goals exist.).
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giving management virtually unfettered discretion over the corporate
enterprise. The Time decision may signal that the Delaware Supreme
Court has decided to give up its seat at the table in reviewing defensive
tactics in corporate control contests.
5. The Aftermath of Time
There is no sure method to predict whether a merger will be suc-
cessful or how the Delaware Supreme Court will apply Time to future
corporate control contests. The takeover of Pillsbury by Grand Met has
been successful, even though it started as a hostile offer. Meanwhile, a
number of companies adopting defensive measures, such as LBOs, have
ended up in bankruptcy court.2"2 The impossible question is whether
shareholders and the corporation would have benefitted more if the hos-
tile offers had been accepted, rather than allowing management to thwart
the takeovers through defensive measures. Although hindsight is perfect,
it is fair to question whether the Time Warner merger has been success-
ful. Time's management premised its refusal to even negotiate with
Paramount on the basis that it had a strategic plan that would bring
shareholders even greater value in the long term while protecting the
"Time Culture" from outside bidders. Approximately two years after
Time first rejected Paramount's offer and continued its pursuit of the
merger with Warner, the transaction can fairly be judged a failure from
the point of view of both shareholders and other constituencies of the
corporation.
In June 1991, Time Warner announced a plan to refinance the
heavy debt it assumed to complete the Warner purchase through a com-
plicated stock rights offering under which the company's current share-
holders would have to purchase rights at a price between $63 and
$105.203 The market swiftly reacted to the rights offering as Time
202. See, e.g., Brown, Grand Met: A Brandrich Bargain Basement, FINANCIAL
WORLD, June 25, 1991, at 18 (Pillsbury contributed 30% of Grand Met's 1991
earnings); Faltermayer, The Deal Decade: Verdict on the Eighties, FORTUNE, Aug. 26,
1991, at 58 (reviewing problems of LBOs and restructured companies with high debt,
including bankruptcy of Interco after defending against hostile bid). Interco filed for
bankruptcy protection only two years after completing the recapitalization designed to
ward off a hostile offer. A court-appointed examiner recommended that creditors be
allowed to proceed with fraudulent conveyance claims against the company's former
chairman in connection with the recapitalization. Schwadel & Smith, Interco Inc. Has
Grounds to Sue Its Chairman, Wall St. J., October 25, 1991, at A3; Jereski* Fiction
In, Fiction Out, FORBES, December 9, 1991, at 292.
203. Landler, supra note 18 at 70-71. Time Warner needs the funds raised
through the equity offering to pay down $4.3 billion of debt due in 1993. Id. at 71.
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Warner's stock fell more than $29 after the announcement. Moreover,
the company's stock had languished in a range of $100-125 per share
throughout 1990 and 1991, far below the Paramount offer of $200 per
share. The long-term growth of Time Warner through global expansion
and the synergy between Time's publishing properties and Warner's
entertainment acumen have not been reflected in the stock price. 4
Time Warner even announced layoffs at its magazines, the very type of
action the company said it would not do in assuming the large debt to
finance the Warner purchase. Among the changes being considered by
management is converting Time magazine from a newsweekly to a jour-
nal of essays and criticism.2 °" The highly prized "Time Culture" is ob-
viously not immune to the requirements of debt service. The venerable
editorial integrity does not rule out a radical change in the flagship peri-
odical in a highly competitive environment.
The problems faced by Time Warner do not necessarily mean that
the merger was wrong. The weakness of the Time decision, however, is
that the Delaware Supreme Court accepted management's contentions
that the transaction would enhance the value of the company without
requiring the directors to do anything more than assert that they had a
strategic plan that would not survive a hostile offer. Without more, Time
allows management to adopt any self-serving plan to shield itself from a
hostile transaction whether or not that plan can succeed." 6
The court in Time should have. required management to put forth
the details of its plan and defend it as a reasonable business decision
that will benefit the corporation and its shareholders.2"7 Such a re-
The company eventually withdrew its rights offering and opted for a more traditional
equity offering of $2.6 billion of common stock. Dobrzynski, Time Warner Feels the
Force of Shareholder Power, Bus. WEEK, July 29, 1991, at 58-59.
204. Landro & Smith, After Stock Debacle, Some Ask: Will Hubris Undo Time
Warner, Wall St. J., July 19, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
205. Goldman, Time Warner Plans $60 Million Charge to Cover Restructuring
and 605 Job Cuts, Wall St. J., September 20, 1991, at B8, col. 1; Reilly, Time
Warner Said to Set Staff Cuts At Magazines, Closing of News Bureaus, Wall St. J.,
August 29, 1991, at B3, col. 1.
206. This is a perverse reversal of the implicit requirement of Van Gorkom, dis-
cussed supra at note 11, that the board adopt additional procedures to ensure proper
documentation of its decision-making process in reviewing an offer. In Time, the stra-
tegic plan takes the place of the board's procedures as the method of policing man-
agement without the Delaware Supreme Court requiring that the plan have any con-
tent or that the board even consider an offer.
207. Gilson and Kraakman make the same point. "[Tihe court must be free to
exercise its independent judgment in weighing whether management's plans present a
plausible story: a goal that improves on the value of the hostile offer and a means
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quirement may not have changed the decision whether the board acted
reasonably in response to an offer. At a minimum, management would
have been forced to divulge a plan it could defend in court. The very
act of arguing for its plan as a defensive measure gives shareholders
information to judge- whether the plan has any likelihood of succeeding.
Time divorces the board's decision to pursue a strategic plan from
the principle that the corporation exists for the benefit of the sharehold-
ers. Therefore, the court does not have a logical method to evaluate the
plan beyond accepting the board's declaration that the corporation will
benefit. Instead, shareholders bear the brunt of the decision to reject a
$200 per share offer to pursue a course that has worked to their detri-
ment. While Time extols the virtues of a board's decision to act for the
'long-term benefit of the company, the decision does not reach the issue
of whether the corporation's other constituencies can rely on the board
to protect their interests. Section IV of this article examines whether
stakeholders and other investors in the corporation have gained any real
protection from the changes in corporate law brought about by the battle
for corporate control in the 1980s.
IV. STAKEHOLDERS AS THE NEW PLAYERS IN THE GAME
The underlying principle of corporate law has been that manage-
ment conducts the affairs of the corporation under the general oversight
of the board with the company operating for the benefit of its share-
holders. That simplistic approach was challenged in the 1980s, as shown
in the preceding section. Moreover, regardless of whether that principle
is sufficient to arrange the primary relationship between management
and shareholders, it ignores the interests of other constituencies, such as
owners of the company's debt securities (i.e., bondholders), employees,
suppliers, and the local communities surrounding a company's opera-
tions. As the disruptive effects of takeovers reached these other con-
stituencies, they clamored for a voice in the decision-making process.
The Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that
parties other than the shareholders may have a claim on the board's
consideration in Unocal, stating that the effect of a tender offer "on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, em-
ployees, and perhaps the community generally)" can be considered in
the directors' analysis of the proper defensive measure.208 In Time, the
court emphasized that Paramount's offer was a threat to the corporation
that is reasonably likely to achieve the goal." Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Inter-
mediate Standard, supra note 86, at 270-71.
208. 493 A.2d at 955.
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rather than its shareholders. The company's adherence to its strategic
plan, therefore, is part of the board's inherent power to manage the cor-
poration for the long term, a duty that cannot be delegated to sharehold-
ers.
209
Stakeholders in a corporation depend on a firm's stability and its
continuation as an enterprise to protect their investments; in short, stake-
holders are risk-averse.21° Although corporate law did not provide di-
rect protection to anyone other than shareholders, owners of the corpo-
ration's bonds unsuccessfully sought to use the traditional corporate and
contract law principles of fiduciary duties and good faith to protect
themselves from management's restructuring of corporations."' Unlike
209. 571 A.2d at 1153-54; see Johnson & Millon, Beyond Time, supra note
186, at 2114 (Unocal and Time concern threats to the corporate enterprise, not to
shareholders; moreover, the impact of a coercive bid is on constituencies other than
shareholders); see also, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications
Corp., No. 12150 (Del Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 277613 at *33,
n.55) (Board of directors does not act improperly, if in an informed, good-faith effort
to maximize a corporation's long-term wealth, the board diverges from the choice the
stockholders [or any single group interested in the corporation) would have made if
they had the opportunity to act).
210. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BusINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LE-
GAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 42-44 (3d ed. 1988) (decisions that increase risk will
result in increased stock but decreased band value); Macey, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, supra note 3, at 181 (fixed claimants do not receive a greater return on
investment if firm performs well).
211. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 301 (Del. 1988). The Delaware
Supreme Court held that convertible debentures embody "a contractual entitlement to
the repayment of a debt and does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing
corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fidu-
ciary duties." Id. at 303. The issue of what protection bondholders have outside the
trust indenture when the issuer of the debt securities undertakes an LBO arose in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). Two insurance companies purchased various bonds issued by RJR Nabisco
before its $24 billion LBO in which RJR assumed $19 billion of new debt. The
insurance companies sued when RJR Nabisco's debt was downgraded after the LBO,
causing multimillion dollar loses in the value of the insurance companies' debt securi-
ties. Id. at 1506. The insurance companies alleged a breach of fiduciary duty and
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing not to incur substan-
tial debt to liquidate the company's shareholders when that transaction dramatically
impairs the value of the company's bonds, notwithstanding the fact that express provi-
sions of the indenture did not prohibit the transaction or assumption of additional
debt. Id. at 1508. The district court noted that "[i]nvestors as sophisticated as [these
plaintiffs] would be hard-pressed to plead ignorance of these market risks." Id. at
1514. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
not "permit an implied covenant to shoehorn into an indenture additional terms plain-
tiffs now wish had been included." Id. at 1519; see Coffee, Unstable Coalitions:
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Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, at 1508-09
(1990) [hereinafter Unstable Coalitions] (the problem with the insurance companies ar-
gument is that duty of good faith and fair dealing constrains a party's exercise of
discretionary power under a contract, and does not overrule express terms or substitute
implied terms). The district court also rejected the insurance companies' breach of
fiduciary duty claim, adopting the holding of Simons that bondholders are not owed
any fiduciary duty but instead are limited to the terms of the trust indenture. 716
F.Supp. at 1524.
Metropolitan Life has been criticized because it accepts the indenture at face
value as a contract negotiated between the issuer and the bondholders. Mitchell, supra
note 22, at 1188-89. Yet, the issuer and underwriter create the indenture before the
securities are sold and incorporate the minimum degree of protection necessary in the
indenture to sell the debt securities at the lowest cost to the issuer. Even sophisticated
insurance companies must accept the indenture as written; therefore, bondholders
should be protected by imposing additional fiduciary duties on management similar to
those protecting shareholders. Id. Professor Mitchell argues that imposing fiduciary
duties on behalf of bondholders will protect -a disenfranchised and practically power-
less group of corporate investors." Id. at 1228. It is hard to imagine as "practically
powerless" large institutional investors such as insurance companies, that manage secu-
rities trading accounts with billions of dollars of debt, equity, and derivative securi-
ties. Any argument on behalf of such investors based on a need to overcome their
ignorance is not intuitively appealing. See Carney, Defining Constituencies, supra note
21, at 405 ("Arguments that sophisticated institutional bondholders have been victim-
ized, either by the monopoly power of issuers or the naivete of buyers, do not sit
very well.").
The problem with the notion of extending fiduciary duties to debt securities
is that the indenture is a widely disseminated public document setting forth the basic
relationship between the parties only if a person or institution wants to purchase the
bond. Investors are not compelled to purchase the bond, and claims for breach of
fiduciary duty seek to expand the rights of bondholders to cover events that are not
prohibited by the indenture. Permitting bondholders to assert claims of breach of a
fiduciary duty to recover losses on their investments will impose additional costs on
the issuer and, ultimately, its shareholders. This claim will not add any real value to
the debt securities because the bonds are priced to include the risk that a company
will default on its interest and principal payments.
Bondholders, however, have had success challenging LBOs as fraudulent con-
veyances when the company falls into bankruptcy. Bondholders now routinely chal-
lenge LBOs in which the company ends up in bankruptcy as fraudulent conveyances.
The courts have become more receptive to the claims. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990); Murphy v. Meritor Savings
Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 Bankr. 370 (Bankr D. Mass. 1991); Mellon Bank v.
Metro Communications, Inc. (In re Metro Communications, Inc.), 95 Bankr. 921
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). This trend has resulted in greater payments to bondholders
to settle their claims to allow companies to emerge from bankruptcy. See McCartney,
A Move Toward Reparations for Losers in Empire's Demise, Wash. Post, August 18,
1991, at H1 (bondholders of Allied Stores Corp. agreed to settle their fraudulent con-
veyance claim for $192 million [approximately $.32 on the dollar] against Robert
Campeau and third-party lenders in connection with the Federated Stores LBO fi-
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bondholders, howev'er, the other corporate constituencies could not even
attempt to invoke formal legal principles to protect their interests. Their
claim on the firm is indirect and generally not recognized by corporate
law, even though their interests are no less important than the claims of
shareholders and bondholders. These stakeholders, therefore, turned to
state legislatures to protect corporations from hostile takeovers and limit
the adverse impact of these transactions on the employees and the com-
munities in which the companies operated. In.response, state legislatures
passed antitakeover legislation and explicitly empowered corporate
boards to consider non-shareholder interests.
As a result, corporate law is now enmeshed in the conflicting de-
mands of shareholders and stakeholders that the corporate enterprise be
managed to protect each group's interests, even at the expense of other
interests.
A. Stakeholders and the Rise of Antitakeover Legislation
Shareholders and bondholders have a quantifiable investment in the
corporation that can usually be sold in the secondary market. The "Wall
Street Rule" permits investors to express their disagreement with the
management and minimize their losses by selling their investment in the
securities markets. Unlike shareholders and bondholders, stakeholders in
the corporation do not have that option because their "investment" is an
intangible commitment of labor and energy in the corporation or an
investment in businesses and services that support the corporate enter-
prise and its employees. These firm-specific investments cannot be liqui-
dated in the same way a shareholder might sell stock in the corporation
or as bondholder may sell a debt security. In addition, there is no legal
mechanism similar to a derivative suit to preserve the value stakeholders
have built up in the corporation. Disruptions that can occur from an
extraordinary corporate transaction reach far beyond the financial mar-
kets and may deprive employees, suppliers and communities of a life-
long commitment to a corporation.
The difficult question concerning the mergers and acquisitions boom
in the 1980s is whether it was beneficial to society. A strict economic
approach to corporate restructuring views the changes as follows:
[Niot only are takeovers beneficial to the shareholders of the firms
being acquired, takeovers also provide substantial benefits to society at
large. These gains come in the form of improving the productivity of
American corporations so that goods and services reach Americans at
nanced in part through transfers from Allied Stores).
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lower prices, and enabling American firms to compete more effective-
ly in global product markets.1
12
According to this view, any perceived detrimental effects on
stakeholders can be remedied through a private contracting process be-
tween the corporation and its various constituencies. Stakeholders suffer-
ing dislocations can be compensated through side payments by the firm
outside the takeover context.213 The value derived from takeovers and
corporate restructuring is easily measured by calculating the amount of
the premium received by shareholders over the price of the firm's secu-
rities prior to the transaction.
Commentators have questioned the assumption that the premiums
received by shareholders is a fair measure of the value of transactions
because the premiums may overestimate the actual benefits of a transac-
tion."" If the benefits from takeovers are not as great as first estimat-
ed, the social costs of the transactions may outweigh any economic
benefits.21 5 Moreover, it is small consolation to an employee who was
laid off or a restaurateur whose clientele have been transferred that, in
212. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 19, at 472.
213. See Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 3, at 175 ("Dis-
locations to non-shareholder constituencies, while real, can best be remedied by side
payments, made through intra-firm contracts."). For example, suppliers can enter into
long-term contractual relationships or seek outright vertical integration into the corpo-
ration with which they conduct business. l at 191. The role of the court under the
contract approach to protecting stakeholder interests is to discover the implicit con-
tracts, police any ex post opportunism that exploits firm-specific capital investments,
and respect the special needs of shareholders as residual claimants on the
corporation's value. Id. at 180.
214. See Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) [hereinafter Takeover Premi-
ums]. Professor Stout makes the seemingly obvious but overlooked point that a
corporation's supply of stock is generally inelastic. Therefore, a tender offer may
exert price pressure on the limited supply of shares and bid up the market price of
the stock. Id. at 1247. Takeover premiums may reflect the downward sloping demand
curve for stock. The fact that a premium is paid does not necessarily prove that a
takeover is beneficial because it creates efficiency gains. l at 1275. Professor
Wolfson makes a related point that successful bidders may be infected with the "win-
ners curse" because they will systematically overestimate the value of the target.
Therefore, any gains from a takeover may reflect overbidding rather than other eco-
nomic forces. Wolfson, Efficient Markets, Hubris, Chaos, Legal Scholarship and Take-
overs, 63 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 511, 518 (1989). See also Coffee, Takeover Reform,
supra note 16, at 443 (source of takeover gains remains a mystery).
215. Coffee, Takeover Reform, supra note 16, at 447. Coffee notes that even if
the private gains from takeovers outweigh the social costs, the wealth transfer is
probably "anti-egalitarian." Id at 448.
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the aggregate, shareholder gains will outweigh the relatively minor loss
caused by corporate restructuring. Academic descriptions of the contract-
ing process by which stakeholders can protect their firm-specific capital
have a certain metaphysical quality that does not seem to reflect the
reality of losing a job or a business.
Whether takeovers work to the ultimate benefit of society, man-
agement and stakeholders fought the threat of hostile offers by turning
to their state legislatures. The Supreme Court initially rebuffed attempts
to regulate hostile tender offers in Edgar v. MITE, when the Court
found the state law violated the Commerce Clause, holding that the
Williams Act preempted the state legislation.216 Pressure in the states
for protective legislation, however, only increased as the pace of corpo-
rate transactions exploded in the 1980s. A series of second generation
antitakeover statutes appeared that attempted to avoid the problems iden-
tified in MITE by ostensibly regulating only the internal affairs of do-
mestic corporations. These statutes generally were of two types: one set
regulated the terms of an offer by requiring a fair price for all shares or
pre-approval by all disinterested shareholders prior to acquisition of a
control share of a target, ostensibly to eliminate the threat of two-tiered
tender offers;217 a second type was business combination statutes pro-
hibiting persons acquiring more than a defined percentage of shares
from engaging in a business combination with the target corporation for
a certain number of years without the prior approval of the board."18
1. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: The Supreme
Court Upholds Second-Generation Antitakeover Statutes
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 9 the Supreme
Court upheld an Indiana statute that placed some restrictions on the
conduct of a hostile tender offer, and in the process, the Court opened
216. 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASSN'S CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-709 (Supp.
1991) (fair price statute); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1991)
(control share statute); see generally Garfield, State Competence, supra note 18, at
548-53 (describing array of second generation statutes); Hazen, State Anti-Takeover
Legislation: The Second and Third Generation, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77, 80-84
(1988) (describing second generation takeover statutes).
218. The first two states to adopt this type of statute were New York and New
Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:IOA-1 to 1QA-6 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992); see Sroufe & Gelband,
Business Combination Statutes: A "Meaningful Opportunity" for Success, 45 BUs.
LAW. 891, 892 & n.5 (1990) (reviewing states adopting business combination statutes).
219. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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up the field to broad state regulation of the market for corporate control.
Indiana enacted a control share statute that applied to companies incor-
porated in Indiana meeting certain criteria.2 Any entity that acquired
a threshold amount of the stock of a corporation covered by the statute
could not vote the shares unless a majority of the corporation's disinter-
ested shareholders voted to give the acquiring entity the right to vote its
shares.22 The question of whether to allow the acquiring entity to vote
its shares had to be submitted to a disinterested shareholder vote at a
special meeting within fifty days of the acquiring entity's request for the
special meeting. The Indiana statute avoided the problems identified
by the Supreme Court in MITE of favoring incumbent management by
interfering with the timing provisions of the Williams Act and allowing
state officials to block takeovers. The Indiana legislature limited the
antitakeover provision to regulating the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion, i.e. the relationship between the corporate issuer and its sharehold-
ers, and only applied to companies incorporated in Indiana with mini-
mum threshold contacts to the state.
Six days after the Indiana statute went into effect, Dynamics an-
nounced a tender offer for one million shares of CTS, bringing its hold-
ings to 27.5% of CTS. 23 Dynamics sought to enjoin CTS' use of the
act and the district and circuit courts sided with Dynamics. 24 In the
Supreme Court, Dynamics reiterated its arguments that the Indiana stat-
ute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce, and therefore was un-
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 22 Dynamics also
220. The criteria are: (1) 100 or more shareholders; (2) principal place of busi-
ness, principal office, or substantial assets in the state; and (3) either a certain num-
ber of shares owned by Indiana residents or a certain percentage of the company's
shareholders are Indiana residents. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-4 (Bums 1990).
221. The thresholds for triggering the "control share" voting restriction are 20%,
33.3%, and a majority. Id. § 23-1-42-3. "Interested" shareholders include both the
acquiring entity or any members of a group that crosses the percentage threshold and
the officers and directors of the target corporation. Id. §§23-1-42-1.
222. The acquiring entity must make certain specified disclosures with the re-
quest for a meeting and must pay the expenses for the special meeting. Id. §23-1-42-
7, 8. If the disinterested shareholders grant the acquiring entity the right to vote its
shares, then shareholders are entitled to dissenters rights based on the highest price
paid by the acquiring entity for its control shares. Id. § 23-1-42-11. If the right to
vote is denied, then the corporation has the right, but not the obligation, to purchase
the acquiring entity's shares for "fair value." Id. § 23-1-42-10.
223. 481 U.S. at 75. Dynamics owned 9.6% of CTS.
224. CTS 481 U.S. at 75-76 (reviewing Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986)).
225. Id. at 87-88.
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asserted that the Williams Act preempted the state regulation because it
delays completion of a tender offer, conflicting with the requirements of
the Act.22
The Court rejected the preemption argument, holding that even
under the reasoning in MITE, the Indiana statute "passes muster" be-
cause the legislation protects shareholders from the coercive aspects of a
tender offer.227 The fifty day waiting period before the shareholder
vote could cause some delay in completing an offer. However, the Court
refused to require that the timing provisions of the Williams Act control
all aspects of a tender offer.228 The Court held that the delay itself did
not create a conflict with federal law. To hold otherwise "would pre-
empt a variety of state corporate laws of hitherto unquestioned valid-
ity. ' 29 The Court also concluded that because of the states' -historic
role in regulating corporations, "if Congress had intended to pre-empt all
state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender
offer, it would have said so explicitly. ' 23
The Court also rejected the Commerce Clause argument, reasoning
that the Indiana legislation did not subject corporations to inconsistent
regulations because the statute only applied to corporations chartered in
the state and not to foreign corporations that might have to comply with
more than one set of regulations.23 1 The Court went on to analyze the
state's interest in chartering and regulating corporations, especially the
voting rights of shareholders. The Court held that the Indiana statute did
not prohibit tender offers for corporations subject to the control share
provisions. 232 Although the legislation may decrease- the number of
226. Id. at 78-79.
227. Id. at 82-83. The Court contrasted the Indiana statute, which did not give
management or the offeror an advantage in communicating with shareholders, and the
state statute reviewed in MITE, which favored management by prohibiting offerors
from communicating with shareholders and allowed the state government to interpose
its views of the transaction. Id. at 83.
228. Id. at 84-85.
229. Id. at 85.
230. Id. at 86.
231. Id. at 89. The Court emphasized that "[n]o principle of corporation law
and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic
corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders." Id.
The Indiana statute upheld in CTS was at best a mild deterrent on tender offers. The
legislation even had a beneficial effect for offerors because it provided a mechanism
to force a shareholder vote to consider a hostile bid that management would other-
wise never permit. See Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes L supra note 71, at 1668 &
n.82.
232. 481 U.S. at 89-93.
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successful tender offers, such an effect does not invalidate the statute
under the Commerce Clause.233
CTS makes clear that state regulation of the internal affairs of do-
mestic corporations does not always violate the Commerce Clause.2"
The preemption analysis, however, is more problematic. The Indiana
statute was clearly passed to protect in-state corporations from takeovers
by making them harder, or at least more cumbersome, to consummate.
Yet, the Court chose to focus solely on the shareholder protection aspect
of the statute to support its conclusion that the law favored neither
management nor offerors in conformity with the Williams Act neutrality
policy. The Court then reviewed two factors supporting its preemption
analysis: first, Congress did not intend to preempt all state regulation in
this area, recognizing the state's pervasive control of corporate law, and
second, any delay caused by the Indiana statute presented only a de
minimis conflict with the Williams Act.235 CTS does not state how the
factors relate to one another or whether both factors must be satisfied
for a state statute affecting takeovers to avoid preemption. The preemp-
tion discussion in CTS appears to be deliberately vague in reaching its
conclusion. The decision does not state what principles lead the court to
find no conflict between the state and federal laws. This approach has
been attributed to the Court's desire to retain flexibility for lower courts
and itself in reviewing future challenges to state antitakeover laws.236
233. "Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the number of successful
tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not offend the Commerce Clause."
Id. at 94 (citation omitted).
234. See Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes 1, supra note 71, at 1677-78 & n.
133 (although CTS applies two Commerce Clause analyses, one can predict that courts
will uphold internal affairs antitakeover laws and strike down laws regulating foreign
corporations under the Commerce Clause). The Commerce Clause portion of the opin-
ion is not a model of clarity, however, because the court appears to apply a tradition-
al balancing test to review the Indiana legislation in addition to finding that the law
only regulates the internal affairs of domestic corporations. The court never states ex-
plicitly that it is undertaking a balancing test, making it difficult to determine what
principle should guide the review of other state regulations. See 481 U.S. at 95
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (balancing inquiry is ill-suited to judicial function);
Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes I, supra note 71, at 1677; Sroufe & Gelband, supra
note 218, at 905 (court did not expressly apply balancing test). Lower court decisions
after CTS support the proposition that statutes regulating takeovers of corporations in-
corporated in another state will not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 700 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd, 865
F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989) (invalidating Tennessee antitakeover laws applied to Delaware
corporation); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla.
1987) (invalidating Oklahoma control share law applied to Delaware corporation).
235. 481 U.S. at 83.
236. See Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes 1, supra note 71, at 1683-84. Weiss
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The Court did not limit its analysis in CTS to control share statutes.
The decision allows legislatures to limit takeovers of companies incorpo-
rated in the state by regulating the internal affairs of corporations and
expanding the areas a board may consider in responding to a takeover
to include the interests of other constituencies. Thus, CTS provided the
legal foundation for states to pass legislation that restricts hostile take-
overs. Within two years of the decision, a majority of the states adopted
new laws or amended provisions to strengthen their takeover protections,
including twenty-eight states passing "stakeholder" provisions.237 The
unanswered question after CTS was how far the lower federal courts
would allow states to go in restricting takeovers through regulation of
corporate internal affairs.
2. BNS and Amanda Acquisition: The Limits of State Power
In BNS Inc. v. Koppers Company, Inc.,238 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware considered a constitutional chal-
lenge to Section 203 of the Delaware business combination statute.2
39
Section 203 prevents a business combination between an "interested
stockholder" that acquires more than 15% of the outstanding stock and
the company for three years, unless the transaction comes under one of
the three exceptions to the act's coverage.2" The district court brushed
states,
The Court may have wanted to keep "a seat at the table--a position from
which, without overruling what it had said in CTS, it could hold unconsti-
tutional any state internal affairs antitakeover law that went "too far." In so
doing, the Court also enabled the inferior federal courts to review and
strike down such laws, albeit without much guidance.
237. See Sroufe & Gelband, supra note 218, at 891 n.2 (listing states passing
or amending antitakeover laws after CTS); Lieberman & Bartell, supra note 20, at
154, n.25 (listing states with stakeholder provisions).
238. 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988). BNS made an all cash tender offer
for Koppers at $60 per share, conditioned on a finding that Section 203 was uncon-
stitutional or inapplicable to the offer. 683 F. Supp. at 461.
240. The exceptions to Section 203 are: (1) if the interested stockholder acquires
more than 85% of the stock in the transaction in which the 15% threshold is crossed;
(2) if the.board and two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders approve the business
combination; and (3) if an offer is made after the board approves a friendly business
combination. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a). The statute also permits the board to
approve a business combination if the offeror purchases at least 85% of the stock. Id.
at § 203(b). Delaware had decided against adopting a control share statute similar to
the Indiana legislation because corporate management thought such a statute might
have the effect of encouraging takeovers. Special Report, The Battle Over Tender
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aside the Commerce Clause argument, noting that Section 203 is "exqui-
sitely crafted" to reach the limits of the state's. constitutional power to
regulate corporations. 41 The court's preemption analysis began with the
proposition that a state cannot completely eradicate tender offers because
favoring management to such a degree would violate the Williams Act's
neutrality policy.242 To determine the permissible scope of state regula-
tion, the court proposed a test that a state may enact legislation to re-
strict tender offers "so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to
target shareholders have a meaningful opportunity for success" under the
2,1statute. 43 Adopting the "meaningful opportunity for success" standard
allowed the district court to apply CTS to a business combination statute
that raises a very different preemption problem than the Indiana control
share provision reviewed in CTS.2 4
The Delaware statute obviously favors management since hostile
takeovers cannot be completed for three years unless a significant por-
.tion of the company's stock is purchased or the board agrees to cooper-
ate with the offeror. 245 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in CTS,
the fact that the state legislation conflicts with federal law is not dispos-
itive. Section 203 does not protect shareholders from coercive offers, as
does a control share statute. Yet, CTS found that some interference with
the Williams Act is permissible because of the states' broad power to
regulate corporate internal affairs. 2' The BNS test sets an outer limit
Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Congress, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 60, 63 (Jan. 15, 1988).
241. 683 F. Supp. at 473.
242. Il at 468.
243. Id. at 469.
244. The preemption issue in CTS concerned whether the Williams Act prevent-
ed states from enacting legislation that affects the timing of a tender offer and the
right to vote acquired shares. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. The
Delaware legislation raises the broader issue of whether federal law prohibits states
from imposing conditions on share acquisitions or by regulating corporate management
decisions to limit takeovers. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text. The
Delaware legislation does not interfere with the operation of the Williams Act in any
way, but raises the more challenging issue of whether states have any power to regu-
late takeovers in light of the federal legislation.
245. The district court described the effect of holding constitutional the Dela-
ware business combination statute, stating, "Section 203 alters the balance between
target management and the offeror, perhaps significantly. Yet, the section will be
constitutional notwithstanding its pro-management slant, so long as it does not prevent
an appreciable number of hostile bidders from navigating the statutory exceptions."
683 F.Supp. at 470.
246. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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of interference with the Williams Act, allowing states to regulate take-
overs. BNS requires that states preserve at least a semblance of a market
for corporate control through hostile offers. The district court examined
the three exceptions to Section 203 and concluded that, although the
preemption issue is a close question, the statute allowed bidders a mean-
ingful opportunity to succeed in an offer and therefore the degree of
conflict with the Williams Act did not warrant voiding the statute.247
While the Delaware district court took a measured approach to
CTS, the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took
the Supreme Court's preemption analysis as a signal that all state laws
regulating the internal affairs of corporations do not conflict with the
Williams Act. In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp.,24 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a challenge to Wisconsin's
antitakeover law prohibiting mergers for three years unless the target's
board of directors agrees in advance.24 Amanda had commenced a
tender offer at $30.50 per share for Universal Foods. 2" ° Amanda. sued
to have the statute declared both unconstitutional as a violation of the
Commerce Clause and preempted by the Williams Act. Unlike the Dela-
ware statute, the Wisconsin antitakeover law did not have a threshold
ownership level above which the merger prohibition did not apply, and
a corporation could not opt out of coverage.25'
The Seventh Circuit's opinion by Judge Easterbrook, a leading
scholar on corporate law, begins by lambasting the Wisconsin legislature
for passing the statute, stating that "[i]f our views of the wisdom of
247. 683 F.Supp. at 468-72. Section 203 was held constitutional by two other
judges in the District of Delaware, applying the BNS "meaningful opportunity for
success" test to the statute. City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., 696 F.Supp. 1551
(D. Del. 1988), affd on other grounds, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition
Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F.Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988). The Georgia busi-
ness combination statute, which required the hostile offeror to acquire 90% of the
target's stock to avoid a five-year waiting period, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1132
(1989), was upheld under the "meaningful opportunity for success" test. West Point-
Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F.Supp. 1096, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
248. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
249. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West 1957 & Supp. 1988). The statute ap-
plied to every company incorporated in Wisconsin with its headquarters, substantial
operations, or 10% of its shareholders in the state. Id. at § 180.726(2). The
antitakeover provisions were triggered by acquiring 10% of a corporation's stock un-
less the board approved the transaction before acquisition of the stock. Id at §
180.726(1).
250. 877 F.2d at 498.
251. This statute was among the most extreme of the business combination stat-
utes passed by the states after CTS. 877 F.2d at 498.
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state law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover statute would not survive ....
We believe that antitakeover legislation injures shareholders."" 2 The
power of the legislature to make unwise decisions was not at -issue,
however, and the court turned to the question whether federal law pre-
empted the Wisconsin statute.
The Seventh Circuit first determined that the Supreme Court's
decision in CTS lifted the "weight of precedent" of MITE concerning the
preemptive effect of the Williams Act, thereby freeing the circuit court
to determine what effect the federal law had on the state's power to
regulate takeovers." 3 The court began with the proposition that the
Williams Act regulates only the process of tender offers by mandating
time limits for shareholders to respond and specifying rights of equal
treatment.254 State regulation of internal affairs, such as super-majority
approval of mergers and staggered director terms, and various models of
ownership that do not involve traditional common stock with voting
rights, all. make tender offers less attractive. However, these state law
provisions are not preempted by federal law. More importantly, although
a delay mandated by state law in completing a second stage merger may
depress or deter bids, postponing completion of the bidder's business
strategy does not affect the conduct of a tender offer in violation of the
Williams Act.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis leads to the rather simple point that
"[o]nly if the Williams Act gives investors a right to be the beneficiary
of offers could Wisconsin's law run afoul of the federal rule. No such
entitlement can be mined out of the Williams Act, however. '255 The
252. Id. at 500 (footnote omitted). Ignoring its own admonition, the court then
attempts to instruct legislators (and perhaps future judges) about the value of an un-
fettered market for corporate control, a position Judge Easterbrook powerfully argued
before his elevation to the bench. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note
13 at 164.
253. 877 F.2d at 502-503. The court stated, "The rough treatment our views
received from the [Supreme] Court-only Justice White supported the holding on
preemption-lifts the 'weight of precedent'."(sic) Id. at 503. Weiss describes the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning supporting the analysis of the preemptive effect of the Wil-
liams Act as' "disingenuous." He further describes the Supreme Court's allegedly
"rough treatment" of the circuit court's preemption analysis in CTS as "blatantly inac-
curate." Weiss, Emperor Has No Clothes 1I, supra note 71, at 260-61. Although the
circuit court said that its opinion would "stop short of the precipice," 877 F.2d at
503, the restrictive approach to the preemption issue can only be seen as a leap into
the void of allowing the states unfettered discretion to pass any antitakeover bill that
ostensibly regulates a corporation's internal affairs.
254. 877 F.2d at 503-04.
255. Id. at 504.
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court then made its point even more starkly, stating, "[i]nvestors have
no right to receive tender offers."256 The statute makes tender offers
less likely, and ownership of Wisconsin corporations potentially less
rewarding. Yet, the state legislation does not interfere with the bidding
process once a bidder appears, and therefore is not preempted by the
Williams Act.257
Amanda Acquisition is an opinion seemingly at war with itself
because the circuit court simultaneously excoriates a law it believes to
be bad while adopting a legal analysis allowing states the broadest pow-
er to adopt even more extreme legislation. In addition, the decision
rejected the more measured approach proposed by the Delaware district
court. The Seventh Circuit, or perhaps more pointedly, Judge
Easterbrook is sending a message that he will adopt the starkest position
possible on the preemption issue so that Congress will be forced to
confront the issue of state regulation of takeovers by amending the
Williams Act to prohibit legislative efforts to restrict the market for
corporate control.25 The Seventh Circuit never states the conclusion
256. Id.
257. The Seventh Circuit did acknowledge the BNS "meaningful opportunity for
success" test. The court stated that the Wisconsin statute allowed some chance of
success because a bidder may, for example, operate a target as a subsidiary for three
years, even though that may be a less attractive alternative. Id. at 508. The court also
rejected the Commerce Clause challenge to the Wisconsin statute, noting that it only
regulated the internal affairs of a corporation and therefore would not cause enough
interference with interstate commerce to warrant invalidating the law. Id. at 506. The
court's analysis of the "meaningful opportunity for success" test comes in its review
of whether the statute violates the Commerce Clause. The Delaware district court had,
however, formulated the test as a means to determine whether the statute conflicted
with the Williams Act. BNS, 683 F.Supp. at 469. The Seventh Circuit's logic that a
bidder can overcome the hurdles erected in the Wisconsin statute seems to be an
attempt to acknowledge the BNS decision without overtly rejecting it by addressing
the BNS analysis in connection with an unrelated issue. The court's clear goal is to
confine the role of the Williams Act. Addressing the "meaningful opportunity for
success" test in its proper context would require the court to acknowledge that the
Williams Act has some preemptive effect beyond regulating the process of tender
offers. See Sroufe & Gelband, supra note 218, at 915 (Amanda Acquisition summarily
rejects the "meaningful opportunity for success" test).
258. Weiss accuses Judge Easterbrook of judicial activism in misrepresenting the
plaintiff's claims and addressing arguments in inappropriate contexts. Weiss also ac-
knowledges that the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the preemptive effect of the Wil-
liams Act is certainly not unreasonable. Weiss, Emperor has No Clothes II, supra
note 71, at 258. While the moniker of "judicial activist" may be anathema to many
conservative judges, Judge Easterbrook has proposed that courts and legislatures inter-
vene in the area of takeovers to restrict management's power to resist tender offers.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 13, at 1194 (proposing rule limit-
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this explicitly. However, Amanda Acquisition stands for the proposition
that state regulation of the internal affairs of a corporation will never be
preempted by the Williams Act, no matter whether a tender offer can
ever succeed under the statute, unless the state legislation directly alters
specific timing requirements of federal law. The Amanda Acquisition
test, as formulated here, presents no problem to a state legislature con-
sidering antitakeover proposals because it limits the Williams Act's
coverage to a narrow area of tender offer regulation while the states re-
tain the broad field of "internal affairs" to enact legislation that protects
corporations from unwanted offers.
3. Pennsylvania Takes the Law Even Further
The full extent of a state's power to pass legislation to restrict
takeovers incorporated in that state may depend on whether the laws are
reviewed under BNS or Amanda Acquisition. Yet, both decisions clearly
hold that the states have substantial authority to restrict completion of
hostile offers and effecting mergers. After CTS, more states jumped on
the bandwagon, passing antitakeover laws in response to pressure from
corporations subject to hostile offers and from employees, suppliers, and
communities who believed their economic, well-being was threatened by
the prospect of a takeover. The states expanded their reach under the
internal affairs doctrine beyond control share and business combination
statutes, passing measures expanding a board's power to consider non-
shareholder interests, requiring severance payments to workers laid off
after a transaction, and deterring hostile raids seeking greenmail pay-
ments.259 State legislatures passed many of these laws to protect spe-
cific corporations from threatened or actual hostile offers.2"
ing management's power to defend against tender offers). Johnson and Millon also
argue that the Williams Act does not preempt state regulation of takeovers, although
their political agenda is quite different from Judge Easterbrook's. They support the
movement by states to protect non-shareholder interests through restrictive legislation.
See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 15, at 1868 (no
credible support for finding preemption of state antitakeover legislation in Williams
Act). It is interesting to note that the same legal analysis of the Williams Act is used
by scholars with such diametrically opposed positions as Judge Easterbrook and John-
son and Millon.
259. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, §65 (Supp. 1991) (nonshareholder protec-
tion); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin 1992) (nonshareholder protection);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (nonshareholder protection), § 2572 (greenmail protec-
tion), § 2581-83 (severance payment to any worker terminated within one year of a
control share fight) (Purdon Supp. 1991).
260. See supra note 19 (listing states that passed antitakeover legislation to
protect a particular company in the state).
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Perhaps the most far reaching antitakeover statute is Pennsylvania's
legislation adopting a traditional control share provision similar to the
Indiana law approved in CTS but also extending the reach of the state's
power to deter hostile transactions through new approaches. Like many
other statutes protecting a specific company, the Pennsylvania
antitakeover provisions were enacted in 1990 to thwart a hostile offer by
the Belzberg family for Armstrong World Industries.26' The law re-
quires that any controlling person or group acquiring or disclosing an
intention to acquire 20% of a corporation, or to otherwise seek control
of the corporation, must pay the target corporation all profits from sales
of stock the target corporation's consulated between two years before
and eighteen months after the purchaser becomes the controlling person
or group. 262 The disgorgement provision is not limited to hostile of-
fers, but also covers proxy contests for control and friendly offers. The
ostensible purpose of the provision is to prevent "greenmailers" and
other corporate raiders from putting a corporation into play. However,
the provision is not narrowly tailored to meet that purpose.263 Other
provisions of the Pennsylvania law allow directors to fulfill their fiducia-
ry duties by considering the effect of a transaction on non-shareholders,
the short and long-term interests of the corporation, and the intent and
conduct of a bidder in responding to an offer.2' Moreover, the board
is not required to put the interests of shareholders before than those of
any other group.265 Finally, Pennsylvania provides a "tin parachute" of
severance pay based on the number of years worked to those employees
terminated within ninety days of the acquisition of a control share of the
261. See Klein & Greenbaum, Many Pa. Companies Opt Out, Nat'l L.J., Sep-
tember 10, 1990, at 15, col. 2; Zweig, Socialism, Pennsylvania Style, FORBES, May
14, 1990, at 42; Franklin, Tough Takeover Statute: Critics Say Pennsylvania's New
Law Is Extreme, N.Y.L.J., May 3, 1990, at 5. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to consider a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Pennsylvania antitakeover provisions because the tender offer for
Armstrong World Industries had lapsed. Therefore, the district court determined that
the claim was not ripe for adjudication. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Adams,
No. 90-2920 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1991) aff'd, 961 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1992).
262. PA. CONS. STAT. § 2573 (Purdons Supp. 1991).
263. Shargel & Mitchell, Pennsylvania's New Anti-Takeover Legislation, 24 REv.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 7, 9 (Jan. 9, 1991); Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 261,
at 29.
264. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (Purdon's Supp. 1991).
265. Directors of the corporation shall not be required "to regard any corporate
interest or the interests of any particular group affected by such action as a dominant
or controlling interest or factor." Id. at § 1715(b).
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company's stock, or two years after the acquisition. 26 The new reach
of the Pennsylvania antitakeover legislation may have depressed the
value of the stock of companies incorporated in the state,267 generating
pressure on a number of large companies to opt out of coverage of all
or parts of the law.2
Assuming their company is not subject to an actual or potential
unwanted offer, the expanded protection from hostile offers enacted by
the states often presents management with a hard choice, as shareholders
pressure management not to accept the shield provided by the law.
Meanwhile, stakeholders generally support these provisions and clamor
for greater protection. The market for corporate control forces manage-
ment to make explicit where its sympathies lie because the new statutes
have nothing to do with shareholder protection, a misnomer often ap-
plied to second-generation statutes to hide the true purpose of the leg-
islation.2 ' If management opts for the protections offered by the state
legislatures, as many have done, the key issue is determining what
stakeholders have gained through the political exercise of enacting
antitakeover laws, and whether shareholders have lost anything in the
process.
B. The Balance Between Shareholders and Stakeholders.
The expanded scope of state antitakeover legislation after CTS has
altered the balance in corporate law from the simple dichotomy of man-
agement and shareholders to a complex set of relationships between a
corporation, the shareholders, and the variety of interest groups falling
under the label of stakeholders.20 At this stage of corporate law's de-
266. Id. at § 2582(a).
267. See Demick, Study Links Loss By Pa. Stocks to the Takeover Law, Phila.
Inquirer, October 14, 1990, at DI (study estimated Pennsylvania companies lost 9% of
value after introduction of legislation, compared with 3% loss of other stocks); Zweig,
supra note 261, at 43 (study of Pennsylvania companies shows stock prices lagging
market by 2-3%).
268. See Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 261, at 15 (many companies an-
nounced they opted out to remain attractive to investors, although some felt
disgorgement and control share provisions may also have been threatening to man-
agement).
269. See Garfield, State Competence, supra note 19, at 559 (true motivation for
state legislation is protection of large local employers threatened by takeovers); John-
son & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 15, at 848 (principle aim of state laws
is not to maximize share value but to protect non-shareholders from disruptive impact
of restructuring); Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 19, at 468
(statutes protect interests of individual firms rather than interests of public or share-
holders).
270. Coffee argues that corporate law has become a multi-player game in which
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velopment, shareholders have seen their position eroded by the states
through the antitakeover and nonshareholder constituency statutes permit-
ting a board to consider other interests, and by the courts. The Time
opinion grants management broad power to respond to "threats" to the
corporation and its constituencies without considering the shareholders'
desire to sell their shares. While shareholders appear to have lost some
of their standing, it is not clear that stakeholders have truly gained any-
thing in a process enhancing management's power to control the corpo-
ration.
1. The End of Shareholder Primacy
An increase in management's power to run the corporation is not a
novel phenomenon. As discussed in the earlier review of the status of
corporate law before the mergers and acquisition boom, management had
broad power to respond to offers under Cheff. In addition, the proxy
rules and the business judgment rule worked decidedly in management's
favor. One might be tempted to view the result of the legal and legisla-
tive changes as much ado about nothing, a facade behind which the
power of incumbent managers remains once and forever protected. That
analysis, however, ignores the reality of the corporate restructuring that
occurred in the 1980s, including displacements, enormous wealth trans-
fers, and its effect on the basic rationale of corporate law.
The new emphasis on the rights of stakeholders means that share-
holders can no longer claim to be the primary beneficiaries of the cor-
porate enterprise. 27 The corporate entity exists to serve a number of
interests and represents an investment by more than just the equity own-
ers. Employees have firm-specific capital investments in a company.
Bondholders have an interest in the continued operation of the corpora-
tion in approximately the same form to ensure repayment of debts. Sup-
pliers seek stability of demand for products and services. Communities
want the presence of the corporation or its operating subsidiaries for the
continued contributions to the public good.272 The current change in
corporate law is the explicit acknowledgement that the board must now
management, shareholders, and different stakeholder groups form shifting coalitions to
protect. their interests. Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 211, at 1496-97. Coffee
provides a number of important insights into how two or more players will bargain to
reach a desired result that may negatively affect the player cut out of the process, re-
sulting in choices that are individually rational but collectively irrational. Id. at 1545.
271. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223, 242 (1991)
[hereinafter Millon, Corporate Law] (shareholder constituency statutes "clearly reject
shareholder primacy as the guiding principle" of corporate law).
272. Id. at 234-35.
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account for these interests in making decisions. A key question not
addressed in the shift away from the older focus on the shareholder-
management relationship is where shareholder interests reside in the
panoply of interests management must consider.
Professor Millon argues that the nonshareholder constituency stat-
utes and the Time decision demonstrate the shift away from a private
law conception of the corporation to a public law approach. 73 Rather
than viewing the corporation as a private ordering between management
and shareholders, the law is beginning to acknowledge the public nature
of the corporation that involves obligations to communities and the other
constituencies with an interest in the firm. 274 The preeminent position
of the shareholders cannot continue because a corporation has duties be-
yond the short-term wealth interests of the owners of its equity, which
constitute only one investment in the corporation. This approach has
strong historical roots in the nineteenth century conception of the corpo-
ration as a creation of the state in the public's interest.2" The move
away from shareholder primacy means that the interests of other con-
stituencies may be considered in corporate decisions. It is not clear,
however, what that additional consideration involves, or what a board
should do to respond to the new conception of corporate law.
While shareholders no longer have the primary claim on the corpo-
ration, no one advocates that their interests be removed completely from
consideration. The states have not, however, given any content to the
new regime of nonshareholder interests by designating whose interests
are of greater or lesser importance or what circumstances require consid-
eration of one group's concerns over another.2 76 To announce that
shareholders are one among equals means that there is no hierarchy to
weigh the interests of the different competing interest groups. Manage-
ment would be left to reach decisions that may favor one group over
another without any principled basis to support its decision. 277 Corpo-
rate law will have to regulate a series of relationships without any val-
ues assigned to different interests. Therefore, it would be impossible to
make a fair judgment of management's decision that may favor one con-
stituency over others.278
273. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 15, at 252-53.
274. 1d
275. Id. at 209-10; see also Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theo-
ry: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U.L. REv. 806, 842-44 (revival of earlier
theory that corporation is creature of state and ultimately dedicated to interests of
society as a whole).
276. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 15, at 243.
277. Id. at 245.
278. See Millon, Corporate Law, supra note 271, at 243 (statutes offer little if
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2. Enforcement of the New Corporate Rules
A leading corporate law practitioner argues that there is little
chance the meaning of the nonshareholder constituency statutes will be
tested in the courts because "only a reckless corporate advisor would
permit board minutes, or an accurate rendering of the advice given a
board, to suggest that the board put non-shareholder interests before
those of shareholders." 279 The new constituency statutes may be mean-
ingless if corporate boards simply ignore them, considering them little
more than a legislative bone thrown to whining interest groups. That
attitude may be overly cynical, but it demonstrates the more telling
argument that shareholder constituency statutes grant management unfet-
tered power to make decisions with no principled check on a board if
shareholders are not the primary beneficiary of the corporate enterprise.
Managers that can respond to the demands of multiple constituencies
with equal claims are accountable to no one.280
any guidance as to how management should exercise its discretion in considering
nonshareholder interests).
279. Sommer, Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 43-44 (1991). Mr. Sommer is a
former commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission and a widely recog-
nized expert on securities and corporate law.
280. See Carney, Defining Constituencies, supra note 21, at 419 ("there is no
rational way for managers to consider the relative preferences of multiple constituen-
cies"); Ribstein, supra note 21, at 149 (-Instead of following an explicit standard of
maximizing shareholder welfare, the managers can hide behind vague duties to con-
flicting groups."); Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 21,
at 127-28 (legislation provides no real protection to constituencies, but only fosters
management entrenchment); Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 19, at
477 (state legislation is "positively detrimental" to shareholders by granting power to
management to negotiate on their behalf); Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra
note 13, at 1191-92 (manager responsible to two conflicting interests is answerable to
neither). The contractarian approach to corporate law rejects the nonshareholder con-
stituency statutes as an ineffective means to protect interests which can be better
served through judicial enforcement of private contracting arrangements. Carney, Agen-
cy Cost Model, supra note 5, at 387-88 (constituency representation on board will not
add to protection of contracts); Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note
3, at 174-76 (contracting process generates results superior to governmental regulation
of rights in corporation).
Millon argues that the constituency statutes should be interpreted by courts
to limit management's right to ignore the concerns of non-shareholders in pursuing a
course of action that will benefit the short-term interests of shareholders. He argues
that the non-shareholders should have a right to sue for management's failure to con-
sider their interests in reaching a decision. Millon, Corporate Law, supra note 271, at
265-76. Millon analyzes the fundamental problem with the constituency statutes, that
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Professor Johnson, a leading proponent with Millon of
nonshareholder constituency statutes, acknowledges that protections under
constituency statutes are indirect because legislation can only impair the
shareholders' autonomy to accept an offer and sell their stock.28' The
indirect protection comes through the board of director's broad power to
resist an offer and prevent shareholders from selling their stock to an
offeror. Therefore, non-shareholders depend on the board for protec-
tion.282 This result is anomalous in comparison with the tenet of cor-
porate law that management's power must be restrained by imposing
fiduciary duties. One can argue that management is still governed by the
same fiduciary duties. However, now they also apply to decisions to
protect non-shareholders. Nonetheless, that approach fails because man-
agement must serve two conflicting interest groups-shareholders and
stakeholders. Any decision will usually prove costly to one group. The
premise of the constituency statutes is that management must have virtu-
ally unchecked power to decide between competing interests and, if
necessary, reject a transaction that enriches some and harms others. That
position is at odds with the rationale of imposing fiduciary duties, which
impose certain accountability requirements on management and the board
to justify decisions as the proper exercise of business judgment on be-
half of parties owed the duty.
Rather than argue that state statutes protect non-shareholders direct-
ly, Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum recognize that the goal of
constituency statutes is only to "permit directors to take into account the
interest and role of non-stockholder constituencies in the corporation's
long-term vitality." 283 State statutes are not for the protection of non-
shareholders per se, but are designed to permit directors to focus on the
corporation as a business enterprise.28 All constituencies will benefit
from board decisions that will strengthen the corporation for the long-
they do not provide any enforcement mechanism requiring management to consider
nonshareholder interests. Id. at 226. Even if a court were to allow non-shareholders to
sue management under the constituency statutes, expanding the right to seek legal re-
dress for business decisions may not be the best method of promoting the corporate
enterprise. Millon acknowledges that a more radical restructuring of corporate law may
be necessary to protect the interests of all persons with investments in the corpora-
tion. Id at 276-77 (current corporate structure may be replaced with one in which
decision-making power is distributed downward to include employees and non-share-
holders).
281. Johnson, The Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 15, at 888 n.86.
282. Id.
283. Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2,. at 215.
284. Id.
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term, rather than transactions that only serve the short-term orientation
of shareholders." 5 This conception of corporate law places its highest
trust in management to weigh competing interests. This position is not
troublesome, according to Lipton and Rosenblum, because charges of
managerial self-interest and entrenchment are "simply unfounded." 28 6
Reliance on management, to protect the interests of non-shareholders
often rests on denigrating shareholders' interests in the corporation.
Lipton and Rosenblum support their argument in favor of management
by disparaging shareholders as having as much interest in the corpora-
tion as,
[t]he holder of a betting slip views a racehorse. Just as the bettor
does not really care about the fate of the racehorse as long as it
provides him a financial payoff, so too the stockholder/investor does
not really care about the fate of the corporation as long as the stock
generates a profit.2"7
This description may fit stock arbitragers. But such an overly broad
indictment of shareholders and their reasons for investing includes, for
example, the employees and management of a corporation who own
shares in their corporate employer. It is doubtful that they look upon
their investment as a chance to emulate the sport of kings. Moreover,
nonshareholder concerns are generally portrayed as much more worthy
than the shareholder's mere investment of money because the
corporation's constituencies are much broader and even represent the
general welfare. Attacking the motives of shareholders or comparing the
relative value of the interests of different constituencies does not resolve
the issue of managerial accountability unless one begins with the as-
sumption that managers are sufficiently attuned to the interests of all
constituencies to protect each of them. Alternatively, one can assume
that the emerging corporate order will impose a new structure on the
corporation as a substitute for the generally ineffectual power of share-
285. "[T]he ultimate goal of corporate governance is the creation of a healthy
economy through the development of business operations that operate for the long
term and compete successfully in the world economy." Id. at 189.
286. Id. at 195; see also Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point, supra note 15,
at 853 (simplistic equation of management sponsorship of antitakeover statutes with
selfish entrenchment may be questionable).
287. Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2, at 194 (citing
Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST 8 (May 5, 1990); see Norwitz, supra note 21, at 387
("For the overwhelming majority of the time, the shareholder is merely one type of
investor, usually with a diversified portfolio, and so with a smaller interest in the fate
of any one company than that company's employees, creditors, support industries or
perhaps even customers.").
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holders to constrain management.
The rationale for protecting nonshareholder interests is to limit
damage from corporate restructuring caused by, among other things,
hostile takeovers. In order to protect those interests, the corporation must
be shielded from any threats that will cause disruptions in relationships
that have emerged with the various nonshareholder constituencies. Millon
reads the Time opinion as an "endorsement of corporate management's
power to favor stability and gradual adaptation to consumer preferences
over' short-term shareholder gain ... ."" These preferences may
allow protection of any substantial company which is an established
feature of the corporate landscape from the damaging effects of a hostile
offer. Similarly, Lipton and Rosenblum argue that the corporate gover-
nance structure should be altered to provide management with the sta-
bility necessary to achieve long-term operating successes with a corpora-
tion."' The goal of protecting nonshareholder interests seems to be
designed to preserve the status quo for corporations. Change should be
resisted unless it is gradual and has the support of management as part
of a strategic plan. Such an approach is extremely conservative, even
reactionary, because, in order to protect relationships built over time, it
seeks to impede the process of change that necessarily occurs in any
economic system. It is not irrational to fear change. But the protection
of nonshareholder interests in the corporation should not be a facade to
protect companies from changes in markets, including changes brought
about by hostile takeovers.
Expanding management's power under the guise of protecting
nonshareholder interests may be to slow the pace of hostile offers. Yet,
the disruptive effects of corporate restructuring have not stopped. The
banking sector currently has seen consolidation of large money-center
banks through friendly mergers. The primary motivation for these trans-
actions is to cut costs by eliminating duplicative operations, such as
branches and back-office operations.290 One obvious effect of transac-
288. Miflon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 15, at 258.
289. Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2, at 189.
290. Three large bank mergers announced in the summer of 1991 involved
Chemical Bank and Manufacturers Hanover in New York, NCNB and C&S/Sovran in
the southeast, and Bank of America and Security Pacific in California. The parties
justified the transactions as moves that will generate savings through consolidating
operations. See Hector, Do Bank Mergers Make Sense?, FoRTUNE, Aug. 12, 1991, at
71 (Chemical-Manufacturers Hanover merger will close 70 branches and lay off 6,200
employees, generating savings of $650 million per year); Mitchell, Hamilton, Kerwin
& Glasgall, Bank of America's Big Bang, Bus. WEEK, Aug 26, 1991, at 25 (Bank of
America - Security Pacific merger will involve $1 billion of cost cutting per year
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tions premised on realizing cost savings is the disruption of longstanding
relationships, through employee layoffs and reduced presence in com-
munities. Constituency statutes do not specifically address friendly trans-
actions, and nonshareholder interests do not appear to be a check on
management's decision to pursue transactions that involve disruptions
through consolidation of operations that create gains by cutting expenses.
The position of stakeholders after the legislative and judicial deci-
sions recognizing their interests in the corporation does not appear to
have changed in any significant way because non-shareholders ultimately
depend on management for protection of their interests. This position
does not entail any real change in corporate law in place prior to the
mergers and acquisition boom. The state statutes do not impose any
additional duties on management commensurate with the expanded pow-
er to consider the interests of other constituencies. On the other hand,
sharehoiders have lost ground because corporate law is no longer a
simple balance between management and owners of the corporation,
with shareholder primacy the governing principle. Both Time and the
constituency statutes mean that shareholders must fight for recognition of
their position rather than assuming any corporate decision will be for
their benefit. The corporate law system has been inexorably changed by
the battle for corporate control in the 1980s. The remaining question is
how the law will address the tension between management, shareholders,
and stakeholders.291
with 14,000 jobs eliminated over three years); Knight, NCNB to Merge with
C&S/Sovran, Wash. Post, July 23, 1991, at Al (NCNB-C&S/Sovran merger will elim-
inate 9,000 jobs over three years, generating savings of $350 million). Another pro-
posed merger between Bank of Boston and Shawmut Bank that would have generated
large savings through consolidation of operations was called-off in January, 1992. See
Suskind, Bank of Boston, Shawmut Agree on Merger Plan, Wall St. J., Sept. 23,
1991, at A3 (Bank of Boston-Shawmut merger will cut 3,000 positions and generate
$300 million of savings per year); Suskind, Bank of Boston, Shawmut End Merger
Talks, Wall St. J., January 16, 1992, at A3, col. 3 (Shawmut ended merger discus-
sions due to improving conditions in New England economy that lessened the need
for combination). The airline industry is also undergoing consolidation resulting in
large-scale job losses. See O'Neal, Zellner & Payne, The Age of Consolidation: Will
Megamergers Really Make the U.S. Economy More Competitive? Bus. WEEK, Oct.
14, 1991, at 86.
291. The rapid development of new financial products provides an additional
challenge for corporate law to reconcile the demands of investors in the corporation.
Professor Hu argues that financial products embodying both equity and debt features
create difficult problems for determining how management should enhance shareholder
welfare. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation,
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1273, 1306-09 (1991) (prin-
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IV. How CHANGES IN THE MARKET MAY ALTER THE MIX
A. Can Institutional Investors Change the Relationship of Shareholders
with Management?
The classic conception of shareholders as individuals with modest
investments in a variety of companies may never have been a com-
pletely accurate profile of stock ownership in the United States. But in
1950, individuals directly owned over 90% of the equity in public com-
panies.2" By the end of the 1980s, the market had radically changed
with the phenomenal growth in institutional investments. Institutions now
own at least 44% of the total equities in the United States, with assets
reaching approximately $5.7 trillion.293 Not only is the aggregate size
of institutional equity holdings Staggering, approximately $1.7 trillion,
but the assets under institutional management have grown through appre-
ciation and additional contributions. Comparatively, individual investors
have decreased their direct investment in stock.29
The advent of institutional investors affects not only the relationship
between the corporation and its shareholders, but also the marketplace
for securities through the introduction of new trading products. Institu-
tions manage funds on behalf of and owe a fiduciary duty to their in-
vestors. Among the largest institutions are pension funds. Many of these
ciple of shareholder wealth maximization utterly fails to provide management with
useful guidance).
292. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK 1991
5.
293. Id. at 5-6.
294. The equity assets of institutions have grown primarily through appreciation.
The relative holdings of institutions compared to individuals has changed so noticeably
because individuals had net sales of equities of over $750 billion in the 1980s, while
institutions increased their holdings through purchases by approximately $296 billion.
This shift in ownership was exacerbated by a decline in the overall equity market of
over $500 billion through corporate restructuring. Id. at 5, 11.
Institutional ownership in individual companies varies, with a greater concen-
tration in larger public companies. The aggregate size of institutional ownership of
some companies is quite high. For example, in 1989 institutions owned 88% of Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, 71% of Digital Equipment, and 69% of Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A
Summary of Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project, 19-20
& tables 4, 7 (Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of
Law, 1990). The equity assets of different types of institutions as of 1989 has been
estimated as follows: private pension funds/$667 billion; public pension funds/$290
billion; life insurance companies/$116 billion; other insurance companies/$94 billion;
mutual funds/$239 billion; bank trust departments/$305 billion. Id.
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pension funds are governed by federal standards enunciated in ERISA
that require managing assets solely in the interest of the beneficia-
ries. 9 s In order to fulfill their fiduciary and statutory duties, fund
managers seek to spread the risk of investing through diversification of
assets. A prime method of achieving this goal is through index investing
in the equity markets."g Futures and option contracts on foreign mar-
ket indices, debt securities, currencies, and commodities also allow insti-
tutions to hedge their positions and limit their exposure to downside
risks outside the domestic equity markets.
Institutional investors are similar to individual investors in that each
seeks a high return on an investment, and both supported the wave of
mergers and corporate restructurings that transferred substantial wealth to
shareholders. The institutional investor has an added incentive to support
these extraordinary corporate transactions because they provide a conve-
nient means of liquidating a position, at virtually no cost to the fund,
while realizing a substantial gain on the investment.297 The sheer size
of institutional holdings, however, has an important limiting effect on
how large investors can react to changes in a corporation. The tradition-,
al "Wall Street Rule" is that shareholders who do not like management
or are dissatisfied with results should sell their investment. Institutional
investors may not have that option, at least to the extent the individual
investor can liquidate a position.9 " An institution that wants to sell its
295. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988).
296. See, e.g., Bartlett, A California Pension Fund Cuts the New York Umbilical
Cord, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at F12, col. 1 (seventy-seven percent of equity
portfolio of California's largest state employee retirement fund is indexed). Stock
indexes are composites of stocks that represent a portion of the market, such as the
S&P 500, or even the entire market, and will reflect the value of the selected market.
Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 43, at 864 n.3
(citing Clark, Why Dale Hanson Won't Go Away, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, April
1990, at 79.). Indexing means that the investments are passive to the extent that any
change in the components of an index will require an institution to adjust its holdings
by buying or selling shares, but otherwise there is no trading of stocks to increase
gains or limit losses. The securities and commodities exchanges have responded to in-
creased demand by institutional investors for broad market investments by creating
derivative securities allowing investment in an index without actually purchasing all
the stocks that compose a particular index, including indexes on foreign stocks. In-
vestments in index funds can also lower transaction costs because the fund does not
need to pay for securities analysis and trading commissions because index funds do
not require active trading.
297. See Rock, supra note 36, at 484-85 ("Institutional investors receive a clear
benefit from exiting via tender offers: a substantial premium over market price.").
298. See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corpo-
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holdings usually requires block trades that can involve transactions from
10,000 to as many as one million shares. Flooding the market with that
much stock at one time will likely depress its price. If the fund manager
is reacting to negative news, then the downward pressure on the price
will be exacerbated. 2 The option of simply walking away from an
investment that may be souring temporarily is not .feasible for institu-
tions that must weigh the effect of their decisions on a broad portfolio
and, where applicable, the strict duties imposed by ERISA. Moreover,
the institutional investor who indexes a portion of the managed funds
cannot pick and choose the stocks owned in the market composite;
indexes are, by definition, a broad sampling of stocks that include more
than a few lemons. In short, institutional investors cannot shun the equi-
ty market for any length of time without endangering the continued
growth of the funds under management.
The decline in the market for corporate control and the increase in
institutional ownership of stock refocuses the tension between sharehold-
ers and management away from the hostile offer as a means of disci-
plining management and towards reforming the system of corporate
governance. Institutions have become more active in opposing manage-
ment-sponsored antitakeover devices and have sought to make manage-
ment more responsive to the needs of large shareholders.3" The end
rate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288-89 (1991) [hereinafter Liquidity Versus
Control] (institutional ownership of large blocks of stock makes selling out position
hard without substantial price discount); but see Sommer, Corporate Governance in
the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 367 [hereinafter
Corporate Governance] (most institutions express dissatisfaction through- the "Wall
Street walk"). Sommer notes, however, that the trend may be away from selling hold-.
ings in companies. Id. at 376.
299. Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model of stock valuation, all shares are
valued by the market relative to other shares with equivalent risk, and demand for
stock is perfectly elastic. Therefore, under this theory, the sale (or purchase) of a
large block of shares should have no effect on the price. See W. KLEIN & J. COF-
FEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE 323 (3d ed. 1988); Gilson & Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630 (1984). If demand is
inelastic, however, then transactions involving large blocks of stock can exert price
pressure, and institutional investors cannot conduct transactions without considering
whether they will incur additional costs outweighing the benefit of retaining their
investment. See Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra note 214, at 1247 (-Investor demand
for stocks is not perfectly elastic: incremental changes in price produce incremental
changes in quantity demanded.").
300. See, e.g., Anand, Proxy Fight Schedule Looks Quieter Than Last Year's,
INVESTOR'S DAILY, April 3, 1991, at 8 (corporate boards are reacting to demands
from institutional shareholders); Dickson, Shareholders Stand Up and Are Heard FIN.
TIMES, March 4, 1991, at 17 (institutional shareholders are concentrating on proxy
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of the mergers and acquisition boom coincides with the rise of institu-
tional investor activism to influence corporate policy.
Institutions began by opposing antitakeover measures proposed by
management because tender offers are usually beneficial to shareholders.
However, the market for corporate control is an imperfect means of
disciplining management. Accordingly, institutional investors have ex-
panded their horizon to focus on reforming the structure of corporate
governance to increase discipline over management as another method to
improve the performance of their investments. The mechanism for using
their growing power is the proxy process. Recently, institutions have
started to use their voting power to oppose management and support
director slates proposed by insurgents to force management to address
institutional concerns.3°'
Institutional investors may be able to overcome the collective action
problems that plagued shareholders of the earlier era because manage-
ment no longer faces an electorate composed of small shareholders with
little incentive to educate themselves and organize to support alterna-
tives. The problem of rational apathy is not present since institutional
ownership of stocks is not a transient investment. Therefore, fund man-
agers will have an incentive to protect their sizeable investments by
scrutinizing management. The increased concentration of voting power
means that fund managers can more easily organize themselves to effec-
tively influence the corporation. This control diminishes the problem of
free riding because institutional holdings are usually large enough to
justify bearing the cost of collective action.3 2
The involvement of institutional investors in proxy contests has
been "uneven, episodic, and trendy." 3 The process of institutional in-
volvement on any large scale is still in an embryonic stage as different
types of institutions test the best method to exercise their voting power
and influence on corporations, and determine which issues their con-
proposals at companies with poor performance, focusing on executive pay and com-
position of boards).
301. See, e.g., Schine & Zellner, Lockheed: Oh What a Difference a Year
Makes, Bus. WEEK, Feb 25, 1991, at 37 (support for management by institutions in
proxy contest after turnaround in performance one year after institutions supported
outside slate of directors); Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990,
at 66 (describing institutional investors opposing management sponsored antitakeover
provisions and supporting insurgents seeking election to board).
302. Coffee points out, however, that institutional ownership brings with it new
collective action and rational apathy problems limiting the effectiveness of institutions
as corporate monitors. See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 298.
303. Rock, supra note 36, at 451.
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stituencies will support. Consequently, no clear guidelines remain for
institutions.
CalPERS (California Public Employee Retirement Systems), one of
the largest and most active public pension funds, has changed its meth-
od over the past four years from a scattershot approach in supporting
corporate governance proposals to selecting a few, specific companies
that will be the target of its pressure and, if necessary, opposition in the
proxy vote.3 4 Institutional investors have begun to concentrate on in-
creasing management's responsiveness by proposing shareholder advisory
committees to enhance communication about the company from manage-
ment to shareholders, and using secret balloting in proxy votes to dis-
courage management from pressuring shareholders into supporting
management's proposals. The SEC has even responded to increased
political pressure on the issue of corporate governance by proposing a
change to the proxy rules that will require greater disclosure of execu-
tive pay, including stock options that can dramatically increase compen-
sation.30 5
The problem of collective action among shareholders has been
diminished by rising institutional ownership, but it has not been elimi-
nated. Institutional investors must still overcome coordination among
large shareholders and management opposition to institutional involve-
ment. Grouping fund managers under the heading of institutional ihves-
tor implies a unity of interest that not present because the funds serve a
variety of beneficiaries with differing, and sometimes conflicting inter-
ests. Institutional investors entail six different types of organizations:
public pension funds, private pension funds, investment companies,
insurance companies, bank trust funds, and charitable/non-profit founda-
tions and endowments. 3 6
Different types of institutions are subject to different pressures that
affect cooperation in advancing their individual interests. Professor Rock
304. Levin, The Clout of Calpers, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., May 27, 1991, at
16 (CALPERS makes proposals to only 12 companies it judges as under-performing).
305. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Rel. No. 33-6940, 57 Fed. Reg.
29582 (July 1, 1992) (proposed rules will provide clear presentation of executive
compensation); Salwen, Shareholders Likely to Get Vote on Pay, Wall St. J., February
3, 1992, at A3 (SEC proposal is response to political heat on issue that "has reached
searing levels").
306. See Sommer, Corporate Governance, supra note 298, at 362-63. Even
listing six types of institutional investor overlooks differences within groups, such as
public pension funds including states, municipalities, and teacher pensions, and invest-
ment companies, consisting of both open and closed-end funds. Rock, supra note 36,
at 480.
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points out that private fund managers face great costs if they oppose
management, while public pension funds and mutual funds are more
likely to take positions that enhance the position of shareholders.' °7
Within a single corporation the institutional investors may line up on
opposite sides. For example, a proposal recommending that the company
opt out of a state antitakeover law may be supported by public fund
managers because it increases the possibility of a tender offer for the
company. Yet, a corporate pension fund may oppose the proposal be-
cause it is under the direct control of management or subject to pressure
to adopt a position in support of management.308 In that situation it is
misleading to consider institutional investors in that instance as repre-
senting a single interest.
Corporations have stepped up their efforts to keep institutional
investors from opposing the company's proposals. One means for man-
agement to limit institutional power is to retain control of stock voting
rights owned by the company's pension funds and create support groups
on behalf of management proposals at a variety of companies." Man-
agement can also pressure insurance companies and banks to oppose
shareholder proposals with the implied threat that management will
withhold future business if those companies and banks oppose
management's position. ° Public pension funds are generally consid-
ered immune from pressures exerted by management. 3" Yet, even they
may not be able to avoid management's fight to retain control of the
proxy process. It was rumored that California's governor sought to rein
in CalPERS' shareholder activism by changing the fund's board to in-
clude a majority of directors appointed by the governor, who presum-
ably would restrict the huge pension fund's efforts to change the corpo-
rate governance system.312 Public funds are subject to political interfer-
307. Rock, supra note 36, at 469.
308. Id. at 475 & n.99 (private fund managers are subject to the most amount
of pressure to vote with management from client corporations).
309. See Franklin, Voting Proxies: Companies Take Pension Fund Voting In-
House, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1989, at 5 (Business Roundtable urges members to retain
voting rights in corporate pension funds); Sommer, Corporate Governance, supra note
297, at 372 (corporate response to increasing success of shareholder proposals includes
taking back voting rights of pension fund stocks).
310. Rock, supra note 36, at 469-71 (describing various means to pressure mon-
ey managers to support management).
311. See, Sommer, Corporate Governance, supra note 298, at 373; Rock, supra
note 36, at 471.
312. Dobryznski, Grover & Schine, Is Pete Wilson Trying to Mute a Sharehold-
er Activist?, Bus. WEEK, July 1, 1991, at 29.
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ence, and there is no reason to believe that state legislatures willing to
pass stringent antitakeover statutes may not also try to constrain the
independence of pension funds threatening management's prerogatives by
active involvement in the proxy process.31 3 Management's opposition
to the involvement of institutional investors is not surprising because it
threatens management's control over proxy voting and may portend
greater shareholder involvement in reviewing corporate performance.31 4
The important point about shareholder activism, however, is that it
need not be limited to the paradigm of shareholders battling manage-
ment to maintain a thriving market for corporate control. Institutional
investors represent the collective interests of the beneficiaries of the
funds: the stakeholders 'of the corporation. Corporate pension funds
hold the assets of a company's employees, and therefore must work to
protect the interests of those employees, while public pension funds
contain the assets of millions of individuals. Investment companies have
accounts of both individuals and businesses (including retirement* ac-
counts), while mutual life insurance companies invest premiums on
behalf of policyholders. These beneficiaries are the employees, suppliers,
customers, and charitable organizations who have invested firm-specific
capital in the corporation along with the pool of investments managed
by institutions. In most instances, the institutional investor is both a
shareholder and a fiduciary of stakeholders in corporations.
Much of the commentary on institutional investors ignores benefi-
ciaries of the assets and the crucial role the fund manager can play as
an intermediary. Institutional investors can use the proxy process to
oppose management's efforts to stop hostile offers, a position consonant
with their interests as shareholders. They can also use this power to
improve corporate governance so that management goes beyond giving
lip service to the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. Decisions
affecting employees and local communities, such as restructurings and
plant closings designed to cut costs, should be subject to close review
by the board of directors and, where applicable, by shareholders. Greater
institutional involvement in electing directors and increased disclosure of
313. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 599 (public
fund managers need to be good politicians because of potential political* involvement
in decisions).
314. The Business Roundtable warns that "governance by referendum in the
proxy statement can also chill innovation and risk-taking." Business Roundtable, supra
note 4, at 252. Never stepping out of character, the Business Roundtable opposes
changes in the proxy rules all6wing institutional investors to coordinate their actions
without to complying with proxy filing and disclosure requirements. See infra, notes
318-26 and accompanying text (discussing proposed changes to proxy rules).
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management's plans to the public will allow decisions affecting non-
shareholders to be based on a consensus, rather than the power of man-
agement to control a company's operations with minimal board over-
sight.315
The weakness of the constituency statutes can be overcome by
recognizing the obligation of institutional investors to represent their
beneficiaries as both shareholders and stakeholders. Legislative and judi-
cial pronouncements permitting consideration of the interests of non-
shareholders grants a board almost unlimited discretion in making deci-
sions, without meaningful review. Institutional investors can begin to
provide the oversight necessary to police management's decisions since
those institutional shareholders incorporate the interests of stakeholders
in try to achieve a stable healthy enterprise over the long-term. Howev-
er, institutional ownership of stock is not a panacea. The tension be-
tween shareholders and stakeholders will not magically disappear. Nor
will management suddenly become accommodating to institutional share-
holders. It is important to recognize, however, that institutional owner-
ship holds the promise of decreased tension between shareholders and
stakeholders since those interests must coexist in the funds managed by
institutions. Institutional investors are in the equity .market for the long-
term, and will be a presence in corporate board rooms and proxy con-
tests for the foreseeable future.3"6 These investors have every interest
in protecting the rights of shareholders to choose to accept or reject a
tender offer while also ensuring that corporations are managed to protect
the interests of those who invest in the fund. Institutional investors can
bring a greater measure of societal orientation to corporations.
The mere fact of large-scale institutional holdings will not, of its
own accord, overcome management's opposition and the legal obstacles
to collective action. Among the most frequently cited barriers to institu-
tional cooperation are the proxy rules promulgated under the federal
securities laws.3 17 The SEC responded to requests by institutional in-
315. This understanding of the dual role of institutional investors as shareholders
and fiduciaries for the owners of the assets does not overlook the problem that fund
managers are generally not directly accountable to contributors. While federal and
state law imposes certain duties on the managers, there is no direct accountability
similar to a shareholder derivative suit. See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra
note 298, at 1335 (public pension funds have been most active in corporate gover-
nance movement, but are the least accountable to their beneficiaries).
316. See Fromson, supra note 301, at 67 (quoting public pension fund manager
that fund will not sell its stake if it disapproves of the company's performance but
will "stay and work with management"); Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note
298, at 1339 (indexed investors tend to hold stocks for the long-term).
317. See, e.g., Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 536
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vestors to reform the proxy system. In 1992, the SEC proposed amend-
ments to its proxy rules that would facilitate communications between
shareholders without requiring compliance with the rules' filing and
disclosure requirements." 8 The Commission's efforts are an important
first step in swinging the pendulum of corporate law away from man-
agement and in favor of institutional shareholders who also represent
stakeholders' interests in an enterprise.
The proposed rules contain a crucial change .in the proxy rules that
would significantly lower the barriers to cooperation by institutional in-
vestors." 9 "Disinterested" shareholders who have no economic interest
in the subject matter of the proxy, other than their ownership of securi-
ties, would be exempt from the proxy rules so long as the shareholders
do not solicit a proxy, consent, or authorization.320 This rule allows
any person or group, including, institutional investors, whether or not
they are shareholders, to communicate with other shareholders about a
proposal in a proxy statement, including how to vote the proxy.32 The
(proxy rules impose costs, delays, and legal risks on shareholder communication);
Rock, supra note 36, at 478 (substantial legal impediments to collective action include
proxy rules); Sommer, Corporate Governance, supra note 298, at 368 (SEC rules are
obstacles to concerted action); Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction,
HARV. Bus. REV., March 1990, at 52 (proxy and disclosure requirements restrict
shareholder communications); but see Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director, supra note 44, at 895 (compliance with proxy rules not a significant burden
to electing a minority of professional directors).
318. Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-30849, 57 FED. REG. 29564 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 240) (July
2, 1992) [hereinafter Proxy Proposal]. Proposals to reform the proxy rules in favor of
institutional investors came from CALPERS, the United Shareholders Association, and
Fidelity Management & Research Co., a large mutual fund company. The Business
Roundtable, among others, opposes the proposed modifications, arguing that the recent
successes of institutional shareholders demonstrates the adequacy of the proxy rules.
The Business Roundtable believes that the proxy amendments will allow institutional
investors to have "secret back-room dealings," presumably without management's con-
sent or knowledge, although it is not clear who else will be in the room conniving
with institutional investors. Business Roundtable Criticizes SEC Plan on Shareholder
Data, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1991, at A4, col. 4. The SEC originally proposed chang-
es to the proxy rules in favor of institutional investors in 1991, and reissued them
after certain modifications in 1992. Proxy proposal, supra, at 29566-67.
319. Two other changes proposed by the SEC would eliminate staff review of
certain types of material related to a proxy solicitation and make public the initial
proxy filings. Proxy Proposal, supra note 319, at 29568.
320. Id. at 29,577 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)). There is no
filing requirement if the exempt solicitation is oral or by means of publication in the
media Id. at 29,578 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 14a-6(g)).
.321. Those who would not be "disinterested" are defined in the proposed rules
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SEC stated that the broad interpretation of "solicitation" under the feder-
al securities laws may deter some communication, with the proposed
rules permitting shareholders to communicate without abandoning the
flexible meaning of solicitation.322
The SEC's proposed rules would eliminate a significant constraint
on institutional cooperation by lowering the costs of communicating,
encouraging shareholders to undertake the costs of opposing management
and proposing alternatives. 323 The potential for greater involvement in
corporate governance increases if some form of the proposed rules are
eventually adopted because the changes will permit institutional investors
to assert their roles as both shareholders and representatives of
stakeholders.
The prospect of institutional involvement in corporate governance
through the proxy process presents a substantial challenge to manage-
ment, and an opportunity to foster closer cooperation between the corpo-
ration and its shareholders. Two recent articles discuss the possibility of
greater institutional involvement in overseeing the corporation and work-
ing with management to enhance the value of investments in equities.
One proposal, put forth by Lipton and Rosenblum, recommends a five
year term for directors with no non-consensual changes in the company
or its board.324 After the five year term, the company would provide a
detailed report describing its performance over the past five years and
forecasting operations for the next five years, including the expected
return on investment in the company.325
to include the company, affiliates of the corporation, officers and directors of the
company or its affiliates, any person soliciting proxies in opposition to an extraordi-
nary corporate transaction, and anyone receiving compensation from the company or
its affiliate. Id. Employees of the company would be "disinterested" and could com-
municate with shareholders about a proxy. Id.
322. Id. at 29,566.
323. See Pound, Toward Free Speech in the Proxy Arena, Wall St. J., Septem-
ber 6, 1991, at A8, col. 4 (1991 version of proposed rules will vastly lower costs of
communicating about voting issues and foster incremental participatory corporate moni-
toring).
324. Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2, at 225-26.
Shareholders could only remove directors before the expiration of their term for per-
sonal illegal conduct or willful malfeasance. Id. Extraordinary transactions before the
quinquennial meeting could only occur with the approval of the board. Id. at 226-27.
325. Id. at 226. An independent advisor, such as an investment bank or accoun-
tant, would provide a detailed evaluation of the corporation's report. Id. Any share-
holder owning 5% of the company's shares, or shares valued at $5 million, which
usually encompasses institutional ownership, would have access to the proxy machin-
ery, at the corporation's expense, to support an opposing slate of directors. Id. at 236.
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Gilson and Kraakman approach the corporate governance issue in a
different way, accepting the problem of managerial accountability, re-
jected by Lipton and Rosenblum as "unfounded." Gilson and Kraakman
emphasize the role institutional shareholders can play in electing truly
independent directors who will be accountable to shareholders in over-
seeing management. 26 They propose that institutional shareholders
band together to elect professional directors, each of whom would be a
director for up to six companies and whose position would require the
support of institutions for election and continuation in office.327
The threshold ownership requirement is designed to exclude "gadfly" shareholders
from the process. Id. at 231. Lipton and Rosenblum argue that their proposal will
permit management to focus on the long-term health of the corporation by insulating
them from the debilitating effects of hostile takeovers, which force corporations to
operate for the short-term and ignore the ultimate health of the corporation as a con-
tinuous enterprise. Id. at 224-25. The argument that the threat of takeovers causes
management to focus on short-term gains detrimental to the long-term health of the
corporation has been criticized as operating on a flawed understanding of how a
firm's shares are valued. See Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 19,
at 481 (Mhe distinction between maximizing firm value for the present versus maxi-
mizing firm value for the future is wholly false. What matters in determining the
value of a firm's shares is the present value of all flows-present and future.").
The weakness of the quinquennial proposal is that everything hinges on
creating a system for a meaningful quinquennial election when the pressures of eco-
'nomic change cannot be forced into a five-year time span. The incentive created by
such a system is that management will structure corporate performance and earnings
to show a slow but steady growth, reaching a crescendo during the fifth year. Then
dividends can be arranged to provide their greatest return near election time. Much
like voters in the political arena, management can count on shareholders, even institu-
tional owners, to vote their pocketbooks, even if managing earnings and dividends
ultimately harms the corporation. The independent evaluation of the corporate report
provides only a minimal check on management in much the same way that the valua-
tion of assets during hostile offers can be manipulated to reflect management's wish-
es. The independence of an investment bank or accountant may be open to question
because that firm may seek future employment with the corporation, assuming it does
not have such a relationship at the time of the election.
326. Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 44, at
879.
327. Id. at 885-86. The position is full-time only to the extent that a director
serves on enough boards to equate a professional position. The director's salary and
benefits will be the aggregate payments from the companies on whose boards the
director serves. Id. The directors would be directly responsive to the institutional
shareholders, and could work with management and other independent directors elected
with management support to monitor corporate performance and discipline manage-
ment. Coordination of institutional investors and monitoring professional directors can
be achieved by creating a permanent, institutionalized operation devoted to the task.
Id. at 886-87.
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Although neither proposal is likely to be fully adopted any time
soon, each proposal reflects the radical change in the relationship be-
tween the corporation and its shareholders caused by the rise of institu-
tional investors. 32" The key issue is how great an effect institutional
investors will have on the system of corporate governance.329
B. Will Management Try to Curtail The Right to Vote?
Management will oppose attempts by shareholders to control com-
pany operations, and corporate law is designed to protect the provinces
of each side. Not surprisingly, the law is constantly attempting to bal-
ance the interests of each side as they struggle to assert their positions.
This process is complicated by the presence of third-party stakeholders
seeking recognition of their interests. Management's opposition to insti-
tutional shareholder activism is nothing more than the traditional asser-
tion of power constrained by the requirements of corporate law that
shareholders control certain corporate decisions and may suggest policy
to the board. The SEC's proposed amendments to the proxy rules may
help balance the competing interests by curtailing management's tradi-
tional dominance of the shareholder voting process. If management can
win control of the proxy process by diminishing the voting power of
institutional shareholders, however, the balance of power will have
The proposal for creating a class of directors controlled by institutional in-
vestors has at least two questionable aspects. First, the task of monitoring the direc-
tors is delegated to a new bureaucratic organization because the institutional investors
do not have the time or expertise to conduct that function. But how is the account-
ability of that organization policed: who will monitor the monitor monitoring the
monitors? Second, Gilson and Kraakman argue that it would be difficult for manage-
ment to justify opposing the professional directors. Id. at 893. That assumption may
be naive. Proxy battles between management and dissidents should make even politi-
cians wince. One can almost hear management's arguments to shareholders that these
outsiders are trying to disrupt your company by bringing in hired guns that will only
serve the interests of short-term investors seeking to liquidate the corporation for
immediate gains. Management is unlikely to welcome truly independent directors to
the board and may try to actively obstruct any oversight by professional directors.
328. The quinquennial election program requires legislation at the federal and
state levels, a laborious process. Also, the professional director proposal entails a
substantial commitment of time and resources to coordinate support among institutional
investors and create a structure to actually select and supervise the directors. Gilson
and Kraakman acknowledge that their proposal is not a "panglossian cure," and the
structure may fail to improve corporate performance in every company. Id. at 892.
329. See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 298 (arguing that institu-
tional investors may become effective monitors of corporations if legal rules are
changed and if sufficient incentives are created to overcome collective action and
agency cost problems).
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swung completely away from shareholders. In much the same way cor-
porations adopted antitakeover measures to prevent transactions threaten-
ing to usurp management's power, so too can management undermine
the power of institutional shareholders by diluting or restricting their
voting power.
Some targets employ an antitakeover device creating an ESOP into
which the company transfers a sufficient number of shares to preclude
majority approval of the merger. Likewise, some targets will simply
refuse to tender these ESOP shares precluding the target from gaining a
controlling block.33 In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,3
the Delaware Chancery Court upheld the creation of an ESOP, which re-
ceived 14% of the target's stock, effectively blocking a tender offer.332
Corporations adopted ESOPs as a defensive measure in light of Polaroid
because the plans are perceived to put shares in friendly hands, i.e.
employees, who tend to support management.
ESOPs can also be an effective tool to dilute the voting power of
institutional investors. When a plan is created, shares of the corporation
are transferred to the ESOP and then allocated to the individual partici-
pants according to the provisions of the plan for acquiring shares. The
company appoints a trustee for the plan, with the ESOP holding the un-
allocated shares on behalf of the present and future participants. The
participants control the voting rights of the allocated stock.3 33 A pro-
portional voting provision incorporated in most ESOPs requires the trust-
ee to vote the un-allocated shares in the same proportion as the allocat-
ed shares. 3' The effect of this proportional voting rule provides a sub-
stantial aid to management in a proxy contest.335 Employees tend to
330. ESOPs are benefit plans in which employees may invest in shares of their
employer. Congress encourages the creation of the plans through favorable tax
treatment. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1986); 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (1988). In addition
to ESOPs, employees can invest in their company's stock through profit sharing plans,
stock option plans, and 401(k) contribution plans. Most public companies have some
form of stock investment plan for their employees.
331. 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
332. Id. at 273-4. The Chancery Court applied the entire fairness analysis, not
the business judgment rule, to the decision to create the ESOP. The court concluded
that even under the highest standard, the plan 'was entirely fair to the company's
shareholders. Id. at 276.
333. 26 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1988).'
334. Comment, The Disproportionate Effects of an ESOP's Proportional Voting,
85 Nw. U.L. REV. 824, 828-29 (1991) (citing Welch, Fiduciary Aspects of Employee
Stock Ownership Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 575, 598 (1988)).
335. See id at 838 n.81 (as an anti-takeover device, "proportional voting could
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vote in management's favor, and will be subject to great pressure to
support the company in light of the "threat" that management will de-
scribe if an opposing proposal or slate of directors wins the election.
Proportional voting magnifies the effect of the ESOP because shares that
are not owned by management nor directly controlled by employees can
be effectively controlled through a provision of the ESOP. 336 An
ESOP with a substantial block of stock is a competing institution that
management can rely on to counterbalance some of the voting power of
activist institutional investors. Although the ESOP will not block all
proposals opposed by management, it adds to the pro-management bias
built into the proxy process that institutional ownership is only begin-
ning to overcome.
A greater threat to the voting power of institutional shareholders is
dual class voting stock. Through this stock management controls a ma-
jority of the votes without owning an equivalent amount of the
corporation's stock. A corporation can issue different classes of stock
with different voting rights, such as class A shares with multiple votes
and class B shares with one vote. Management will usually control the
shares with greater voting rights giving it effective control over the
company.337 Similar to ESOPs, dual class common stock can be an
antitakeover device and remains one of the most powerful weapons
against an unfriendly offer because management controls the voting
power necessary to approve any transaction. A hostile bidder cannot cir-
cumvent management's control of the voting power.33
be viewed as the major ESOP mechanism that 'stacks the ESOP deck' in favor of
management."). "
336. The Comment argues that proportional voting violates the exclusive benefit
rule under ERISA because the plan trustee does not act for the benefit of the partic-
ipants and beneficiaries. Instead, the Comment argues, the trustee should disregard
proportional voting provisions and vote the un-allocated shares in the best interests of
the participants and beneficiaries. Id. at 864-65.
337. For a description of the variety of dual class voting structures adopted by
corporations, see Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 134-45 (1987) [hereinafter Dual Class Com-
mon Stock].
338. See Gordon, Shareholder Choice, supra note 38, at 4 (no secret that pop-
ularity of dual class stock is a response to hostile takeovers); Seligman, Equal Pro-
tection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687 (1986) ("Few takeover defenses are more likely to be
successful than dual class capitalization."); but see Fischel, Dual Class Common Stock,
supra note 339, at 149 (equating dual class stock with other defensive tactics is mis-
leading). Professor Seligman notes that Fischel's arguments that dual class common
stock is not predominantly an antitakeover device represents "the triumph of hope
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The NYSE, the nation's primary stock market, has long banned
listing more than one class of common stock with different voting rights
to avoid the wrath of Congress or the SEC, both of which opposed
listings violating the principle of one-share, one-vote.339 In the 1980s,
however, the NYSE proposed a change to its rules eliminating the dual
class voting stock ban because of increased competition from the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ, an automated quotation
system for over-the-counter stocks. Both of these institutions permitted
trading of dual class voting stocks.' The SEC responded to the
NYSE's proposed abandonment of the one-share, one-vote requirement
in 1988 by adopting Rule 19c-4. This rule prohibits all exchanges and
self-regulatory organizations from listing the stock of a corporation that
adopts a provision "with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparate-
ly reducing the per share voting rights" of outstanding stock. 4'
over experience." Seligman, supra, at 703 n.80. Professor Bainbridge argues that the
fundamental problem with creating a dual class stock structure is management's con-
flict of interest in pursuing a transaction to protect management's position when it is
not paying for the voting control through acquisition of a majority. Also,
management's decision is not subject to judicial review. Bainbridge, The Short Life
and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 565, 583 (1991) [hereinafter
Rule 19c-4].
339. Seligman, supra note 341, at 689 (citing NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 301 (1983)). Seligman provides a detailed history of the
NYSE's rule against listing different voting classes of stock that shows the rule's
roots in the 1920s from federal opposition to allowing management to control large
corporations by shutting out small shareholders from any oversight of the company.
Id. at 690.
340. See Gordon, Shareholder Choice, supra note 38, at 5-8 (reviewing NYSE
decision to change rule in response to competition from AMEX and NASDAQ).
341. 17 C.F.R. §240.19c-4 (1991). Rule 19c-4 provides in pertinent part:
No rule, stated policy, practice, or interpretation of this exchange [or this
association] shall permit the listing, or the continuance of the listing, of
any common stock or other equity security of a domestic issuer, if the
issuer of such security issues any class of security, or takes other corporate
action, with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the
per share voting rights of holders of an outstanding class or classes of
common stock of such issuer registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Act.
mhe following shall be presumed to have the effect of nullifying, restrict-
ing, or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of an outstanding
class or classes of common stock:
(3) Any issuance of securities through an exchange offer by the
issuer for shares of an outstanding class of the common stock of the issuer,
in which the securities issued have voting rights greater than or less than
19921
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
In The Business Roundtable v. SEC,342 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia invalidated Rule 19c-4 as beyond
the scope of the SEC's power to regulate the securities markets under
the Commission's authorizing statutes. The SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 to
"ensure fair shareholder suffrage," and argued that Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, granting the Commission power over
proxy solicitation, authorized the issuance of a rule which advances the
purposes of regulating the proxy process.3 43 The SEC also relied on its
rulemaking power under Section 19, permitting the Commission to re-
view and approve regulations of securities exchanges and self-regulatory
organizations. 34  The circuit court rejected the SEC's "immensely
broad" perception of its rulemaking power under Section 19, holding
that if Rule 19c-4 were validated, then the SEC "would be able to es-
tablish a federal corporate law by using access to national capital mar-
kets as its enforcement mechanism. '345 The court' criticized the SEC
for making arguments that took statements out of context. Moreover, the
hostile tone of the opinion makes it clear that the SEC's power to regu-
late voting power apportioned among shareholders is minimal.346
the per share voting rights of any outstanding class of the common stock
of the issuer.
(4) Any issuance of securities pursuant to a stock dividend, or any
other type of distribution of stock, in which the securities issued have
voting rights greater than the per share voting rights of any outstanding
class of the common stock of the issuer.
The SEC also sought to preempt state antitakeover statutes that conditioned the exer-
cise of voting rights on the approval of disinterested shareholders. Rule 19c-4(d)(4)
defined corporate acts in compliance with state law that condition voting rights on
approval by independent shareholders as having the effect of 'nullifying, restricting or
disparately reducing the per share voting rights of listed securities.' Id. at § 240.19c-
4(d)(4).
342. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For a detailed discussion of the decision
see Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4, supra note 341, at 620-33.
343. 905 F.2d at 410 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. at 26,391-92).
344. Id. at 408.
345. Id. at 412. The circuit court noted that "Rule 19c-4 presents the worst of
all possible worlds ... turning regulation of securities markets into the vehicle for
federalizing corporate law." Id. at 412 n.7.
346. The circuit court stated that one SEC argument was based on a gamble
that the court would accept a position based "on a statutory fragment without even a
glance at its context. Wrong court, bad gamble." Id. at 416. The NYSE and
NASDAQ enacted rules virtually identical to Rule 19c-4 prohibiting listing shares of
with disproportionate voting rights. Exchange Act Release No. 28277 (July 27, 1990),
55 Fed. Reg. 31,465 (1990). The NASDAQ rule received temporary approval from the
SEC, while the NYSE rule had been adopted in 1989, before the decision challenging
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Changing a corporation's voting system from one-share, one-vote to
a dual class system with management controlling a majority or signifi-
cant voting block of the votes, requires the shareholders to amend the
corporate charter to approve the creation of a class of shares with en-
hanced voting rights.4 7 If the shareholders approve the change in the
corporate charter, the new class of shares can be distributed through an
exchange offer or a special dividend to shareholders. 4 The possibility
of a corporation adopting dual class common stock to limit the voting
power of institutional shareholders would seem remote because the insti-
tutions will automatically reject any proposal that allows management to
entrench itself. 9 The size of institutional ownership does not, howev-
er, mean that institutions control the corporate voting process. Manage-
ment retains significant structural advantages in voting proxies that
would likely allow it to convince enough shareholders to approve dual
class voting stock. Moreover, the proposal to create a new class of stock
need not, and likely would not, be presented as a naked grab for power
by management. The proposal can be coupled with "sweeteners," such
as increased dividends or a special shareholder payment requiring ap-
proval of the dual class stock as a prerequisite to receiving the benefit.
Institutional and individual shareholders can be swayed by the benefits
of a short-term gain to vote in management's favor, even if the long-
term effect is to diminish their voting power.35
the Rule 19c-4. The AMEX is considering a rule that does not prohibit listing dual
class stock, but allows it if the stock is part of an initial public offering or if the
shareholders vote to approve the creation of shares with disproportionate voting rights.
SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (Feb. 14, 1991).
347. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 345 (3d ed.
1983). The corporate charter may already provide for dual class voting stock. Cur-
rently, a number of companies issue stock with limited voting rights in initial public
offerings in which the original owners of the company retain the voting power.
348. See Gordon, Shareholder Choice, supra note 38, at 40-42 (describing
mechanism for distributing dual class stock); Dent, Dual Class Recapitalization: A
Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 725, 740-41 (1986) (same).
349. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 571 (dual
class stock is a "non-issue" because institutional shareholders will not approve uiless
insiders already control the voting process). Even if insiders currently control the
company, they may anticipate a time when public shareholders will own a majority of
the stock, either through future offerings or potential sales by insiders. The insiders
can insert dual class voting stock into the corporate charter and issue themselves the
new stock in order to maintain control of the voting process once they lose actual
majority ownership of the corporation.
350. See Gordon, Shareholder Choice, supra note 38, at 47-49 (describing effect
of management providing sweeteners on shareholder voting). Gordon also argues that
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The contest between management and shareholders has shifted away
from tender offers. Defensive measures will now entail restricting the
voting rights of shareholders and providing management with greater
control of the proxy process without requiring greater ownership of the
corporation's equity. Although the SEC failed to outlaw dual class com-
mon stock, the proposed proxy amendments can provide institutional
shareholders with a better means to police management proposals that
might diminish the voting power of independent shareholders. Dual class
common stock and the creation of ESOPs to create a block of friendly
shareholders are only two ways to alter the system of shareholder vot-
ing. They certainly do not exhaust the methods by which management
will protect itself from the activism of institutional investors. The history
of takeover defenses shows that management will create new devices to
limit the power' of shareholders in voting their proxies, exacerbating the
tension between management and shareholders.
C. Will the Delaware Supreme Court Try to Retake Its Seat at the
Table?
Increasing institutional investment in equities will change the rela-
tionship between shareholders and management. The courts, primarily
the Delaware courts, will play a crucial role in adjudicating disputes and
determining the relationship between the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. The current lull in takeovers does not mean that tender offers will
never reappear. Challenges to defensive measures will arise in future
contests for corporate control. Courts will also be called on to determine
whether management's attempts to block institutional investors from a
greater role in the boardroom are permissible. The courts must also
decide the extent to which shareholders may be excluded from interfer-
ing in areas of corporate operations traditionally reserved to the board.
The ultimate issues are not different since corporate law must still deter-
mine the contours of the relationship between management and share-
holders. However, there will be more cases concerning the use of voting
power to require management to pursue a particular course of action and
the propriety of defensive measures to limit voting rights. An important
issue remaining after the mergers and acquisitions boom is whether the
Delaware Supreme Court will extend the rationale of Time to give man-
agement broad discretion in pursuing corporate interests without requir-
management can play a game of "chicken" with shareholders to gain approval of dual
class common stock by describing the negative effect on the value of the company if
management's proposal is not accepted. Id. at 49-50.
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ing it to accede to the desires of the corporation's shareholders.
The Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard applies to a board's deci-
sions in the context of takeovers because transactions for corporate
control implicate inherent conflict of interest in the board's decisions
affecting their positions within the corporation. Outside of takeovers,
Unocal may not be implicated. 5' The business judgment rule then ap-
plies to corporate decisions, such as creation of an ESOP, that affect the
voting rights of institutional shareholders. If the Delaware Supreme
Court limits enhanced scrutiny solely to cases involving takeovers, insti-
tutional investors will receive little assistance from the courts because of
the broad protection afforded to management and the board under the
business judgment rule. On the other hand, the court could approach
decisions that affect voting rights of shareholders under the same reason-
ing adopted in Unocal since a decision affecting voting rights may have
been intended to protect management and the board from shareholder
oversight. The potential for management entrenchment pervades any
decision giving management greater control over the process of voting
shares. Therefore, that decision should be subjected to a higher degree
of scrutiny.
Whether or not the Delaware Supreme Court expands the Unocal
analysis beyond the takeover context, Time permits a board to both
pursue a strategic plan without regard for the short-term wishes of its
shareholders and reject an offer without permitting shareholders any
input in the decision.352 The implicit rationale of Time is that manage-
ment and the board should protect shareholders from their own igno-
rance or mistaken beliefs concerning the value of the company and
preserve benefits accruing from adherence to a strategic plan.353 That
rationale should not apply, however, where shareholders are not individ-
uals with little information concerning the company and no incentive to
educate themselves about the value of their investment in comparison to
an outstanding offer. While it is questionable whether any significant
percentage of shareholders can be described as ignorant or susceptible to
coercion, institutional investors are radically different from those con-
351. See Warren & Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial Review of Procedur-
al Defenses in Proxy Contest, 47 Bus. LAW 647, 649 (1992) (both insurgents and
management face evolving standards of judicial review for offensive and defensive
tactics affecting shareholder's franchise in corporate control contests).
352. 571 A.2d at 1153-54.
353. "One concern was that Time shareholders might elect to tender into
Paramount's cash offer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit
which a business combination with Warner might produce." Id. at 1153.
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ceived by the Delaware Supreme Court in Time. Institutions are highly
sophisticated investors with the ability to judge how a course of action
will affect the value of an investment, and perhaps more importantly,
how the time frame for one investment relates to the fund manager's
overall objectives. Institutional investors are not merely short-term own-
ers, who only want an immediate return on their investment. Institutional
investors cannot simply leave the equity market or abandon a company
which they believe will be successful in the long-term.'-
If the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledges that a significant
number of shareholders are institutions, with the expertise to protect
their interests, then courts can abandon the highly paternalistic nature of
the Time opinion. Instead, the focus can shift to the issue avoided in the
Time decision: whether the strategic plan adopted by the board had a
reasonable chance of increasing the value of a shareholder's investment
compared to the value of the outstanding offer. The Delaware Supreme
Court accepted the Time board's argument that the merger with Warner
would create even greater value without requiring management to spell
out how the plan would work, what its assumptions were, and when the
benefits would be reflected in the stock price, the principle measure of
the shareholders' investment.
The key for institutional investors is accurate information from
management from which a rational judgment can be made about the val-
ue of an investment as well as the probability that the stock will pro-
vide a reasonable return. However, Time deprives institutions of the very
information needed most by accepting management's arguments without
requiring the company to put its information on the record. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court can reclaim its seat at the table without rejecting
its decision in Time or even limiting that opinion to the unique facts
present in the case. The court can require a company opposing an offer
under the guise of protecting the interests of the corporation, or attempt-
ing to limit shareholder voting rights if the Unocal standard applies
outside the takeover context, to put forth all the information supporting
its argument that its plan will enhance the corporation's value beyond
that offered by the competing party. This disclosure may include the
board's consideration of the corporation's nonshareholder constituencies'
interests and how the challenged decision will protect those inter-
ests.
355
354. But see Lipton & Rosenblum, Quinquennial Election, supra note 2, at 205-
06 (institutional investors have little inclination to behave like traditional owners of
enterprise, and most will support a hostile takeover or other restructuring -that boosts
immediate price of stock).
355. The position advocated here is similar to the analysis proposed by Gilson
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No manager or board member would dare argue that a long-term
plan will harm shareholders or the value of the company. Yet,
conclusory statements such as those advanced in Time do not provide
any basis for institutional shareholders to judge the adequacy -of
management's plan. Institutional shareholders can analyze the benefits of
the plan and make their decision to support or oppose management if
they know the basis for management's projections of the corporation's
future value. If the information disclosed by management convinces an
institution that continuing its investment is no longer prudent, the insti-
tution could risk selling its investment at a loss. Investors owning shares
of a company solely because of its inclusion in an index will lose some
value. However, they can continue to pressure management to increase
the stock price and will stand ready to support a future tender offer.
By requiring management to disclose the basis for its decisions, the
Delaware Supreme Court can protect the long-term plans of a corpora-
tion while serving. the interests of shareholders, rather than simply deni-
grating. the position of equity investors as it did in Time. This approach
avoids the problem of requiring a judgment of the value of competing
plans since the. court's role is to compel disclosure of the plan's under-
lying rationale and to make a preliminary determination that the plan
meets the requirements of Unocal, that it is a reasonable response to the
threat posed to the corporation. The court polices management only to
the extent of requiring the company to make its position explicit, allow-
ing the market to value the plan.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate law underwent rapid change during the 1980s, and only
now is slowing to allow an assessment of the effects of the mergers and
acquisition boom. In some ways, the emphasis on defensive measures
and enhanced scrutiny only obscured the basic tenet of corporate law:
that managers must be free to conduct the affairs of the corporation yet
are accountable to shareholders. The tension inherent in the separation of
ownership and control has not. been dissipated. Much of corporate law
still revolves around balancing the needs of management and sharehold-
ers. The form of accountability has changed, however, because the cor-
porate law. equation is no longer, limited to shareholders and managers.
It includes nonshareholder constituencies whose claims for attention in
the corporate decision-making process have been recognized by courts
and state legislatures. For better or worse, the interests of non-sharehold-
and Kraakmnan concerning how the courts should apply the Unocal test. See Gilson &
Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, supra note 86, at 272.
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ers are a legitimate concern for the board on a footing that may be
equal to those' of shareholders. Whether stakeholders are better protected
by pursuing contract claims does not change the reality that a majority
of the states permit directors to consider their interests. Moreover, the
board must consider the investment of employees, suppliers, and com-
munities in making basic corporate decisions. Nonshareholder constituen-
cy statutes may have their genesis in the drive by management for
greater protection from takeovers. Yet, the statutes present an opportuni-
ty to shift corporate decision-making to a broader perspective. Further,
states are not likely to reverse their course, thereby requiring corporate
law to adjust to a new environment.
The more subtle change that will ultimately occur is not directly-
attributable to the corporate restructuring of the 1980s, but to a new
pattern of equity ownership. Institutional investors present a new model
of the shareholder. Corporate law must adjust its focus away from view-
ing shareholders as individual owners of small stakes in a corporation
who devote little attention to their investment beyond watching the stock
price and dividend yield. Institutional investors invest their assets into
virtually all parts of the securities markets. Accordingly, institutional in-
vestors must develop expertise to evaluate corporate profitability and
management. These investors represent the concerns of all the beneficia-
ries of the institution's assets as well as the interests of its shareholders.
Thus, institutional investors are uniquely qualified as the best representa-
tive to ensure management's accountability. Managers and boards will
resist institutional involvement in governing the corporation. However,
the new structure of corporate law will not allow them to insulate them-
selves from outside influences. State constituency statutes and institution-
al ownership require management to respond to the interests of both
shareholders and non-shareholders. If the courts require companies to
reveal their strategic plans, the market for corporate control will remain
as a final check on management.
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